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Preface
In the realm of ‘theory’ — the discourse traversing aca-
demic departments and negotiating their interdisciplinary
commerce —, much of the heavy lifting is done by pre-
fix. The claim holds true, or so it may seem, for modern
cultural formations in general: At some point in the nine-
teenth century, the Catholic church developed its habit
of seeing in inconvenient aspects of modernization mere
returns of ancient heresies, denouncing, for example, sec-
ular life as ‘neo-pelagianism’. The prefix ‘neo-’ migrated
beyond apologetics and drove much of the industrially en-
hanced historicist differentiation of ‘styles’ in architecture
and visual culture (‘neogothic’ being the most promin-
ent), spreading through many cultural realms well into
philosophy (‘neokantianism’, ‘neohegelianism’, etc.).1 The
twentieth century added the no less emblematic prefixes
‘anti-’, ‘trans-’, and very soon also ‘post-’ as the ultimate
marker of the quintessentially modern belief in historical
acceleration.2
1 The term ‘neokantianism’ can be dated to 1875, whereas ‘neoplaton-
ism’ emerged in German eighteenth-century histories of philosophy,
by way of a slow and intricate contraction from ‘newer platonians
(Neuere Platoniker)’. See Helmut Holzhey, ‘Neukantianismus’ and
Helmut Meinhardt, ‘Neuplatonismus’, in Historisches Wörterbuch der
Philosophie, ed. by Joachim Ritter, Karlfried Gründer, and Gottfried
Gabriel, 13 vols (Basel: Schwabe, 1971–2007), vi (1984), pp. 747–54,
754–56.
2 The OED dates the first occurrence of ‘post-Impressionist’ and ‘post-
Impressionism’ to 1910, OED Online (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2000– ) <http://www.oed.com> [accessed 3 January 2018].
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Yet the work of theory seems to avail itself of more
refined or better camouflaged prefixes, less explicitly de-
noting a position, historical or otherwise, and marked by
operational pervasiveness rather than thematic exposition.
In these prefixations, the latinate stratum of the English
lexicon is heavily favoured; and latinate prefixes in partic-
ular — such as ‘de-’ and ‘re-’ — boast a morphological
fecundity that allows them to colonize non-latinate parts of
the lexicon as well, pleasantly tingeing scholarly discourses
with the latinate hue of learnedness.
Critics have begun to pay attention to the different
valences these subtler prefixes bring into play in a rather
underhanded fashion. Thus, Rita Felski, in her 2015 mani-
festo TheLimits of Critique, switches into italics to describe
a veritable war of prefixes:
We shortchange the significance of art by focusing
on the ‘de’ prefix (its power to demystify, destabil-
ize, denaturalize) at the expense of the ‘re’ prefix: its
ability to recontextualize, reconfigure, or recharge per-
ception.3
The exclamation is remarkable not just because what is
being advocated for so vigorously is nothing more than a
two-letter prefix, but for the way in which it mobilizes the
ambiguity of the possessive pronoun ‘its’ to drain the sup-
posed ‘significance of art’ into the antagonism of ‘powerful’
prefixes, detaining the detrimental ‘de-’ in brackets, whole-
heartedly embracing the benign ‘re-’ with a colon. Felski’s
poignant question — what’s in a prefix? — casts itself as a
3 Rita Felski, The Limits of Critique (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2015), p. 17. Felski’s book has been widely discussed. See, for
example, the eight responses collected in ‘On Rita Felski’s The Limits
of Critique’, PMLA, 132.2 (March 2017), pp. 331–83, as well as Felski’s
response to them: ‘Response’, ibid., pp. 384–91.
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synthesis of her masterful snapshot of current theorizing,
anchored in a nuanced appreciation of the impact affect
theory has had in many overlapping fields, but in partic-
ular in queer theory (which, in turn, assumed a vehicular
function in the affective turns of various disciplines). Her
observations that the prefix ‘de-’, while engendering for-
midably complex readings, reduces the valuable possibil-
ities of art and politics to their ‘againstness’ and ‘resistance’
and that it frequently feigns a kind of surgical precision, a
neutral negativity, are indeed compelling. Yet they also risk
veiling their own detachments and the inherently unstable
proximity of ‘repair’ and re-doubled negativity, which Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick’s seminal essay playfully evokes in its
subtitle ‘You’re So Paranoid You Probably Think This Es-
say Is About You’.4 Somewhat vexingly, Felski’s ‘suspicions’
about the use of the ‘de-’ prefix proves indeed more il-
luminating than her confidence in the power of ‘re-’ to
conclusively depart from the routines of ‘critical idioms’,
the paralyzing stance of a hermeneutics of suspicion, the
probing pointlessness of close reading, or the reflexes of
ideology critique. The burden is considerable: for Felski —
but she is far from alone in this — ‘re-’ will not only reorient
the humanities, but bridge the divide between the schol-
arly treatment of art and the layperson’s appreciation, and
the even more worrying rift between theory and activism
within feminism and queer movements.
In a subsequent publication, a stunning essay collec-
4 Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, ‘Paranoid Reading and Reparative Reading,
or, You’re So Paranoid, You ProbablyThinkThis Essay Is About You’, in
Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Durham,
NC: Duke University Press, 2003), pp. 123–51. See Heather Love,
‘Truth and Consequences: On Paranoid Reading and Reparative Read-
ing’, Criticism, 52.2 (Spring 2010), pp. 235-41, for a distinctly un-
Manichaean reading of Sedgwick’s essay.
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tion entitled Critique and Postcritique, Felski and her co-
editor Elizabeth Anker toned down the celebration of ‘re-’,
settling, at the very outset of their introduction, on a very
even-handed re-word, though it is still being played against
the chosen prefix of theories past:
We are currently in the midst of a recalibration of
thought and practice whose consequences are dif-
ficult to predict. There is little doubt that debates
about the merits of critique are very much in the
air and that the intellectual or political payoff of
interrogating, demystifying, and defamiliarizing is
no longer quite so self-evident.5
The very circumspect introduction acknowledges the
‘complex temporality’ of the totemistic ‘post-’ suspended
in the volume’s title and generated by the attempt to look
for a ‘postcritique’ that would avoid both being uncritical,
but also sliding back into critique by engaging in a ‘critique
of critique’.6 The difference between ‘recalibration’ and
the meatier ‘re-’words heralded in the earlier publication
signals the richness of ‘re-’, its indeed quite unpredictable,
at times positively erratic behaviour. The same, of
course, could be said about ‘de-’, even if it may have been
favoured in the past, as Felski astutely observes, because
it seemed to offer a clear orientation, a clear pathway to
negation. The two prefixes as well as their relation have
indeed always been more complicated. Gilles Deleuze’s
and Félix Guattari’s play of ‘deterritorialization’ and
‘reterritorialization’, for example, is non-dialectic and
non-antagonistic, yet gives the ‘re-’ little chance to shine
5 Elizabeth S. Anker and Rita Felski, ‘Introduction’, in Critique and Post-
critique, ed. by Anker and Felski (Durham, NC: DukeUniversity Press,
2017), pp. 1–28 (p. 1).
6 Ibid., pp. 1, 2.
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even if the ‘de-’ is encompassed by other re-words, such as
Deleuze’s understanding of repetition; and anyone who
wanted to relate Jacques Derrida’s ‘deconstruction’ to
‘reconstruction’ immediately revealed themselves to be a
retrograde ignoramus.7
This is indeed the zone where the subtle fixations of
prefixation tangle with the Eurocentring totems of peri-
odization, ‘neo-’, ‘post-’, and ‘anti-’, all of which are pre-
ceded by the strange anachronizing gyrations of that mod-
ern master-re-signifier ‘renaissance’.8 And conversely, the
story of ‘de-’ would have to be tracked back, at least, to
Max Weber’s definition of modernity as a ‘disenchant-
ment (Entzauberung)’, which in turn was designed to shift
away from Karl Marx’s ‘Entfremdung (alienation, or, lit-
erally and vexingly, de-alienation)’. Indeed, not only does
Weber’s term resonate in Felski’s critique ‘demystification’,
but her trenchant critique of ‘de-’words strictly aligns with
a grotesque de-lirium of Carl Schmitt’s:
All de-theologisations, de-politicisations, de-
juridifications, de-ideologisations, de-historicisa-
tions, or any other series of de-prefixed entities
[Ent-Entungen] tending towards a tabula rasa are
nullified. The tabula rasa de-tabularises itself and is
erased with its tabula.9
7 Adrian Parr, ‘Deterritorialization/Reterritorialization’ and ‘Repeti-
tion’, in The Deleuze Dictionary, revised edn, ed. by Parr (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 2010), pp. 69–72 and 225–26. Jacques
Derrida, ‘Letter to a Japanese Friend’, trans. by David Wood and An-
drew Benjamin, in Derrida, Psyché: Inventions of the Other II, ed. by
PeggyKamuf and Elizabeth Rottenberg (Stanford: StanfordUniversity
Press, 2008), pp. 1–6.
8 The full ‘anachronic’ potential of the renaissance is unlocked dazzlingly
in Alexander Nagel and Christopher S. Wood, Anachronic Renaissance
(New York: Zone Books, 2010).
9 Carl Schmitt, Politische Theologie II: Die Legende von der Erledigung
jeder Politischen Theologie (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1970), p. 124,
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It should thus be clear that the prefix ‘re-’ should be
pitched against ‘de-’ only with the greatest care and without
smoothing over its rifts or gathering its folds, and without
hoisting a prefix into the dubious realm of the concept.10
Felski’s and Anker’s ‘recalibration’ exercises this care, tak-
ing distance from anything like a restitutio ad integrum.11
Yet the careful withdrawal into a recalibrative use of the
prefix still does not acknowledge the plurivectorial tension
that constitutes ‘re-’, a tension that renders ‘re-’ inescap-
ably multistable, suited indeed for de/constituting wholes
and bringing out their errant underpinnings.12 That the di-
vergences of language and logic can be traced perhaps at
the level of the former’s morphology, perhaps even more
instructively than in the no less uneasy relation between
syntax and predication, has been pointed out by Willard
Van Orman Quine, in his terse essay on ‘Prefixes’:
in English asPoliticalTheology II:TheMyth of theClosure of AnyPolitical
Theology, trans. and introduced by Michael Hoelzl and Graham Ward
(Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p. 128.
10 A fascinating suggestion by Edgar Morin redeemed not only by its
totalizing abandon, but also by its entangling of prefixations with con-
ceptual, ‘de-’-related tensions between physics and biology, opposing
‘re-’ to linear, mechanical determination and embedding it in the ir-
reversible time of entropic decomposition. Cf. ‘RE: From Prefix to
Paradigm’, World Futures, 61 (2005), pp. 254–67 (p. 255): ‘[W]e must
think of RE not as a prefix but as a paradigmatic concept that informs
all our thinking.’
11 As difficult as it may be to resist the lure of a title such as Robert Coyle,
‘RE’: God’s Favorite Prefix (Montgomery, AL: E-BookTime, 2013).
12 Alluding here to a series of ICI Publications is not to suggest that
there is anything linear, let alone necessary, in the sequence of ICI
projects and publications. Cf. Tension/Spannung, ed. by Christoph F.
E. Holzhey (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2010), Multistable Figures: On the
Critical Potentials of Ir/Reversible Aspect-Seeing, ed. by Christoph F.
E. Holzhey (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2014), De/Constituting Wholes:
Towards Partiality Without Parts, ed. by Manuele Gragnolati and
Christoph F. E. Holzhey (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2017).
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Our prefix re- […] is Latin in origin and double in
meaning. It can mean ‘again’, as in recreate and reit-
erate, and it can mean ‘back’, as in rebound. The full
form is red-, and the d is kept before vowels; thus re-
deem (red plus emere, ‘buy back’) and redintegrate.
In French the two senses tend to be distinguished
by the vowel: re- for ‘again’ and ré- for ‘back’. This
could help us remember which words have re- and
which ré-, but regrettably it is not dependable.13
Lack of dependability means something very different to
logicians and to linguists, and the latter would no doubt
add that Quine is mistaken in thinking that even the ‘re-’s
of his English examples had the same vowels — the ‘re-’s of
English vary, at least phonetically, between /ri/, /ri/, and
/rə/, and /re/. A morphological segmentation of ‘refer’,
‘defer’, for example, while it may lead to interesting etymo-
logical speculations, violates the Saussurian requirement
according to which the minimal linguistic sign has to be
an arbitrary, yet constant union of sound and meaning.14
13 Willard VanOrmanQuine, ‘Prefixes’, inQuine,Quiddities: An Intermit-
tently Philosophical Dictionary (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1987), pp. 162–65 (p. 164).One of thewords inwhich ‘re-’ signifies not
a repetition but a rebounding is ‘reaction’. Jean Starobinski, Action and
Reaction:The Life and Adventures of a Couple, trans. by Sophie Hawkes
(New York: Zone Books, 2003) presents a stunning history of the met-
eoric rise of ‘reaction’ from Newton’s third law to political semantics
and psychoanalysis.This history should be registered as a tectonic shift
in the varied landscape of ‘re-’prefixation.
14 Sergio Scalise and Emiliano Guevara, ‘The Lexicalist Approach to
Word-Formation and the Notion of the Lexicon’, inHandbook ofWord-
Formation, ed. by Pavol Štekauer and Rochelle Lieber (Dordrecht:
Springer, 2005), pp. 147–87 (p. 157). The problem of ‘bound morphs’
was recognized by ancient and medieval grammarians and indeed dis-
cussed in connection with the prefix ‘re-’. See Vivien Law, ‘The Middle
Ages’, in Morphologie / Morphology: Ein internationales Handbuch zur
Flexion und Wortbildung / An International Handbook on Inflection and
Word-Formation, ed. by Geert Booij, Christian Lehmann, and Joachim
Mugdan, 2 vols (Berlin: DeGruyter, 2000–2004), i (2000), pp. 76–90
(pp. 83–84).
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The layered realm of logical and linguistic complications,
thus, calls for an exploration — this is the very wager of
this glossary — that acknowledges the synchronically as
well as diachronically errant constitution of unbounded
languages.
The contributors of the present volume encountered
the prefix ‘re-’ not through the work of one of its cham-
pions but rather through a series of serendipitous — and
hence, of course, potentially ‘symptomatic’ — accidents
and convergences. All the authors were members of a re-
search group assembled at the ICI Berlin in 2016 in order
to pursue a common two-year project entitled ‘ERRANS,
in Time’. While their individual projects related to the
idea of an errant dimension within time and among non-
synchronizable temporal experiences, their approaches,
anchored in radically different disciplinary and other tra-
ditions, had not been chosen to harmonize with one an-
other. Nonetheless, very early on, the prefix ‘re-’ emerged
in several of the individual and collaborative projects and
subsequently in some of the public events organized by the
ICI Fellows, from a conference on repetition in medieval
culture entitled ‘The Shape of Return’15 to an engagement
with ‘reenactment’ as a crucial strategy of contemporary
art production.16
In the Fall of 2017, the research group presented its
reflections in a public workshop adhering to a set of strict
15 ‘The Shape of Return: Progress, Process, and Repetition in Medieval
Culture’, organized by Francesco Giusti and Daniel Reeve, ICI Ber-
lin, 29–30 September 2017 <https://www.ici-berlin.org/events/the-
shape-of-return/> [accessed 3 January 2019].
16 ‘Over and Over and Over Again: Reenactment Strategies in Contem-
porary Art and Theory’, organized by Cristina Baldacci, Clio Nicastro,
and Arianna Sforzini, ICI Berlin, 16–17 November 2017 <https:
//www.ici-berlin.org/events/over-and-over/> [accessed 3 January
2019].
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rules: Each participant was to give two ten-minute present-
ations, each dealing with a single ‘re-’word, one in a morn-
ing session, the other in the afternoon. The great success
of the workshop inspired the idea of the current volume,
which translates a sequential event into the spatial distribu-
tion of a glossary of ‘re-’words, far from comprehensive and
proceeding not from fixed ideas about a definite meaning,
let alone inherent virtue of the prefix. It registers the irredu-
cibly plural constitutions and effects of ‘re-’words in order
to trace the complex temporal logic folded into many of
them. This requires also a return to older modes of theoriz-
ing, which, despite their ‘de-’saturated terminologies, have
been redescribed as efforts to emancipate repetition and
reiteration from sameness — thereby sourcing ERRANS
in time. The endeavour is deliberately col-lective, instig-
ating a swarm-like exploration of very different segments
and crevices of a very much erratically constituted stock
of ‘re-’words. As such, it invites non-linear and transversal
readings, but also future extensions, contestations, and re-
distributions.
ARND WEDEMEYER




According to the logical axis of time — the sequential time
of the clock — the movement of ‘research’ (recherche) is
always a movement forward, insofar as it is intentionally
oriented toward a goal. Whether the search is oriented
toward an object lost in the past or an object that is still
to be discovered or invented in the future, whether the
researcher knows what they are searching for or not is
of no importance regarding the temporal directionality of
the action denoted by this verb: one (re)searches always
forward. Accordingly, both in English and in French, the
prefix ‘re-’ has a strictly intensive value: iterative usages,
where ‘to re-search’ or ‘rechercher’ means ‘to search again’,
are quite rare and always colloquial.
At first sight, the title of Marcel Proust’s famous novel,
À la recherche du temps perdu (In Search of Lost Time) intro-
duces a disturbance in this directionality of the arrow of
time. The object of the search, of the ‘recherche’, is ‘lost
time’: something that should be retrieved, resuscitated.
But because this object is time itself, the title is of course
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paradoxical, since it implies that what is searched for in a
movement oriented forward in the axis of sequential time
is something that is by definition irretrievable according to
the very same understanding of time as infinite succession
from past to future.
Two distinct translations of Proust’s title exist in
English. Up until a revised translation was published
in 1992, the novel was known to the Anglophone
readership since its first translation by C. K. Scott
Moncrieff as Remembrance of Things Past, a phrase
borrowed from Shakespeare’s sonnet 30.1 While Scott
Moncrieff ’s translation of the text has been widely
acclaimed, his rendition of the title is misleading. Proust
himself complained to his French editor about this
misinterpretation,2 which indeed does away with the
intensive value of ‘research’, occludes the intentional
duality according to which time lost will be ‘regained’,
and gears the entire project towards the resurrection of
past memories. The revised, more literal translation (In
Search of Lost Time) adequately captures the forward
directionality of the search, as well as its seeming paradox
with respect to linear time. But because of the constraints
of the English language, it cannot fully capture two
essential nuances. ‘Temps perdu’, in French, is time lost,
1 Charles Kenneth ScottMoncrieff translated the first six volumes ofÀ la
recherche du temps perdu between 1922 and 1930. Presented as the first
volume of a novel whose title was already translated as Remembrance
of Things Past, Swann’s Way was therefore published at a time when
three volumes still remained to be published in French, i.e., when the
final revelation of ‘time regained’ and the temporal structure of the
whole novel had not yet been disclosed to a readership unaware of the
author’s design. The title has been rectified by D. J. Enright in a revised
translation taking into account the secondPléiade edition of the French
text published in 1987–89.
2 See Jean-YvesTadié,Marcel Proust. Biographie, 2 vols (Paris:Gallimard,
1996), ii, p. 478.
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but also time wasted: while lost time is a metaphor of
the past, time can be wasted in past, present, or future.
In the French syntagma ‘À la recherche du temps perdu’,
this ambiguity is brought into a productive resonance
with the prefix ‘re-’. Everything happens indeed as if
the double meaning of ‘temps perdu’ bounced back to
reactivate the iterative dimension of the prefix ‘re-’, now
divided into two co-existing yet contradictory meanings
and directions, at the same time intensive and iterative,
forward and backward. Proust embeds the temporal
eeriness of his entire novel within the enigmatic closure
of a syllepsis that also opens unto a logical nightmare.
What if the originality and extraordinary complexity of
Proust’s prolific endeavour was actually encapsulated in
this two-letters prefix: ‘re-’? What if this coexistence of
the intensive value of the prefix ghosted by a reactivated
iterative value sufficed to frame the temporal paradoxes
of this seven-volume masterpiece, and, indeed, the very
nature of artistic creation?
The general features of the temporal paradoxes that in-
form Proust’s novel are, of course, widely known. In the
very last volume of the novel, the narrator discovers his
vocation as a writer: he will write the novel that we just
read. One discovers at the end how and why one must
begin. That revelation occurs in the wake of a series of
involuntary states that unsettle the time of the clock —
states of which involuntary memory, epitomized in the
Madeleine episode, is of course the most famous and most
widely commented instance. The adult narrator takes a bite
of a Petite Madeleine soaked in tea. He is suddenly over-
whelmed by a delicious sensation of pleasure that does not
seem to have an immediate or tangible cause, and that mo-
mentarily interrupts the course of life. The narrator starts
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to search for the cause and meaning of this eerie sensation,
and, just as suddenly as the unexplainable sensation had
unsettled him, the childhood memory to which this taste
refers appears to him.3 The present sensation has awoken
in the narrator the memory of a past, forgotten sensation,
which appears from the depth of night with the character of
a vibrant and sensory certainty, and, as it were, presents the
past again, ‘like a stage set’,4 as a scene, offered to his joyful
contemplation. No act of voluntary memory would have
been able to reconstruct such a past in its sensory vivacity
and presence. Proust devotes many pages to search for the
deeper meaning of such scenes emerging from the invol-
untary collision of a past and a present sensation, until the
narrator, in the final revelation, realizes that this bringing
together of one quality common to two distinct sensations
allows to abstract their common essence outside of the
contingencies of time and succession, and to produce pure
time. Life had produced such random moments of truth,
art can also produce them by way of style.5
But then again, what motivates this recherche and keeps
it in motion? Is it the appeal of its end? Or the initial mo-
mentum of its beginning? Is it possible that these are one
and the same? Because of the structure of the book, and
because the action of searching seems to be a voluntary ac-
tion that also focuses on events presented by involuntary
actions of the faculties, the recherche (as the eponymous
3 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 6 vols, trans. by C. K. Scott
Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, rev. by D. J. Enright (New York:
Modern Library, 1992), i: Swann’s Way, p. 63.
4 Ibid., p. 64. ‘comme un décor de théâtre’, in À la recherche du temps
perdu, 7 vols, ed. by Jean-Yves Tadié and others (Paris: Gallimard,
1988–90), i: Du côté de chez Swann (1988), p. 47.
5 See Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu, 7 vols, ed. by Jean-
Yves Tadié and others (Paris: Gallimard, 1988–90), vii: Le Temps
retrouvé (1989), p. 196.
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action of searching that gears the book according to cer-
tain directionalities) could imply both a motion forward
of a search that, at its end, discovers that the narrator’s life
has been following a destiny, and also this movement back-
ward towards past sensations and scenes that have been
lost, forgotten, or repressed and would potentially hold the
key to the source and meaning of the entire endeavour.
This opposition between possible interpretations of the
directionality of the search is widely reflected in Proustian
criticism, within which general patterns can be outlined
schematically according to the privileging of a retrogredi-
ent (or deterministic) hypothesis or a progredient (or
teleological) hypothesis. But is it possible to imagine a
third hypothesis that would synthesize and complicate the
two? Before exploring this possibility of a hypothesis a fine
ad initium in my other contribution to this volume, I shall
briefly observe some of the core arguments that generally
inform the criticism based on the first two hypotheses.
The retrogredient or deterministic hypothesis is most
commonly represented in psychoanalytic readings, which
see the novel as polarized by past events. In this hypothesis,
the origin of the search is to be found in the ‘lost time’
of childhood crystallized in screen memories or primal
scenes, which have usually been interpreted according to
Oedipal models.6 In one of the most exhaustive and com-
6 Most readings indeed agree that the Madeleine scene is a screen
memory indicating the repression of a fantasy of maternal incest. See
Serge Doubrovsky, La Place de la madeleine. Ecriture et fantasme chez
Proust (Grenoble: ELLUG, 2000). See also Jean-Yves Tadié, Le Lac
inconnu. Entre Proust et Freud (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), pp. 74–81
on screen memories and p. 90, where the author reads in the good-
night kiss scene a link with an archaic bond with the mother’s breast.
In an article titled ‘Proustiens, encore un effort…! La déconstruc-
tion de l’inceste maternel dans À la recherche du temps perdu’ (French
Forum, 31.3 (Fall 2006), pp. 77–96), Giuseppina Mecchia proposes to
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pelling psychoanalytic readings of the novel, Julia Kristeva,
for instance, demonstrates clearly that the sequence en-
compassing Mamma’s goodnight kiss and the Madeleine,
at the very beginning of Swann’s Way, encrypts a repressed
desire for maternal incest.7 She argues that the source for
involuntary memory seems to be the underlying conflict
with the maternal imago, and equates involuntary memory
with unconscious memory.8 Kristeva sees in the osmotic
bond of the narrator with the mother a relation that is trau-
matic in nature.9 Because traces of this traumatic bond are
instantiated in scenes that keep recurring throughout the
book, across the series of the narrator’s love objects, across
the new rooms where the grown-up will have to go to bed
without the comfort of a kiss, one can indeed consider
that La Recherche is oriented according to and toward this
primal origin.
Yet Kristeva also goes beyond most psychoanalytic
readings of Proust by considering not only the content
of these scenes — be it manifest, latent, or intertextual
— but also the very style and language in which these
scenes are written. Style is the locus of what she calls,
after Proust, a trans-substantiation:10 that is, the operation
de-pathologize the relation of the narrator to the maternal figure by
resorting to Deleuze and Guattari’s famous ‘anti-oedipal’ claims. While
she mobilizes the notion of an intensive, non-personal, pre-oedipal re-
gime of desire to contend that theRecherche destroys themyth of incest
as tragic destiny, the incestual framework and its originary character are
altogether not called into question.
7 Julia Kristeva, Le Temps sensible. Proust et l’expérience littéraire (Paris:
Gallimard, 2000), pp. 14–46.
8 Julia Kristeva, ‘Entretien: La Transsubstanciation de Proust: une sus-
pension du refoulement’, in Marcel Proust, visiteur des psychanalystes,
ed. by Andrée Bauduin and Françoise Coblenc (Paris: PUF, 2003), pp.
63–95 (p. 66).
9 Kristeva, ‘Transsubstanciation de Proust’, pp. 65 and 67.
10 See Kristeva, Temps sensible, p. 46; Kristeva, ‘Transsubstanciation de
Proust’.
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through which signifiers are transfigured through their im-
mersion in the drives, in order to reach essences. Beyond
the unconscious, she even identifies a Schopenhauerian
ambition to escape subjectivity and reach a pre-psychical
state.11 This attempt to go beyond any kind of represent-
ation is still interpreted as an attempt to overcome the
trauma of separation. Psychoanalytic readings generally
locate the source, the impetus of the search in past events
that continue to shape the present, in primal scenes that
must be deciphered, and are therefore predominantly de-
terministic.
A progredient hypothesis takes the opposite view and
interprets the Recherche as the narrative of an apprentice-
ship and tale of a vocation, entirely turned forward, accord-
ing to a teleology that will culminate in its last volume,
when the stages of life reveal themselves as steps toward
the accomplishment of a destiny. That hypothesis has been
most famously formulated by Deleuze, who provocatively
contended that the unity of Proust’s novel does not lie in
the exploration of memories of the past, but in the narrative
of an apprenticeship. In the very first paragraphs of Proust
and Signs, Deleuze states:
On the one hand, the Search is not simply an ef-
fort to recall, an exploration of memory: search, re-
cherche, is to be taken in the strong sense of the term,
as we say ‘the search for truth.’ […] [M]emory
intervenes as a means of search, of investigation,
but not the most profound means; and time past
intervenes as a structure of time, but not the most
profound structure. In Proust, the steeples of Mar-
tinville and Vinteuil’s little phrase, which cause
no memory, no resurrection of the past to inter-
vene, will always prevail over the Madeleine and the
11 Kristeva, ‘Transsubstanciation de Proust’, pp. 67–68.
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cobblestones of Venice, which depend on memory
and thereby still refer to a ‘material explanation’.12
According to this hypothesis, the entire novel unfolds as an
apprenticeship of signs of various natures, which one learns
to decipher, thereby progressing from mundane and amor-
ous signs towards a greater knowledge of truth, which only
gives itself in art. Deleuze argues that involuntary memory
plays an important, yet secondary role in this progression:
reminiscences are signs that must be deciphered, and de-
ciphering them prepares us to the plenitude of aesthetic
ideas. Such contemplation, connecting the subject with the
pure time of essences beyond any empirical temporality,
can only be reached by way of the superior signs of art.13
Deleuze indeed identifies four distinct structures of time.
Time lost and time regained are each subdivided into two
distinct types. Within time lost, there is the time that passes
(the time of the clock, which one can measure differen-
tially between two states of the same being), and there is
also the time we waste (for instance, in loving someone
who is not our type). Within time regained, there is, on the
one hand, the time regained within time lost: for instance,
the sudden affective realization, given through involuntary
memory, just as the narrator bends over to unbutton his
boot, that the grandmother is dead. Yet there is also a last
kind of time, an originary and absolute time, that of a true
eternity, that admittedly goes beyond any experiential di-
mensions of time, but which Deleuze recognizes as their
principle, and which only gives itself through the signs of
12 Gilles Deleuze, Proust and Signs, trans. by Richard Howard (London:
Continuum, 2008), p. 3; Proust et les Signes (Paris: PUF, 1964), pp. 9–
10.
13 See ibid., pp. 4–9.
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art.14 While that time is not accessible through the sen-
suous signs, those are nonetheless necessary: for ‘[o]ur
apprenticeship would never find its realization in art if it
did not pass through those signs that give us a foretaste of
time regained, and prepare us for the fulfilment of aesthetic
ideas. But they do nothing more than prepare us: a mere
beginning.’15 Sensuous signs serve a crucial propaedeutic
function in the trajectory that will lead to the final under-
standing of the true vocation and give access to the pure
time of ideal essences beyond material signs. They are steps
in an apprenticeship that reveals in the end its teleological
nature. The time of essences is, to some extent, at stake in
involuntary memory, yet only in an opaque fashion, since
it is always embodied as a local essence: the Madeleine
gives us Combray, the cobblestones give us Venice, etc.
Even if these scenes do not give us the real Combray but
rather Combray as it should have been, in an essential form
detached from both past and present, its essence is none-
theless differential: its truth lies in the intertwining of a
worldly, local scene and an ideal, abstract essence.16 On
the contrary, the time regained in the work of art is a prim-
ordial time, beyond experience, which is deployed neither
in space, nor in succession: it is time pure and immemorial.
While Kristeva and Deleuze lead their respective en-
quiries in opposite directions, both reach the conclusion
that the Time ultimately at stake in À la recherche du temps
perdu is a pure time beyond empirical time, a pure time
whose underlying structure is discovered at the end of the
search/recherche. The question remains whether the im-
memorial time of the unconscious, identified by Kristeva
14 See ibid., pp. 12–17.
15 Ibid., p. 35.
16 Ibid., p. 40.
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as the determining impetus of the recherche, and the im-
memorial time of essences, identified by Deleuze as its
underlying teleological structure, can be reconciled.
If the hypothesis of the unconscious indeed implies a
backward directionality of the Recherche, and if inversely
the hypothesis of pure, immemorial time really directs
it forward, then neither of these hypotheses can account
for the paradox of ‘re-’. The beginning of this essay con-
sidered the way in which the double syllepsis structuring
the French title enclosed a logical nightmare, preventing
any stable interpretation: one cannot decide, among all
the possible directional combinations, whether ‘re-’ is in-
tensive or iterative, orients itself along the flow of time or
against it. By giving pre-eminence to one of the directions,
one runs the risk of missing the fact that Proust does not
orient his novel according to one or the other polarity of
the arrow of time: rather, he troubles the poles, sets the
compass frantically spinning, and makes the breaking of




Two meanings of the prefix ‘re-’ coexist in the title À la re-
cherche du temps perdu.1 The Recherche unfolds at the same
time backward in an iterative movement and forward in
an intensive gesture. The (perhaps too) schematic outline
of two general directional trends reveals that depending
on which pole of the axis of chronological time is being
given precedence, the Recherche can be accounted for as
memory or as apprenticeship, as the narrative of a des-
tiny determined by the workings of the unconscious or as
a movement teleologically oriented toward the final reve-
lation of a pure time of essences. Yet the double syllepsis
that shapes the title suggests that the poles of such alterna-
tives, however exclusive their directionalities might seem,
would have to be thought jointly. I propose to interrogate
anew this seeming incompossibility by way of a linguistic
1 See Gaillard, ‘Recherche I’, in this volume.
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subterfuge: reframing the enquiry of ‘re-’ by way of its
Greek counterpart ‘ana-’, I will complicate our recherche
on the temporality of the Recherche (of any recherche?) by
confronting it to anamnesis — and more specifically to
Jean-François Lyotard’s elaboration of this notion.
‘Anamnesis’ is the key operator that allows Lyotard to
draw an analogy between the ways in which literature and
psychoanalysis, respectively, relate to time, and to define
both as a recherche du temps perdu — as a search for lost
time.2 Even though Lyotard never devoted a full length
essay to Proust’s novel, the question of temps perdu and
the strange modalities of its recherche haunt the philo-
sopher’s writings after his 1983 monograph The Differend.
Indeed, they resurface systematically each time that Lyo-
tard attempts to compare the work of psychoanalysis and
the work of art (and ultimately that of philosophy) with
respect to the question of the immemorial. But assimi-
lating Proust’s Recherche to the movement of anamnesis
(literally: the action of recalling past events) by no means
amounts to accrediting a determinist hypothesis accord-
ing to which the directionality of the Recherche would be
entirely geared towards a ‘remembrance of things past’.
On the contrary: to Lyotard, ‘things past are remembered
ahead’ (Le temps perdu se recherche en avant).3 ‘Ahead’, or
forward: this direction does not merely describe a linear
progression of the act of searching. As we shall see, this
‘search ahead’ rather characterizes an unsettling of sequen-
2 See Anne Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, in Traversals of Affect: On Jean-
François Lyotard, ed. by Julie Gaillard, Claire Nouvet, and Mark Sto-
holski (London: Bloomsbury, 2016), pp. 73–88 (pp. 82–84).
3 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘Domus and the Megalopolis’, in The Inhuman:
Reflections on Time, transl. by Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby
(Cambridge: Polity, 1991), pp. 191–204 (p. 198); ‘Domus et la méga-
pole’, in L’Inhumain. Causeries sur le temps (Paris: Klincksiesck, 2014),
pp. 181–92 (p. 187).
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tial time, in which the past is not recalled but actually
occurs at the end of a search that it nonetheless drives
forward from the beginning. By conflating ‘recherche’ and
‘anamnesis’, Lyotard complicates the chronology that ori-
ents time in a linear succession of causes and effects from
an origin to an end.
My aim is to highlight the consequences that Lyotard’s
assimilation of psychoanalysis and literature as recherche
du temps perdu have in both fields: on the one hand, the
temporal structure of the Recherche complicates a simple
understanding of anamnesis as remembering or tracing
back, which Lyotard challenges in order to propose a rad-
ical view of the unconscious, absolutely devoid of any
representational character. On the other hand, Lyotard’s
conceptualization of the mechanisms of the après-coup al-
lows for a renewed reading of Proust that seems to syn-
thesize the two opposing trends — deterministic versus
teleological — sketched out in my other contribution to
this volume.
As Anne Tomiche has pointed out, ‘[Lyotard’s] use
of the term “anamnesis” does not refer to Plato’s epis-
temological and psychological theory of knowledge’, but
is elaborated in dialogue with Freudian psychoanalysis.4
Lyotard associates anamnesis with the Freudian Durch-
arbeitung (working-through), most famously defined in
contradistinction to other modes of recollection in Freud’s
1914 essay on psychoanalytic technique titled ‘Erinnern,
Wiederholen und Durcharbeiten (Remembering, Repeating
and Working-Through)’.5 While something ‘simply’ for-
4 Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 75 and p. 82.
5 Sigmund Freud, Gesammelte Werke, 17 vols (London: Imago, 1940–
52), x: Werke aus den Jahren 1913–1917 (1946), pp. 125–36; The
Standard Edition of the Complete PsychologicalWorks of Sigmund Freud,
ed. and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London:Hogarth, 1953–74),
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gotten can be remembered, repressed ‘impressions, scenes
or experiences’6 usually do not resurface as a memory, but,
unbeknownst to the analysand, as an acting out in their
life or in the transferential relation to the analyst. Acting-
out, another name for repetition, therefore constitutes a
form of resistance to remembering: stuck in the loop of
reiteration, the analysand does not know what they re-
peat. The analytic technique, relying on free association
and transference, implies a working-through of the pa-
tient’s resistances, including screen memories and primal
scenes, which do not ‘hide’ other memories but indicate
the existence of repressed phantasies and mnesic traces left
by impressions that have never reached consciousness.7
Recollection, remembrance, (secondary) repression, re-
surfacing, repetition, resistance: all these modalities of
memory imply the reiteration, indeed, the ceaseless retell-
ing of a psyche to safeguard the linearity of causal tempor-
ality.
Lyotard’s originality with respect to the Freudian
Durcharbeitung concerns most clearly its temporal
dimension.8 Indeed, in order to elaborate anamnesis as a
pivotal operator, Lyotard combines the working-through
of the paper on analytic technique with the temporal
structure of afterwardsness (or Nachträglichkeit; in
French: après-coup) and its corollary of primal repression
that Freud first described in the early Project for a Scientific
xii:TheCase of Schreber, Papers on Technique and OtherWorks (1958),
pp. 145–56. AnneTomiche notes that ‘the term […]does not belong to
Freud’s main lexicon’, but becomes an important operator in Lyotard’s
works (‘Anamnesis’, p. 76).
6 Freud, ibid., p. 148.
7 Ibid., pp. 148–49. For a comparison of the descriptions of screen
memories in Proust and Freud, see in particular Jean-Yves Tadié,Le Lac
inconnu. Entre Proust et Freud (Paris: Gallimard, 2012), pp. 79–85.
8 See Tomiche, Anamnesis, p. 82.
JULIE GAILLARD 15
Psychology. As will become clear, this combination
allows to think an unconscious that is not constituted
by repressed representations, but is completely non-
representational, and therefore radically escapes any
philosophy of consciousness.9 Anamnesis, understood
as the act of working through representations and scenes
towards the affect that knows no scene and escapes
any representation, becomes for Lyotard a privileged
modality of opening of a passage toward a ‘past’ that is
lost — neither forgotten nor repressed, but indeed never
inscribed in the first place.
As Lyotard demonstrates in Heidegger and ‘the
jews’, Nachträglichkeit implies ‘a double blow that is
constitutively asymmetrical’.10 A first event strikes the
psychic apparatus, but its intensity is too excessive to allow
the psychic apparatus to record it, let alone assimilate it.
Lyotard illustrates this mechanism through an analogy
with a whistle too high-pitched to be perceived by the
human ear.11 Not recorded, this first blow nonetheless
leaves an imperceptible trace, which is dubbed, after
Freud, ‘unconscious affect’ — although, as Lyotard notes,
it is not localizable ‘within’ the psyche.12 Lyotard imagines
this trace ‘to be like a cloud of energy particles that are
not subject to serial laws, that are not organized into sets
9 Claire Nouvet has analyzed this distinction in ‘For “Emma”’, in Tra-
versals of Affect, ed. by J. Gaillard, C. Nouvet, and M. Stoholski, pp.
37–54 (p. 39).
10 Jean-François Lyotard, Heidegger and ‘the jews’, transl. by Andreas
Michel and Mark S. Robert (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota
Press, 1990), p. 15. The pages on the mechanism of après-coup have
already been commented in J. Gaillard, ‘The Task of Thinking (in)
The Postmodern Space of “The Zone”’, in Traversals of Affect, ed. by
J. Gaillard, C. Nouvet, and M. Stoholski, pp. 229–46 (pp. 234–37).
11 Lyotard, Heidegger and ‘the jews’, p. 15.
12 See Nouvet, ‘For “Emma”’, p. 41.
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that can be thought in terms of words or images, that
do not experience any attraction at all’.13 Because it has
not been inscribed, the effect of the shock cannot be
repressed: it insists beyond any word or image, beyond
any representation, diffuse and inert. This is what Lyotard
identifies after Freud as Urverdrängung (primal repression)
— although it is not exactly ‘repressed’, for lack of prior
inscription. The first blow is therefore ‘a shock without
affect’.14 The second blow, conversely, is
an affect without shock: I buy something in a store,
anxiety crushes me, I flee, but nothing had really
happened. The energy dispersed in the affective
cloud condenses, gets organized, brings on an ac-
tion, commands a flight without a ‘real’ motive.
And it is this flight, the feeling that accompanies
it, which informs consciousness that there is some-
thing, without being able to tell what it is. It indi-
cates the quod but not the quid.15
The sudden surfacing of affect cannot be ascribed to any
apparent cause. According to the chronology of temporal-
izing consciousness, the affect that surfaces as the second
‘blow’ merely indicates that ‘there is’ something, without
providing any indication as to what that ‘thing’ may be.
This affect has no representation, no content but itself.
As such, the second shock is not properly caused by the
first blow, whose effects remained ‘outside the scene’ of
the psychic apparatus — outside of any representation,
conscious or unconscious. This implies a dismantling of
chronology. Indeed:
13 Lyotard, Heidegger and ‘the jews’, p. 15.
14 Ibid., p. 16.
15 Ibid.
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This ‘before’ of the quod is also an ‘after’ of the quid.
For whatever is now happening in the store (i.e., the
terror and the flight) does not come from [provient];
it comes back [revient] from the first blow, from the
shock, from the ‘initial’ excess that remained out-
side the scene, even unconscious, deposited out-
side representation. This is at least the Freudian
(and Proustian) hypothesis. We may call this the
chronologization, obtained by virtue of anamnesis,
the setting into diachrony of what takes places in
a time that is not diachronic, since what happened
earlier is given at a later date (in analysis, in writ-
ing), and since what is later in the symptom (the
second blow) occurs ‘before’ what happened earlier
(the first blow). This chronologization of a time
that is not chronological, this retrieval of a time (the
first blow) that is lost because it has not had place
and time in the psychic apparatus, that has not been
noticed there, fulfills exactly the presumed function
of a protective shield that Freud attributes to it in
Jenseits [Lyotard is here referring to Freud’s Beyond
the Pleasure Principle, J.G.]. Narrative organization
is constitutive of diachronic time, and the time that
it constitutes has the effect of ‘neutralizing’ an ‘ini-
tial’ violence, of representing a presence without
representation, of staging the obscene, of disasso-
ciating the past from the present, and of staging a
recollection that must be a reappropriation of the
improper, achronological affect.16
Affect occurs ‘before’ the ‘initial’ shock which has ‘caused’
it: never registered by consciousness, detached from its lo-
gical origin, the unconscious affect knows no causality and
obeys no chronology. As Claire Nouvet writes, ‘it presents
itself over and over again, without ever representing itself,
each time as if for the first time.’17 Its achronic tempor-
ality undoes diachrony, interrupts it. Anamnesis thus can
16 Ibid., translation modified.
17 Nouvet, ‘For “Emma”’, p. 43.
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be defined as the attempt to account for this unsettling
achrony within a narrative organization that will establish
the link between the first and the second blow, articulate
the order of causes and effects within a chronological se-
quence of past, present, and future. The unconscious affect,
a monstrosity for consciousness, is thereby forgotten in the
very moment when it is ‘treated’, bound by the linear tem-
porality of causal explanation. Always belated with respect
to the apparition of the affect that seizes it, consciousness
must reintegrate it into the causal diachrony of a sequence
of scenes.18
In Lyotard’s works, ‘Proust’ and his Recherche become
the passwords summarizing the workings of this aberrant
temporality, and this necessity for consciousness of ‘ex-
plaining’ the affect by integrating it within a causal se-
quence, by narrating it. Their mention is always parenthet-
ical, appositional, analogical — as if they were transparent
synonyms for ‘anamnesis’. According to the temporality
of afterwardsness, the affect without a cause befalls the
subject ‘before’ any ‘reason’ that could have caused it in
the first place can be even searched for — since whatever
event caused this affect has never been registered. Which
is why the directionality of the search, of the Recherche,
proceeds at the same time backward and forward (in the
chronological time of conscious succession): my recherche,
my anamnesis, is initiated by an affect whose cause actu-
ally lies ahead of me, since it is reconstructed après-coup.
Trying to understand it, attempting to locate its source, I
will always be out of step with it. I contend that this mech-
18 See also Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 82 and Nouvet, ‘For “Emma”’, p. 42,
as well as ‘The Inarticulate Affect: Lyotard and Psychoanalytic Testi-
mony’, in Minima Memoria: In the Wake of Jean-François Lyotard, ed.
by Claire Nouvet, Kent Still, and Zrinka Stahuljak (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 2007), pp. 106–22 (pp. 120–21).
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anism, at stake in Lyotard’s statement that ‘things past are
remembered ahead’ (le temps perdu se recherche en avant),
is also exactly what Proust describes in scenes such as the
famous one of the Madeleine:
Whence could it have come to me, this all-powerful
joy? I sensed that it was connected with the taste of
the tea and the cake, but that it infinitely transcen-
ded those savours, could not, indeed, be of the same
nature. Where did it come from? What did it mean?
How could I seize and apprehend it? […] I put
down the cup and examine my own mind. It alone
can discover the truth. But how? What an abyss of
uncertainty, whenever the mind feels overtaken by
itself; when it, the seeker, is at the same time the
dark region through which it must go seeking and
where all its equipment will avail it nothing. Seek?
More than that: create. It is face to face with some-
thing which does not yet exist, which it alone can
make actual, which it alone can bring into the light
of day.19
‘Seek? [chercher?] More than that: create.’ Proust writes it
in so many words: explaining the sudden occurrence of
an affect that befalls the subject ‘without the notion of its
cause’ is not only a search backward to retrieve an origin: it
is a search forward to produce it. And for Proust, as for Lyo-
tard, the same goes for artistic creation in general, and for
the structure of À la recherche du temps perdu in particular.
As Anne Tomiche summarizes: ‘Proust’s cycle functions as
a paradigm for the literary work of anamnesis because, Lyo-
tard explains, the Recherche, which is entirely structured as
a search for lost time, ends but only to open, at the end,
19 Marcel Proust, In Search of Lost Time, 6 vols, trans. by C. K. Scott
Moncrieff and Terence Kilmartin, rev. by D. J. Enright (New York:
Modern Library, 1992), i: Swann’s Way, p. 61.
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onto the time when the writing of the Recherche begins.’20
Affect does not demand to be reintegrated into the dia-
chrony of causes: but consciousness seeks to integrate it
nonetheless, creating scenes and links between scenes to
account for it — thereby bound to miss it over and over
again. Which is why anamnesis is interminable, and why
the Recherche, as Lyotard writes, ‘ends on an acknowledge-
ment of a debt [une reconnaissance de dette]’, in spite of
the immense effort of Proust’s writing.21 The ‘lost time’
that affect is remains ‘lost’ for consciousness, ‘lost’ for rep-
resentation, and nonetheless keeps re-presenting itself in
making itself be felt, obliquely, through the lure of scenes
that are always questioned as such.22
But if the aim of anamnesis is to work through the
resistance of matter, of representations, of ‘scenes’, in order
to ‘regain’, as it were, or at least approach this ‘essence of
time lost’, then it no longer has much to do with memory.
What would be a memory of something that has never
known any inscription? What does it mean to search back
towards something that has never taken place?
With Proust, to create is to bear witness to the fact that
‘some-thing’ has been forgotten that escapes any retrieval
because it escapes empirical diachrony. One could easily
demonstrate throughout all aspects of the Recherche the in-
20 Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 83.
21 Jean-François Lyotard, ‘La Peinture, anamnèse du visible’, in Misère de
la philosophie (Paris: Galilée, 2000), pp. 97–115 (p. 104), my transla-
tion.
22 Tomiche, ‘Anamnesis’, p. 83: ‘all memories and all representations are
questioned as possible deceptions […] Freud and Proust meet in this
remembrance of things past which is the task of art— and if anamnesis
is a search for lost time, it is not insofar as the time lost would be
represented, or even presented, but insofar as art ensures a passage
towards the essence of time lost, a “pure affect”, the “pure event” of
a “it happens”.’
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sistence of such a motif and its effects in style, as creation
opens a passage toward the immemorial affect through the
matter of words and sounds. The narrator of The Captive,
to quote only one instance, notes that the unique accent
of Vinteuil’s music is proof of the irreducibly singular ex-
istence of the soul, and asks: ‘That Song, … where did
Vinteuil learn it, hear it? Each artist seems like the citi-
zen of an unknown fatherland, forgotten to themselves
(une patrie inconnue, oubliée de lui-même)’.23 To create is
to remember the immemorial. Writing, as anamnesis, as
recherche, is always belated, and always treasonous: it is
bound to betray the pure occurrence of the affect that set
it in motion. However, only this recherche can bear witness
to the factuality of that temps perdu.
With the framing of ‘time lost’ according to primal re-
pression, a psychoanalytic reading of the Recherche meets
the question of the immemorial. It thus reaches the ques-
tion left in suspense previously: that of the possible rec-
onciliation of the immemorial time of the unconscious
and the immemorial time of essences. As I have begun to
show in my other contribution to this volume, Kristeva
seems to hesitate when it comes to identifying the nature
of the Schopenhauerian ‘Being’ she discerns at the core of
the temporality of the Recherche. On the one hand, Being
would be the unconscious, but she also ventures to hypo-
thesize, beyond the unconscious, an inordinate attempt to
escape any subjectivity and reach some state prior to the
formation of the psychic apparatus [‘s’évader du subjectif
23 Marcel Proust, À la recherche du temps perdu, 7 vols, ed. by Jean-
Yves Tadié and others (Paris: Gallimard, 1988–90), v: La prisonnière
(1989), p. 245, my translation. By positing that the singularity of an
artist lies in a forgotten ‘fatherland’ inside the subject unbeknownst
to them, Proust seems to describe an immemorial that is not abstract
and/or collective but indeed singular.
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pour atteindre le prépsychique’].24 Lyotard’s combination of
the Freudian motifs of Durcharbeitung and Nachträglich-
keit accounts for two kinds of unconscious: one formed
by repressed representations, and the other void of any
representional character. Can’t we see, in this ‘beyond’ of
the representational unconscious, some kinship with the
unconscious affect that Lyotard associates with primal re-
pression?
We saw that, on the other hand, Deleuze does away
with the hypothesis of a directionality determined by the
workings of the unconscious and considers the revelation
of the pure, absolute, immemorial time of essences to be
the consecration of an apprenticeship that will ultimately
reveal that the immemorial was there from the beginning,
enmeshed in all other temporalities that it sustains without
hardly ever letting itself be felt, outside of reminiscences
and of the signs of art. Yet Lyotard contends that Deleuze
and psychoanalysis can be reconciled. In Heidegger and ‘the
jews’, having formulated the Freudian hypothesis of an un-
conscious devoid of representational formations, Lyotard
explicitly builds on Deleuze’s reading of Proust as he is
about to introduce the specificity of Nachträglichkeit:
[Deleuze] discovers in À la recherche du temps perdu
the sort of past that interests us here, a past be-
yond [en deçà] of the forgotten, much closer to the
present moment [l’actuel] than any past, at the same
time that it is incapable of being solicited by volun-
tary and conscious memory — a past Deleuze says
that is not past but always there.
24 Julia Kristeva, ‘Entretien: La Transsubstanciation de Proust: une sus-
pension du refoulement’, in Marcel Proust, visiteur des psychanalystes,
ed. by Andrée Bauduin and Françoise Coblenc (Paris: PUF, 2003), pp.
63–95 (p. 68).
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Whatever Deleuze might think of this, there is
in Freud’s own approach and tone a way of articu-
lating this paradox of the immemorial.25
And elsewhere he states: ‘The “signs” that Deleuze, in his
Proust, comments on so well are these affects, outside of
diachrony. Signs that are signed by the “reason” of the
associative fabric, the thing, that writing at the same time
marks and misses.’26 The ‘signs’ signal towards the quod
without quid of affect, of the immemorial, of the Lacanian
‘thing (chose)’, that insists ‘unbeknownst’, the trace of its
present absence in representation.
The hypothesis of recherche as anamnesis, i.e. as a work-
ing through the scenes of secondary repression towards
an affect without representation given by primal repres-
sion, which insists under representation, time lost under
the present, brings together the determinist hypothesis of
the unconscious and the teleological hypothesis of the im-
memorial. The Recherche is not oriented towards its origin
or its end in a linear fashion, rather it spreads out into
the illogical space where beginning and end correspond,
where the end motivates, creates the beginning. Time lost
is not a time accessible to experience yet its effects are felt
concretely: it is what motivates the perpetual search, con-
stantly torn between the two poles of an end, that is an
origin, and of an origin, that comes at the end.
25 Lyotard, Heidegger and ‘the jews’, p. 12, translation modified.
26 Lyotard, ‘La Peinture, anamnèse du visible’, p. 103, my translation; cf.
‘Les “signes” que Deleuze, dans son Proust, commente si bien, sont
ces affects, hors diachronie. Des signes que signe la “raison” du tissu
associatif, la chose, que l’écriture à la fois marque et manque.’

Recirculation
The Wandering of Digital Images in
Post-Internet Art
CRISTINA BALDACCI
Starting from the double meaning of circulation as ‘con-
tinuous motion’ and ‘public availability of something’, I
would like to address the flow of digital images; principally
the idea of recirculation as a process through which both
visual and cultural imagery are put in motion over and over
again in the current information age, and in the context of
post-Internet art in particular.1
Recirculation has of course to do with the many ways
in which images are nowadays produced and exchanged,
as well as evaluated and accepted. That the accelerated dis-
semination of images is rapidly changing the relationship
to them is already well known. More and more images af-
fect us and, at the same time, we affect them as viewers
1 For a definition of post-Internet art, see Marisa Olson, ‘Postinternet:
Art After the Internet’, Foam Magazine, 29 (2011), pp. 59–63 (p. 60).
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too by repetitively circulating and framing them anew, with
each Internet ‘share’, ‘tweet’, or ‘meme’ that makes them
go viral as doppelgängers. But that makes us loose control
over them both as senders and receivers. Once an image is
online, it can presumably be accessed and used by almost
everyone regardless of intent, thus distancing the image
from the initial purpose for which it was uploaded.2 In this
regard, it is also important to remember that, theoretically,
the source of a digital image is less relevant than its destin-
ation, that is, the recipient, or rather, the vast and diverse
audiences it may reach.
These new modes of distribution present, no doubt,
one of the main challenges for artists, since the World Wide
Web permits the large diffusion of images outside institu-
tional contexts and can have a positive effect in terms of
critique and social impact. It can therefore function as an
alternative approach to the traditional system of circula-
tion — and also production of meaning —, through which
artists are able to develop different strategies of resistance,
although there is still a margin for doubt. The way in which
images are received and operated is in fact not predictable,
and, moreover, no one can really determine who the final
receiver is: if it is still human or, more likely, an algorithm.3
2 See Marisa Olson, ‘Lost Not Found: The Circulation of Images in
Digital Visual Culture’, in Words Without Pictures, ed. by Alex Klein
(Los Angeles: LACMA, 2009), pp. 274–84 (pp. 276, 280).
3 I won’t take into consideration here the vast and challenging de-
bate around what Harun Farocki, in his video work Eye/Machine
I (2000), referred to as ‘operational images’, and what Trevor
Paglen calls ‘invisible images’, namely, images that don’t need hu-
mans because they are made ‘by machines for other machines’:
images that are dramatically changing our visual culture and the
way in which we have to approach and study images by es-
tablishing both new categories and interpretative tools borrowed
from computer science. See Trevor Paglen, ‘Operational Images’, e-
flux journal, 59 (2014) <https://www.e-flux.com/journal/59/61130/
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With its vast social communities that everyday spread
large amounts of images across different screens and
among distributed spectators all over the world, the
Internet has merely augmented a process that is clearly
nothing new. The circulation of images concerns a ‘visual
economy’,4 which in the twentieth century has been
reflected upon both in the tradition of ‘the wandering
image’, initiated by Walter Benjamin, with the new
possibilities of the mechanical reproduction of images as
a crucial starting-point, and Aby Warburg’s account of
the survival of ancient image forms, which he configures
as an engram, a mnestic trace reactivated under specific
circumstances or in the presence of specific stimuli.5
By appropriating, editing, and recirculating presumed
‘originals’,6 artists act as special ‘iconographers’ who both
operational-images/> [accessed 18December 2018]; and, by the same
author, ‘Invisible Images (Your Pictures Are Looking at You)’, TheNew
Inquiry, 8 December 2016 <https://thenewinquiry.com/invisible-
images-your-pictures-are-looking-at-you/> [accessed 18 December
2018].
4 Significantly enough, in the last edition of her propaedeutic book on
visual studies, Gillian Rose has answered the central question of what
difference digital technologies are making in the understanding of the
contemporary iconosphere by adding a fourth ‘site’ dedicated to circu-
lation to the three previously existing ones: the site of the production
of an image, the image itself, and the sites of its audiencing. See Gillian
Rose, Visual Methodologies: An Introduction to Researching with Visual
Materials (London: Sage, 2016).
5 Following his interests in empathy theory and bodily movement, War-
burg further evolved the concept of engram, first coined by neurologist
Richard Semon — who also referred to it as ‘mneme’ — into what he
called ‘dynamogram’, that is, a visual inscription of primal, affective ex-
periences.
6 With all the uncertainties that this notion of an ‘original’ includes, since
originality is a problematic and rather recent concept, championed
mostly by Romanticism, which the avantgarde movements have vigor-
ously attacked. A picture is indeed a site where a variety of non-original
images mix and clash, and repetition is possible not because an image
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produce and consume images.7 In so doing, they keep
questioning the ontology of the image, especially in its shift
from analogic to digital, which has led to various new issues
related to their life and afterlife. Just to briefly name a few:
(1) the question of the transferability of images, not only
from one medium or support to another, but from one
context to another as well; (2) the question of their alleged
immateriality, considering that the way in which images get
seen online is shaped by energy and algorithmic patterns;
(3) the question of the difference between what is real and
what is unreal when we look at images.
Hito Steyerl’s theoretical writings, which together
with her practice as a video artist and filmmaker represent
some of the most influential thoughts in the current
debate on the status and dispersion of digital images, will
help me to unpack these issues.
For Steyerl, ‘postproducing, launching, and accelerat-
ing’ an image — that is, diffusing it — is more import-
ant than making it. The term she coined to describe this
principle is ‘circulationism’, which, although it relates es-
pecially to our digital age, according to her emerged in a
very specific moment in time: in 1989, namely when, in
the midst of the Romanian uprising, ‘protesters invaded
TV studios to make history’. Since then — Steyerl suggests
— images have changed their function and have become
‘nodes of energy and matter that migrate across different
supports, shaping and affecting people, landscapes, polit-
or gesture has a specific origin — thus could be considered unique —
but simply because of its anteriority.
7 Cf. Les Artistes iconographes/Artists as Iconographers, ed. by Garance
Chabert and AurélienMole (Paris: Empire Books-Villa du Parc, 2018),
pp. 319–26.
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ics, and social systems’.8 And that basically means that
images not only present reality, they also make it.
However, the fluidity, variability, and migration of
images — in particular when artistic appropriation is in-
volved — inevitably produce an impoverishment, if not of
content, at least of form. It is in this regard that Steyerl
speaks of the ‘poor image’, namely a copy of poor quality, of
low resolution and definition,9 which is bound to a relent-
less peregrination. And which ends up being ‘a ghost of an
image, a preview, a thumbnail, an errant idea, an itinerant
image distributed for free, squeezed through slow digital
connections, compressed, reproduced, ripped, remixed, as
well as copied and pasted into other channels of distribu-
tion.’10
Once removed from secure places such as the archive
and the film library, the ‘poor image’ is thrown into a land
of uncertainty, that is, the Internet. Here it becomes avail-
able, therefore also exposed, to easy appropriation, reuse,
and alteration, allowing a wider audience to participate in
its new reproduction and distribution processes. Speed,
intensity, and circulation become its new features; while
qualities such as resolution and exchange value recede into
the background, or even disappear. Though what comes
back is the aura, which is no longer based on the notion
8 Cf. Hito Steyerl, ‘Too Much World: Is the Internet Dead?’, in The
Internet Does Not Exist, ed. by Julieta Aranda, Brian Kuan Wood, and
Anton Vidokle (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2015), pp. 10–26 (pp. 11, 20–
21).
9 On the concept of low definition see Francesco Casetti and Antonio
Somaini, ‘The Conflict Between High Definition and Low Definition
in Contemporary Cinema’, Convergence, 19.4 (2013), pp. 415–22;
and Antonio Somaini and Andrea Pinotti, Cultura visuale. Immagini,
sguardi, media, dispositivi (Turin: Einaudi, 2016), in particular chapter
5.
10 Cf. Hito Steyerl, ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, in The Wretched of the
Screen (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2012), pp. 31–45 (p. 32).
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of uniqueness, authenticity, and authorship, but rather —
in Steyerl’s words — ‘on the transience of the copy’.11
The idea of the remediation of the image is crucial
here. Granted that the original, even if reproduced as an
exact copy, is never a true replica because it loses the two
qualities that make it unique — the here and now —, the
copy of the original gets its own aura as well, since, thanks
to its refashioning, it is linked to a specific new context and
time.12
Since in the digital visual domain things are evolving
rapidly, Steyerl is at the same moment updating and re-
shaping her thoughts. As she argues, in the last decade (her
text on the ‘poor image’ was first published in 2009) two
main changes occurred: first, what previously would have
been considered high resolution images are now very nor-
mal and diffused images; second, what once was regarded
as a free circulation of images, today increasingly appears
as a regulated flow, mainly under the control of powerful
platforms. And, what’s more, energy has turned out to be
a force or medium for circulation, which affects both nat-
ural, social, and power relations, since the transmission of
digital images (Steyerl refers to videos in particular) will
soon be the principal cause of electricity consumption in
the world. That is why she is now progressively moving
from the definition of ‘poor images’ towards that of ‘power
images’.13
11 Ibid., p. 42.
12 Cf. Andrea Pinotti, ‘Optic Distance, Haptic Immersion’, inTheEncyclo-
pedic Palace, ed. by Massimiliano Gioni and Natalie Bell (Venice: La
Biennale di Venezia–Marsilio, 2013), pp. 193–94; andBorisGroys, ‘Art
Topology:The Reproduction of Aura’, inWhen Attitudes Become Form:
Bern 1969/Venice 2013, ed. by Germano Celant (Milan: Fondazione
Prada, 2013), pp. 451–56.
13 This is a very condensed summary of a much more articulated talk she
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Allan Sekula, whose artistic work is likewise rooted
in a strong theoretical basis and who produced a consist-
ent corpus of writings throughout his entire career (he
died in 2013), was even more sceptical than Steyerl is, and
made similarly critical comments in relation to the photo-
graphic archive.14 For him the image’s ‘loss of context’
starts already from the archive tout court. ‘In an archive’,
he writes, ‘the possibility of meaning is “liberated” from
the actual contingencies of use. But this liberation is also
a loss, an abstraction from the complexity and richness of
use.’ This is because photographic meaning depends largely
on context, which has both a spatial and temporal connota-
tion’.15
The (archival) image abstraction described by Sekula
— which can be compared to the (digital) image poverty
pointed out by Steyerl — undermines, in his words, the
‘notion of mutual recognition, of global connectedness and
legibility, at the heart of the promise of the Internet’, and
highlights the dangers of digital iconographic greed, klep-
tomania, and piracy. Referring especially to digital images,
in fact, Sekula warns of another main and often underes-
timated risk: that of the increasing privatization of images
recently gave in the context of the conference on Art/Politics at n.b.k.
– Neuer Berliner Kunstverein in Berlin on 12 May 2018.
14 I won’t consider here indexicality as an opposition between analogue
and digital photography, since the most recent debate on this subject
matter is eliminating the problem by giving a whole new interpretation
to indexicality, both from a historical and contemporary perspective.
For a short overview, see Jaime Schwartz, ‘Is a Photograph Still an
Index If It’s on the Internet?’, Dis Magazine <http://dismagazine.
com/discussion/41736/a-discursive-mask/> [accessed 18 December
2018].
15 Cf. Allan Sekula, ‘Reading an Archive: Photography Between Labour
and Capital’, in The Photography Reader, ed. by Liz Wells (London:
Routledge, 2003), pp. 443–52 (p. 444).
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or change of ownership, and the consequent monopoliza-
tion of copyright.16
Under these circumstances, the flow and recircula-
tion of the ‘poor’ images would seem to be jeopardized by
private property appetites, the control exercised by search
engines, and the congestion produced by the increasing
amount of ghost data that accumulate on a daily basis as
‘digital debris’ and are dispersed as spam.17
But, in the end, should this only be seen as a danger?
Certainly not. If on the one side poor images show the hid-
den social mechanisms and political forces that rule today’s
visual economy, on the other they also create an alterna-
tive circuit that fosters the reappearance and recirculation
of excluded or marginalized visual materials, creating new
networks and debates. Furthermore, as contemporary art
practices show, it also facilitates the images’ reenactment
and refashioning, thus opening ever new, eclectic visual
possibilities.
Since the circulation of poor images feeds both cap-
italist media appetites and alternative artistic experiment-
ation, Steyerl reserves judgment.18 Alongside sameness,
anaesthesia, alienation, and control, the circulation of poor
images also has the potential to create — according to her
— ‘disruptive movements of thought and affect’, continu-
16 The target of Sekula’s critique was principally the ‘cybericonographic
omnivore’ Bill Gates who — as long as he owned the Corbis agency
— collected and controlled almost every valuable image in the world,
thus also their reproducibility and circulation, or better, since these are
services for a fee, their ‘traffic’. Cf. Allan Sekula, ‘Between the Net and
the Deep Blue Sea (Rethinking the Traffic in Photographs)’, October,
102 (2002), pp. 3–34 (pp. 3, 11).
17 SeeHito Steyerl, ‘DigitalDebris: SpamandScam’,October, 138 (2011),
pp. 70–80.
18 Steyerl’s remarks concern especially experimental cinema, hence audio-
visual material.
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ing, in the twenty-first century, the tradition of avant-garde
‘non-conformist information circuits’. The shift of atten-
tion is thus all on the afterlife of images, on their ‘swarm
circulation, digital dispersion, fractured and flexible tem-
poralities’. Which means that in the digital realm the focus
is no more on the ‘original’ image itself (the real thing) but
on the conditions of its recurrent circulation (reality) and
translation.19
19 Cf. Steyerl, ‘In Defense of the Poor Image’, pp. 43–44; and also Hito
Steyerl, ‘Politics of the Archive: Translations in Film’, transversal (Vi-
enna: eipcp, 2008) <http://eipcp.net/transversal/0608/steyerl/en>
[accessed 18 December 2018]; repr. in Steyerl, Beyond Representation:






The current debate on the lyric is imbued with diverse tem-
poralities, but they are rarely explored in their multilevel
interactions. What is the time of lyric writing and reading?
What is the temporality of the lyric as a literary genre? How
do present poems relate to past and future poems? Sum-
marizing the formation of the modern idea of lyric in the
nineteenth century in their introduction to The Lyric The-
ory Reader, Virginia Jackson and Yopie Prins write:
If for Hegel the ideal lyric poet would move civiliza-
tion forward in its perfect self-expression, for [ John
Stuart] Mill the ideal lyric poet would have to be the
representative of both original nature and acquired
culture, something no one yet had done perfectly.
For such idealized accounts, the lyric poet could
only be an imagined figure, a hero of a poetry yet to
appear (as indeed the poet became rather explicitly
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for Ralph Waldo Emerson, until Walt Whitman vol-
unteered for the job).1
This concept of the lyric, or rather of the ideal lyric project,
is patently authoritarian, essentialist, and teleological. It is
also quite voyeuristic, if we consider that, according to such
a definition, the reader witnesses — unseen — a first per-
son subject (precariously assimilated to the actual poet)
confessing itself to itself.2 This way the subject is observed
in its autonomous self-formation and an enormous power
is accredited to individual speech. Jackson and Prins, in-
deed, purport to show that this idea of the lyric is a creation
of the nineteenth century that twentieth-century literary
criticism has turned into a real, given genre rather than an
ideal yet to be achieved.
By being read as lyric, a wide range of short verse
writing has thus been lyricized: a historically situated inter-
pretive frame has been inappropriately applied to a variety
of poetic forms produced not only afterwards, but also in
the previous centuries. The creation of such an archigenre is
what Gérard Genette called a ‘retrospective illusion’.3 Re-
gardless of the historical accuracy of Jackson and Prins’s
1 The Lyric Theory Reader. A Critical Anthology, ed. by Virginia Jackson
and Yopie Prins (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014),
pp. 1–8 (p. 3). See also pp. 11–16, the editors’ introduction to the
section ‘Genre Theory’.
2 Northrop Frye echoes John Stuart Mill’s declaration ‘eloquence is
heard; poetry is overheard’ when he states that a lyric poem is ‘pre-
eminently the utterance that is overheard’. Cf. John Stuart Mill, ‘What
is Poetry?’, The Monthly Repository, n.s., 7 (1833), pp. 60–70 (p. 64)
and Northrop Frye, The Anatomy of Criticism: Four Essays (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1957), p. 249. For T. S. Eliot, in first-
person poetry, or ‘meditative verse’, the poet is ‘talking to himself— or
to nobody’, ‘The Three Voices of Poetry’, in On Poetry and Poets (Lon-
don: Faber and Faber, 1957), pp. 89–102 (p. 89).
3 Gérard Genette,TheArchitext: An Introduction, trans. by Jane E. Lewin
(Berkeley:University ofCalifornia Press, 1992) (a selection repr. inThe
Lyric Theory Reader, pp. 17–30).
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analysis, I would contend that the process they outline
could help define the inner workings of the lyric as a genre
instead of shattering it. In other words, I argue that it is pos-
sible to historicize the post-Romantic conception without
ending up with a series of entirely unrelated texts. Two and
a half millennia of literary production have contributed to
the shaping of the Romantic idea of lyric as much as that
idea has contributed to produce poems that intend to be
lyric.
Perhaps, this is my claim, the lyric itself allows for a
‘retrospective illusion’.4 One should thus look for a set of
reiterated gestures5 that could help gather together texts
from different epochs and describe the lyric as a trans-
historical discursive mode — rather than a historical and
contextual literary genre.6 If the process outlined by Jack-
son and Prins has reduced historical difference to ideal
sameness, how can one recover diversity without renoun-
cing any theoretical perspective? I want to approach the
4 For the retrospective definition of the lyric in ancient literary theory
and its productive anachronism, see W. Ralph Johnson, The Idea of
Lyric: Lyric Modes in Ancient and Modern Poetry (Berkeley: University
of California Press, 1982), pp. 83–95.
5 For Dominique Rabaté, the poem itself is a lyric gesture of re-
enunciation or re-citation, see Gestes lyriques (Paris: José Corti, 2013);
‘Énonciation poétique, énonciation lyrique’, in Figures du sujet lyrique,
ed. by Dominique Rabaté (Paris: PUF, 1996), pp. 65–79; and ‘AWorld
of Gestures’, Journal of Literary Theory, 11.1 (2017), special issue The-
ories of Lyric, ed. by Claudia Hillebrandt, Sonja Klimek, Ralph Müller,
William Waters, and Rüdiger Zymner, pp. 89–96.
6 Transhistorical does not mean meta-historical. Instead of focusing on
contextual differences, a transhistorical approach, as that pursued by
Jonathan Culler in Theory of the Lyric (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2015), seeks traces of historical continuity in cultural
artefacts. It does not propose immutable ahistorical features, but rather
traces recurrences across contextual variations. Through iteration, dif-
ference can emerge, and variations allow tracking continuity. See
Francesco Giusti, ‘The Lyric in Theory. A Conversation with Jonathan
Culler’, Los Angeles Review of Books, 27 May 2017.
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lyric from a specific angle, namely the multilayered and
asynchronous temporalities that the lyric both establishes
and is constituted by. As a general key to unlock them, I
shall deploy the term recite, from Latin recitare ‘read aloud,
repeat from memory, declaim’, which is composed of re-
‘back, again’ and citare ‘to summon’. At different moments,
I shall use the word in both its senses of ‘to repeat aloud’
and ‘to quote again’. By shedding light on this double act
— the recitation of the poem and the re-citation of prior
lyric gestures — correspondences between the time of the
poem and the time of the genre might emerge.
In Augustine’s Confessions, the recitation of a poem is
presented as a good example of his notion of time (XI, 38):
Imagine that I am to recite [dicturus] a hymn
[canticum] that I know. Before I start, my
expectation [expectatio] extends to the hymn
as a whole. But once I begin, whatever part of
that expectation I have plucked away goes into
the past and is retained in my memory: the life
force of my performance [actionis] is in tension
[distenditur] between memory (because of what
I have already spoken) and expectation (because
of what I have yet to say). My awareness [attentio]
is in the present though; and through it what
was future crosses over to become the past. The
longer the performance continues, the more my
expectation is reduced and my memory prolonged,
until expectation is entirely exhausted: and once
the whole performance [actio] of the hymn is
finished it shifts into memory.7
For Augustine, the recitation of a canticum is a suitable in-
stance of the workings of temporality in the human mind:
7 Augustine, Confessions, ed. and trans. by Carolyn J.-B. Hammond, 2
vols (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014–16), ii: pp.
253–55.
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on the one hand the establishment of past and future, on
the other hand the progressive subdivision of the present
— from the whole poem down to the individual syllables.
Both past and future are produced in the act of reading,
the former as memory and the latter as expectation. As
memory extends itself, so expectation is gradually reduced.
The action of voicing marks the present moment that sets
apart what has been already repeated from what is yet to
come. At the same time, as Augustine observes, an arbi-
trary subdivision of the text/time delimits the extension of
the present.
I do not want to enter Augustine’s discussion of time
here; rather I am interested in this passage as the trace of a
textual practice. In the retrieval of memory, past and future
have nothing to do with the acquisition or transmission
of knowledge: it is posited that the reciter already knows
the poem. The present is thus an action, not a reflection.
In recitation, expectation does not concern unforeseeable
events, but rather the anticipation of what is going to hap-
pen, or is likely to happen. In order to have expectations,
the reciter (or the reader) must recognize the unfolding of
a structure; in order for time to pass, the structure must be
recognizable. The unexpected, one might deduce, breaks
the passing of time. The deviance — the event that could
not be predicted based on previously known causes —
erupts as an error, a clinamen — in the terms of Lucretius’s
De Rerum Natura (II, 289–94) which translate the parén-
klisis of Epicurean physics. Nothing, of course, prevents
one from tracing outcomes back to some anterior causes —
this is probably one of the aims of retrospective narration.
I will leave aside the question of error for now, and
focus instead on the temporality of reading. The present
moment of reading can be established only within some
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kind of recursive structure — which distends itself in a
system of recollections and expectations — and under the
condition that the gesture is performed again. In the case of
a poem, the present moment, which is an action in time, is
also the re-enactment of the past: the poem already exists
for the reader, just as in Augustine’s example it is already in
the reciter’s memory.
In The Time That Remains, Giorgio Agamben also
refers to a poem to exemplify what he defines as messianic
time: a time that is moving towards its end, but whose end
and fulfilment — the Apocalypse — are beyond time. Here
Agamben connects time not to the performing reader, but
to the structure of the poem itself. Expectations are not
generated by prior knowledge, but by the internal organ-
ization of the text. For him,
[t]he sestina — and, in this sense, every poem — is
a soteriological device which, through the sophis-
ticated mēchanē of the announcement and retrieval
of rhyming end words (which correspond to typo-
logical relations between past and present), trans-
forms chronological time into messianic time. Just
as this time is not other to chronological time or
eternity, but is the transformation that time under-
goes when it is taken for a remnant, so too is the
time of the sestina the metamorphosis that time
undergoes insofar as it is the time of the end, the
time that the poem takes to come to an end.8
Agamben refers specifically to the system of rhymes, but
in The End of the Poem he seems to imply that even non-
8 Giorgio Agamben,TheTimeThat Remains: ACommentary on the Letter
to the Romans, trans. by Patricia Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2005), pp. 82–83.
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rhyming poems work in accordance to messianic time.9
They establish their own time. This time is not some-
thing other than chronos; it is rather an organization of
chronos into a kairos that not only moves towards its an-
ticipated end, but is also internally structured in a system
of announcements and retrievals, that is, in a system of
expectations and memories. If messianic time marks the be-
ginning and the end of time, thus reducing its openness, it
also animates it through the repetition of rhymes, where
each ending sound anticipates and recalls identical ones:
Through this complicated to-and-fro directed for-
ward and backward, the chronological sequence
of linear homogeneous time is completely trans-
formed into rhythmic constellations themselves in
movement. It is not that there is another time, com-
ing from who-knows-where that would substitute
for chronological time; to the contrary, what we
have is the same time that organizes itself through
its own somewhat hidden internal pulsation, in or-
der to make place for the time of the poem.10
As progressing in the poem line after line, the reader is
caught in the fleeting present of enunciation in which the
memory of previous words meets the expectation of the
words to come.
Given that Augustine’s and Agamben’s exemplifica-
tions illustrate the temporality active within the poem, the
question arises whether this multidirectional temporality
might be operative at the level of the literary genre too. To
explore this hypothesis, I shall focus in the second part of
my contribution on Rilke’s decision not to translate, but
9 Giorgio Agamben, ‘The End of the Poem’, in The End of the Poem:
Studies in Poetics, trans. by Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999), pp. 109–15.
10 Agamben, The Time That Remains, p. 82.
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rather to rewrite Dante’s Vita nova (1293–1295) in the first
of the Duineser Elegien (1912), and on the reasons for that
suggested in the poem itself. From recitation in the sense
of repeating a poem aloud, I shall then expand to re-citation
in the sense of quoting another poem again. But before
reaching the level of the literary genre, I shall first look at
Dante’s ‘Tanto gentile e tanto onesta pare’ (‘Such sweet
decorum and such gentle grace’) and the ways in which
this sonnet, written several years earlier, is subsequently in-
cluded in the prosimetric structure of the Vita nova. What
kind of relationship does the lyric poem establish with the
surrounding narrative prose? What kind of temporality is
Dante offering here for the lyric?
Robert Pogue Harrison defines ‘Tanto gentile e tanto
onesta pare’ as the ‘ideal lyric’ of the Vita nova inasmuch as
it presents a fully-fledged ‘circle of incorporation’, and for
Manuele Gragnolati and Francesca Southerden it consti-
tutes a ‘moment of perfect plenitude’.11 The sonnet is gen-
erally acknowledged to be the fullest embodiment of the
praise (loda) that Dante proposes in Vita nova 10 (XVII–
XIX) as his new poetic style.12
11 Although this is the poem in which Dante gets closest to the bodily
presence of Beatrice, for Harrison the lady is still withdrawing some-
thing of herself from full revelation while at once animating the poetic
voice, see Robert Pogue Harrison, The Body of Beatrice (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 31–46 (pp. 31 and 44).
In their account of the sonnet, Gragnolati and Southerden instead
think of the poem as an accomplished full revelation in an ecstatic
now, ‘a (temporary) leap into the instantaneity of glory, which the
poem does not so much describe as actively perform’, see Manuele
Gragnolati and Francesca Southerden, ‘Dalla perdita al possesso. For-
me di temporalità non lineare nelle epifanie liriche di Cavalcanti, Dante
e Petrarca’, Chroniques italiennes, séries web 32 (1/2017), pp. 136–
54 (pp. 143 and 147) <http://www.univ-paris3.fr/medias/fichier/
gragnolati-southerden_1501152291404.pdf> [accessed 20 December
2018]. Translation of the authors.
12 I follow the text and the subdivision of the text into 31 paragraphs
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Such sweet decorum and such gentle grace
attends my lady’s greeting as she moves
that lips can only tremble into silence,
and eyes dare not attempt to gaze at her.
Moving benignly clothed in humility,
untouched by all the praise along her way,
she seems to be a creature come from Heaven
to Earth to manifest a miracle.
Miraculously gracious to behold,
her sweetness reaches, through the eyes, the heart
(who has not felt this cannot understand),
and from her lips it seems there moves a gracious
spirit, so deeply loving that it glides
into the souls of men, whispering: ‘Sigh!’ 13
To understand the specific temporality of this poem, one
has to pay attention to how it is embedded in the prose
of paragraph 17 (XXVI) of the Vita nova. Indeed, the pre-
ceding narrative (ragione, in Dante’s terms) provides the
scene of enunciation that frames the lyric utterance. Before
saying (dire) the sonnet,14 Dante describes the wondrous
appearance of Beatrice in the streets of Florence and the
provided in Dante Alighieri, Vita nova, ed. by Guglielmo Gorni
(Turin: Einaudi, 1996). The corresponding section in Barbi’s edition
is provided in Roman numerals in parenthesis. ‘Tanto gentile e tanto
onesta pare / la donna mia quand’ella altrui saluta, / ch’ogne lingua
deven tremando muta / e gli occhi no l’ardiscon di guardare. // Ella
si va, sentendosi laudare, / benignamente d’umiltà vestuta; / e par che
sia una cosa venuta / da cielo in terra a miracol mostrare. / Mostrasi sì
piacente a chi la mira, / che dà per gli occhi una dolcezza al core, / che
’ntender no·lla può chi no·lla prova; / e par che della sua labbia si mova
/ un spirito soave pien d’amore, / che va dicendo all’anima: Sospira.’
(Dante, Vita nova, pp. 159–61.)
13 Dante Alighieri,Dante’sVita Nuova. New Edition: A Translation and an
Essay, ed. and trans. by Mark Musa (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1973), p. 57.
14 Although the Vita nova as a literary work strongly marks its being
written, it consistently presents the production of poetry as an act of
saying and associates it with verbs of vocalization (dire). This act does
not expect a passive reader or listener; it is rather meant to respond to
someone or to engender a variety of active responses.
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effect she has on the people who hasten to see her. This is a
recurrent event: Beatrice attracts and affects her beholders
every time she makes an appearance in a public place. As
Dante openly declares, he composes the sonnet to share
Beatrice’s miraculous operations with the people who can-
not see her in person (but probably have heard of her).
Therefore, the poem is not a representation of a prior real
event to be interpreted by selected expert readers (Dante’s
fellow love poets), as it is the case with the sonnet ‘A cias-
cun’alma presa e gentil core’ (‘To every captive soul and
loving heart’) in the first paragraph (III). Rather it is con-
ceived as a verbal substitute for Beatrice that, when recited,
aims to induce the same actual effects in its readers that
the actual woman induces in her beholders. The poem is
meant to let other people participate in the iterable advent
of Beatrice.
Furthermore, the enunciation of the poem — reen-
acted at every recitation of the text — covers and artic-
ulates a definite time span. As we read in Dante’s prose,
just after Beatrice’s passage, several bystanders express in
words their wonder at the event and their admiration for
the woman’s angelic beauty. The presence of Beatrice en-
genders in them so strong an honesty that, during the
actual event of Beatrice’s appearance, they cannot but fall
silent and lower their eyes. The pleasant inner experience of
her manifestation is so intense that bystanders are not able
to retell it, and no one could look at her without sighing
upon the very first glance. No one but Dante apparently.
Even though exposed to Beatrice’s impact, the poet wants
to say the event while it happens, before he is eventually
forced to sigh too. The poem wants to make the event
present to the readers while it is taking place and up to the
(expected) sighing, between Beatrice’s first appearance on
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the scene and the silence that her passing by imposes on
bystanders.15
The crystallized moment — which encapsulates itera-
tion — moves toward the final sigh that is the threshold to
the fullness of experience and from where the poem can
begin (again). The poem ‘happens’ after its end and be-
fore its beginning. The iterability of the poem as event is
not made explicit in the poem, but only in the prose.16
The poem, though, offers itself for repetition in different
‘presents’ thanks to its verbal tenses (present and gerund),
the establishment of its own kairos, and the (shareable)
open position of its speaker. Referentiality is kept open in
the poem: the utterance finds its referents only in the larger
world in which it takes place, in this case the fictional world
created by the narrative in which it is inserted.17 As a mem-
ber of a responsive collectivity, the speaker is left relatively
non-individuated since the active role is delegated to Bea-
trice. By inserting in the frame narrative of the Vita nova a
poem that he had written previously, Dante identifies him-
15 Perhaps, in order to be able to look and speak, the speaker has to par-
tially withdraw his presence from the scene of passing and greeting,
or at least slightly delay Beatrice’s effect on him. Indeed, Beatrice ad-
dresses her greeting to others (altrui). Of course, the narrative reason
could also apply here: in paragraph 5 (X–XII), Beatrice had already
denied her sweet greeting to Dante and this deprivation caused the
adoption of the style of praise, which does not ask for any kind of re-
ciprocation.
16 The notion of the poem as event shares some traits with Attridge’s
concept of act-event: the position of both activity and passivity inwhich
the reader finds herself when responding to a text as a literary work,
see Derek Attridge, The Work of Literature (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015). For Attridge, this response concerns literature in general;
I am interested in the linguistic and rhetorical strategies by which the
lyric enables such response.
17 In other cases, amore stable referent can be provided by our ‘real’ world
in the context of the re-enactment of the poem, by literary history, or
by paratextual or macrotextual elements, such as titles, epigraphs, or
recurrent proper names (for instance, Laura in Petrarch’s Canzoniere).
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self as the author — the first person to say the poem — but
also as a reader of the product of a creative power which lies
somewhere else.18 In other words, he is already re-enacting
it.
The verbal gesture of saying or praising the beloved
(or any other object of cultural value) — with no ambition
to contain her in a full representation — is an act of pres-
ence as much as a quotable form. The poem is an effect of
Beatrice that intends to have the same, or at least a similar,
effect on its readers. Over a certain time span, the presence
of the speaker is engendered by the presence of Beatrice as
much as the presence of the reader is engendered (up to the
conclusive sigh) by the presence of the poem.19 One could
say, following Agamben, that the fullness of experience is
beyond the limits of the poem, in the silence brought about
by the sigh, but the entire utterance moves toward that
silence which is outside of the poem, outside of the articu-
lation of time.
The poem is not just made of words that, when read
out loud, are translated into bodily actions or bring forth
what they convey as meaning, as it happens in an oath,
a court sentence, or an instruction book, what could be
18 As at least twelve other poems included in theVita nova, ‘Tanto gentile
e tanto onesta pare’ had an attested previous circulation as a free-
standing poem, see Dante Alighieri, Rime giovanili e della Vita nuova,
ed. by Teodolinda Barolini, notes by Manuele Gragnolati (Milano:
Rizzoli Bur, 2009), pp. 392–402. The subsequent transmission of the
Vita nova shows the resistance of the lyric to be fully absorbed into
the self-exegetical prose, and to a certain extent, into Dante’s authorial
self-projection. Boccaccio transcribes the Vita nova, moving Dante’s
analytical annotations to the poems (divisioni) to the margins and, fol-
lowing this model, the 1576 edition princeps published by Sermantelli
does not print them. See Jelena Todorović, Dante and the Dynamics of
Textual Exchange (New York: FordhamUniversity Press, 2016), pp. 4–
6.
19 In The Body of Beatrice, Harrison investigates in depth this generative
power delegated to Beatrice.
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called a performative utterance in J. L. Austin’s sense of
the term.20 These kinds of words, in their precise arrange-
ment, are re-performed as a real utterance by someone
else and every time they establish a ‘now’ of the event.
Jonathan Culler aptly distinguishes this kind of perform-
ance from Austin’s performativity and specifically credits
the lyric with it.21 Yet there is something else: These words
are not simply the presentation of a feeling, situation, or
condition with which the reader can empathize or identify
herself. Even for the reader, it is not a matter of external ref-
erentiality. In the lyric poem the repeatable verbal gesture
is the real gesture. Language and act coincide in a per-
formance that does not actualize anything but itself in the
external world. The re-enactment or re-citation of such ges-
tures, which always entails an interplay between memories
and expectations, could have a role in the self-recognition
of the literary genre across centuries. By re-citing these ges-
tures, perhaps, one could even act as a lyric subject.
20 John L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Cambridge, MA: Har-
vard University Press, 1975).




Despite the increasing incidence of eating disorders, very
few films have addressed these conditions in particular and,
what’s more, most of the US-American mainstream fiction
films seem to be built on anachronistic clichés hardly de-
picting the broad array of eating disorders. As a proof —
however controversial and partial — of the dramatic and
manifold presence of this health issue in our society, the
latest, fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual
of Mental Disorders (DSM-5),1 in 2013, has reclassified
and expanded the types of eating disorders [abbreviated
in the following as ‘ED’], acknowledging ones which are
less visible, either because they do not conspicuously mark
the body or because they fit socially accepted obsessions
and practices — e.g., strict diets, orthorexia, and over-
exercising.
I am particularly interested in looking at the cinematic
misrepresentation of these conditions because it crucially
1 Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition,
DSM-5, ed. by American Psychiatric Association (Washington, DC:
American Psychiatric Publishing, 2013).
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sheds light on a discrepancy between the temporality of
ED symptoms and the narrative of recovery. The latter
often merely serves the purpose of framing the film’s pro-
tagonists’ dramatic development, namely the story of their
ED experience, according to the traditional plot structure
of beginning, middle, and end, which in most cases winds
up in an implausible ‘therapeutic happy end’. In this sense,
‘to recover’ meets the classic definition of ‘returning to a
normal state of health, mind, or strength’, as if nothing
happened ‘in the meantime’, and as if ‘to heal’ meant ‘to for-
get’. Pointing out the entanglement between ED symptoms
and the process of recovery itself is not a way to deny the
condition, to push it back into a hidden and secret realm,
where no one is around, but it is rather a proposition to find
a different angle to read the ‘externally’ evident expressions
of discomfort, especially when taking into account less
easily detectable, less circumscribed nutritional disorders.
Comparison of medical, psychological, and sociological
explanatory models of eating disorders with one another
shows that anorexia, bulimia, binge eating, and chronic
dieting have not one single cause, but this is not the sense
one gets from watching most films about ED. Not eating
— overeating and binge eating mainly remain out of frame
— is most often shown as a response to life stress or as
corresponding to a desire to be more fashionable or more
efficient. Even if statistics show that anorexia, in particu-
lar, afflicts mostly women, the focus on a single affected
constituency not only marginalizes afflicted minorities, but
also hinders understanding the complexity and multifa-
ceted nature of the disorder, at the risk of reducing it to
a contemporary form of hysteria.2 In this connection, Abi-
gail Bray illuminates how such a perspective fuels the risk
2 Cf. Greta Olson, Reading Eating Disorders: Writings on Bulimia and
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of considering women weak subjects that tend to be pas-
sive, narcissistic victims of the beauty ideals promoted by
the media and the world of fashion.3
The expressive power of ED symptoms, conceived as
a pathic history of the body in motion (as Aby Warburg
would say), does not appear on screen. What the audience
sees instead are bodies progressively wasting away. The
spectator is given no hint of the asynchrony between daily
life and the attempts of the ED-affected person to stop, to
interrupt, and to alter time by shaping and reshaping, filling
up, and emptying their body: a temporal dimension para-
doxically linked to what is rejected, namely the everyday
and corporeality. On the one hand, ED rituals build up a
supposedly safe and private spot where time is suspended,
hollow, detached from shared time; on the other hand, this
temporality is organic, heavy, and ‘physical’, as it is paced
by the rhythm of chewing, the speed of digestion, the com-
pensatory vomiting or ‘purging’. The food rituals create a
delusional control over the flow of time, a way to fold and
unfold time at will, and to daydream about unlimited and
coexisting possibilities. This overwhelming tangle of de-
sires and fears prevent the interaction among past, present,
and future by disjoining every single experience under the
influence of substantial mood swings.
In two of the most popular mainstream films that deal
with ED, For the Love of Nancy (ABC, 1994) by Paul
Schneider and the more recent To the Bone (Netflix, 2017),
directed by Marti Noxon, temporality is rather flattened
to fit a particular age, and it only counts for a certain kind
Anorexia as Confessions of American Culture (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter
Lang, 2003).
3 Cf. Abigail Bray, ‘The Anorexic Body: Reading Disorders’, Cultural
Studies, 10.3 (1996), pp. 413–29.
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of character: a beautiful, white, smart, wealthy teenage girl
affected by anorexia, who will, eventually, recover, thanks
to the support of a charismatic male doctor. Despite the
differences between the two movies, its two protagonists,
Ellen and Nancy, embrace a similar journey of healing,
which ultimately guides them across the threshold of adult
age beyond which they will have to become an active part
of society. This temporal window neither touches upon
the socio-political dimension of ED, for instance, by ques-
tioning the broader frame of capitalist consumption, nor
unveils the individual, morbid, fantasies linked to the ob-
ject ‘food’ and the ways in which these fantasies can be
an either visible or invisible obstacle in the interactions of
daily life.
To the Bone confirms, for instance, a certain voyeuristic
approach that spectacularizes anorexia, which remains the
most represented form of ED in film, probably because it
shows, together with obesity, the most conspicuous bod-
ily effects. Unlike the latter, though, anorexia evokes and
embodies, or better tries to disembody, a desire for control
and a repulsion for the terrestrial and animal side of human
nature. In Noxon’s film — some of whose crew and cast
reputedly had experienced ED, the filmmaker included —
we find at stake some simplistic, and surely not innocuous,
stereotypes that smooth out the characters’ identities and
any probable inner conflicts over their will to be skinny.
Their feeling, their affects, their morbid thoughts, their ob-
sessive gestures are not brought to the surface, but rather
appear as superficial as a fashionable tantrum. To the Bone
tries to challenge traditional family values as much as the
official therapeutic methods with which ED are being ad-
dressed, but these attempts do not really question the
rhetoric around ED, and, furthermore, they do not escape
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gender and racial clichés. As Hadley Freeman has noticed,
the ‘unconventional’ psychiatrist is a man, ‘the nurse is a
woman, Ellen’s mother and her girlfriend are both self-
obsessed, her father is absent but hard-working. The one
male anorexia patient is wise and selfless in a way none of
the female patients are, and he, along with the male doctor,
helps to “save” Ellen’.4
Over the last years, journalists5 and academics from
the social sciences, cultural and gender studies6 have been
drawing attention to the way in which discriminatory as-
sumptions are in play in and being validated by narrative
representations of ED. But despite the longstanding debate
about the negative influence of media on the prolifera-
tion of ED, there is very little research on the significance
of the aesthetics employed in representing ED in narra-
tive visual media.7 And yet, when cinema meets such a
4 Hadley Freeman, ‘To the Bone Confirms There Are (Almost)
No Good Movies about Anorexia’, Guardian, 12 July 2017
<https://www.theguardian.com/film/2017/jul/12/to-the-bone-
confirms-there-are-almost-no-good-movies-about-anorexia>
[accessed 21 September 2018].
5 See Elisabeth King, ‘Are Movies about Eating Disorders
Fundamentally Uncinematic?’, Pacific Standard, 14 July 2017
<https://psmag.com/social-justice/how-to-make-a-movie-about-a-
lonely-terrible-experience> [accessed 21 September 2018]; Michelle
Konstantinovsky, ‘Eating Disorders Do Not Discriminate: Puncturing
the Dangerous Myth That Only White Women Get Eating Disorders’,




6 SeeRoxaneGay,Hunger (NewYork:HarperCollins, 2017);GitteMari-
anne Hansen, Femininity, Self-Harm and Eating Disorders in Japan.
Navigating Contradiction in Narrative and Visual Culture (London:
Routledge, 2016); Helen Malson and Maree Burns, Critical Feminist
Approaches to Eating Dis/Orders (London: Routledge, 2009).
7 See Su Holmes, ‘(Un)twisted: Talking Back to Media Representations
of Eating Disorders’, Journal of Gender Studies, 27.3 (May 2016), pp.
1–16.
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sensitive and persistent social problem, different aesthetic
practices can dramatically affect particular kinds of audi-
ences — for instance those who suffer from ED themselves
as distinct from those who want to learn more about it.
Films are not, or not only, meant to reproduce conven-
tional conceptions of reality but they can go beyond med-
ical statistics, pathological categories, and predictable ways
of instilling empathy. In 2016, the writer and artist Jessie
Kahnweiler directed the webseries The Skinny to sensitize
people to those eating disorders like bulimia that tend to
be less commonly represented than anorexia, since, des-
pite their exponential rise, they are less conspicuous, that
is, cannot be recognized as easily on the patient’s body.
Kahnweiler, who herself has been suffering for many years
from bulimia, points out how films about eating disorders
are not at all realistic since they don’t reveal the disgust-
ing and shameful aspects of binging, purging, and throwing
up. Her attempt to move the issue out of the clinical space
and into daily life by showing eating disorders in their
ordinary, mundane environment where they become in-
visible — yet very present in the daily schedule of the
protagonist — is a remarkable alternative to unrealistic
plots with compulsively happy endings. Nonetheless, visi-
bility and eating disorders are much more entangled than
Kahnweiler brings to light in her intentionally grotesque
depiction of bulimia. If Kahnweiler’s provocation draws
attention to shame and secrecy by overexposing bulimia
symptoms, it uncovers only some of the numerous elem-
ents at stake in analysing eating disorders through both an
individual and socio-political lens.
The question of how ED should be represented sug-
gests a more general question: how to account for mental
disorders, especially when the disorders’ borders blur into
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a chronic life background and their supposed symptoms
approach what Lauren Berlant, within her theory of ‘slow
death’, calls ‘self-interruptive’ gestures.8 In a similar vein,
perhaps, a more detailed and useful way of accounting for
the pervasiveness of ED could be found outside of those
places where recovery officially takes place (clinics, hos-
pitals, therapists). By insisting on the interior settings of
the clinic or the family, films that deal with ED tend, in
fact, to adopt a psychological point of view without en-
larging their frame to the dimensions of production and
consumption that are so central in neoliberal societies.
Eating disorders touch, in fact, both the private and the
public spheres and by doing so, they reveal transforma-
tions, obsessions, and contradictions of society at large.
The paradoxical way, for instance, in which eating dis-
orders are stigmatized while at the same time ‘low-fat’,
‘healthy’ food and dieting have become one of the most
profitable businesses. Not to mention the medicalization
of political issues through the discourses of public sham-
ing disguised by a rhetoric of ‘individual responsibility’ and
the introjection of control. In this sense it is interesting to
look at the obsession with the body not merely as a form
of individual as well as collective narcissism. In the words
of Micki Mcgee ‘the desire to invent a life is no longer evi-
dence of narcissistic self-involvement or an emancipatory
countercultural impulse, but rather is increasingly required
as a new form of ‘immaterial labour’ — mental, social and
emotional tasks — required for participation in the labour
market”.9 In this perspective, the desire to shape and con-
8 Lauren Berlant, ‘Slow Death (Obesity, Sovereignty, Lateral Agency)’,
in Cruel Optimism, (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011), pp.
95–119.
9 Micki McGee, Self Help, Inc.: Makeover Culture in American Life (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 24.
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trol the body is yet another piece of the puzzle that in Silvia
Federici’s historical reconstruction of modernity from the
seventeenth century onwards, sees body and capital as in-
extricably linked,10 or to be precise, the female body and
capital. Zooming out from the pathological frame in this
sense is indeed not a way to relativize the severe medical
consequence of eating disorders, but a way to read the
macro- and micro-expressivity of their symptoms. A teleo-
logical narrative of recovery occludes a crucial aspect of the
temporality of eating disorders, namely the experience of
being condemned to a ‘not yet’, barred from recognizing
one’s self as part of a story in the name of a phantasmal
true self still to be realized. It is perhaps in this sense that,
once again, we should shift our gaze to the causes of the
overwhelmingly gendered epidemic in the socio-historical
roots of this phantasm.
10 Silvia Federici,TheCaliban and theWitch:Woman, the Body and Primi-
tive Accumulation (New York: Autonomedia, 2004).
Reenactment
Errant Images in Contemporary Art
CRISTINA BALDACCI
The following remarks are intended to serve as an introduc-
tion to reenactment, which was the topic of an international
symposium I co-organized at the ICI Berlin in November
2017.1
By ‘visual errancy’ I mean the wandering of certain
images — also intended as forms and gestures — over
time, which contemporary artists appropriate from the
archives tout court, but also from the archive understood
in a broader sense, as a heterotopic space where all cul-
tural images potentially converge and remain in a state of
1 The symposium ‘Over and Over and Over Again: Re-enactment
Strategies in Contemporary Arts and Theory’ <https://www.ici-
berlin.org/events/over-and-over> [accessed 18 December 2018], or-
ganized together with Clio Nicastro and Arianna Sforzini, aimed at
following and retracing the notion of reenactment along three parallel
approaches: the archive, the arts, and curatorial practice. The proceed-
ings of the conference will be published in the same book series as the
current volume, ‘Cultural Inquiry’.
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flux. This appropriation is then followed by a reactivation,
which usually also undergoes a process of manipulation
and/or migration from one medium to another, and by re-
circulation that gives the images new values, meanings, and
configurations.2
As special creators of images, willingly or not, artists
have to deal with a collective visual tradition that relates
to a timeless or at least multi-layered and anachronic time.
They have in fact always been engaged with what came
before; with the gesture of a more or less conscious appro-
priation, with the repetition, as a synonym for reinterpret-
ation and renewal, of a visual heritage made of ‘originals’,3
whose attribution or provenance is mostly not declared
(and not necessarily relevant). No matter how they have
been called throughout the twentieth century, based on
their different connotations and contexts — be it arche-
types ( Jung), Pathosformeln (Warburg), or reproductions
(Benjamin) — in the end they are all recurrent images that
emerge again and travel across time.4
It is hardly news that art does not come out of a void,
2 See Dear Aby Warburg, What Can Be Done with Images?, ed. by Ines
Rütinger and Eva Schmidt (Heidelberg: Kehrer, 2012); and Les Ar-
tistes iconographes/Artists as Iconographers, ed. byGaranceChabert and
Aurélien Mole (Paris: Empire Books-Villa du Parc, 2018).
3 On this topic see, among others, Sylviane Agacinski, ‘Anachronisms
of Art: Style and Medium’, in Time Passing: Modernity and Nostalgia,
trans. by JodyGladding (NewYork: Columbia University Press, 2003),
pp. 105–36, especially p. 111; and ‘Images of Images: The Survival and
Repetition of Forms. AConversation betweenMassimilianoGioni and
Andrea Pinotti’, inToWrite an Image, ed. by Vincenzo de Bellis (Milan:
Mousse Publishing, 2015), pp. 17–27.
4 The image’s wandering has to be understood not only as an external
motion but also, as Giorgio Agamben suggests, as an internal one,
since ‘every image is animated by an antinomous polarity’ that breaks
the myth of its fixity. See Giorgio Agamben, ‘Notes on Gesture’, in
Infancy and History: The Destruction of Experience, trans. by Liz Heron
(London: Verso, 1993), pp. 133–40 (p. 139).
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since it has always been produced in reference to already
existing images, mixing different temporalities and codes.
As Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin highlight in their book
on remediation — by quoting Stanley Cavell’s study on the
ontology of cinema (The World Viewed, 1979) —, despite
the obsession historians and critics have had for novelty,
the task of the (modern) artist has always been ‘one of
creating not a new instance of his art, but a new medium
in it’. That implies, of course, that the ‘novelty’ resembles a
reinvention or rearrangement of what already exists more
than a total revolution.5
And here we come to reenactment, a term that I would
like to introduce as a possible substitute for ‘remake’, which
for me also has a closer affinity with the meaning Bolter and
Grusin attribute to remediation as the act of ‘refashioning’;
especially — but not only — when dealing with (digital)
images and time-based art, that is, film, video, and perform-
ance.
Where does the word reenactment, so often used
today, come from? And how did it happen that, from his-
torical discourse6 and the relationship with the archive and
with time,7 it has now entered both the artistic and the
curatorial practice?
5 Cf. Jay D. Bolter and Richard A. Grusin, Remediation: Understanding
New Media (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), p. 270.
6 Cf. especiallyRobinG.Collingwood,TheIdea ofHistory (Oxford:Clar-
endon Press, 1946); William H. Dray, History as Re-enactment: R. G.
Collingwood’s Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995);
and Vanessa Agnew, ‘History’s Affective Turn: Historical Reenactment
and Its Work in the Present’, Rethinking History, 11.3 (2007), pp. 299–
312.
7 From this perspective, asWolfgangErnst argues in hiswritings, it seems
that even digital technologies have accustomed us to a continuous
reenactment. See Wolfgang Ernst, The Delayed Present: Media-Induced
Tempor(e)alities & Techno-Traumatic Irritations of ‘the Contemporary’
(Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2017), pp. 9–10.
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As a verb and derivative of the Middle English ‘en-
acten’, it has been used since the seventeenth century. Over
time, ‘to re-enact’ has taken on different connotations de-
pending on the specific context of its use. To name two
of the most relevant: it can mean ‘to repeat the actions
(of an earlier event or incident)’ as well as ‘to act or per-
form again’.8 The first definition is less interesting for my
argument because it mainly relates to the trend of ‘Living
History’, that is, to historical revival as a form of enter-
tainment and collective memory constructed through the
act of ‘making experience’.9 The second definition is re-
lated to the former one but goes directly to the heart of
the matter. It does indeed relate to the performing arts,
where the noun reenactment originated — yet within a
wider perspective and an increasing persistence from the
1990s onwards —, connecting it to other artistic idioms.
Although in both cases it constitutes an attempt to bring
history back to life (or to the present), unlike the act of
restaging related to ‘Living History’, which implies the idea
of replicating as faithfully as possible the original event,
reenactment as an art form is an interpretative gesture that
never produces a true repetition. As is well known, it was
Antonin Artaud who once said that a gesture in theatre can
‘never be made the same way twice’.10
8 ‘Reenact’, Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary <https://www.
merriam-webster.com/dictionary/reenact> [accessed 18 December
2018].
9 See, for instance, Marvin Carlson, ‘Living History, Re-enactment’, in
Performance Studies: Key Words, Concepts and Theories, ed. by Bryan
Reynolds (London: Palgrave, 2014), pp. 84–90.
10 Artaud quoted inAmelia Jones, ‘TheNow and theHas Been: Paradoxes
of Live Art in History’, in Perform, Repeat, Record: Live Art in History,
ed. by Amelia Jones and AdrianHeathfield (Bristol: Intellect, 2012), p.
11.
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One of the most interesting aspects of reenactment
as reappropriation and reembodiment is the role of the
artist’s body as a medium that gives form and substance,
not only to actions by other performers — as it happened
inSevenEasyPieces, the most celebrated as well as criticized
work that Marina Abramović staged at the Guggenheim
Museum in New York in 2005 —,11 but also to artworks
that come from different eras, contexts, and languages.12
By staging and embodying anew existing images that
the artist-performer can, from time to time, take either
from his/her own repertoire and the repertoire of others,
or from art history and the visual imaginary, cultural tra-
ditions are reactivated and travel over time in the form
of ritualized behaviours or even scores — where score,
taken from the musical domain, is to be understood in a
broader sense as code, namely a system of signs.13 In this
way, the body becomes similar to an ‘atlas of gestures’,14
11 Seven Easy Pieces included reenactments of two of Abramović’s previ-
ous performances as well as five actions by Vito Acconci, Joseph Beuys,
VALIE EXPORT, Bruce Nauman, and Gina Pane. Cf. Amelia Jones,
‘“The Artist Is Present”: Artistic Re-enactments and the Impossibility
of Presence’, TDR: The Drama Review, 55.1 (2011), pp. 16–45, espe-
cially p. 18.
12 Seen fromHans Belting’s anthropological perspective, the body is here
at the same time the locus and the medium (through which it becomes
picture) of the image. Cf. Hans Belting, An Anthropology of Images:
Picture,Medium, Body, trans. byThomasDunlap (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2011).
13 Cf., among others, Diana Taylor, The Archive and the Repertoire: Per-
forming Cultural Memory in the Americas (Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2003); André Lepecki, ‘The Body as Archive: Will to
Re-enact and the Afterlives of Dances’, Dance Research Journal, 42.2
(2010), pp. 28–48; and Recréer/Scripter. Mémoires et transmissions des
œuvres performatives et chorégraphiques contemporaines, ed. by Anne
Bénichou (Dijon: Presses du réel, 2015).
14 See, to name but a few, Virgilio Sieni’s choreographies, fromwhich this
expression comes,Tino Sehgal’s ‘constructed situations’, andAlexandra
Pirici’s andManuel Pelmuş’ Immaterial Retrospective (2013) andPublic
Collection (2015).
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that is, an archive of movements, experiences, and forms
with a strong symbolic charge; a place for the Nachleben
(survival) that challenges the traditional idea of heritage
and at the same time renews the modalities of conserva-
tion, presentation/representation, and of the circulation of
knowledge.
This is the case, for instance, in Alexandra Pirici’s
choreographed ‘ongoing actions’, where the performers’
bodies become media that translate and transmit cultural
memory and visual history as living images or counter-
narratives. The artist started being noticed in the art scene
in 2011, when a group of performers embodied specific
historical monuments in public spaces to highlight issues
of memory and politics, partly echoing Joseph Beuys’ ‘so-
cial sculpture’.15 Her breakthrough happened when she
participated, together with Manuel Pelmuş, in the 55th
Venice Biennale (2013) presenting An Immaterial Retro-
spective of the Venice Biennale in the Romanian pavilion.
On that occasion, Pirici and Pelmuş demonstrated that his-
tory, and especially the history of art, can be recollected
by transforming the actual object-document (here a se-
lection of artworks made with different media and shown
at the Biennale since its foundation in 1895) into an ac-
tion, as an immaterial testimony. The fact that a work of
art, usually fetishized as a monument or commodity, can
be turned into an image-gesture, thus freed from any spe-
cific substance and stable shape, becomes here a guarantee
for its afterlife. Currently, Pirici’s actions (e.g., Delicate
Instruments of Engagement, 2017) have come to criticize ca-
nonical fixations, data sovereignty, and filter mechanisms
15 Another important point of reference for Pirici is the French choreo-
grapher Jérôme Bel, who is known for his ‘non-dance’.
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within the digital realm by remixing a repertoire of images,
situations, and even Internet memes.
Apart from the body, the rehabilitation of images and
histories — especially the ones that have been forgotten,
never written, censored or are largely lacking testimonies
— occurs through the reconstruction of artworks and
exhibitions, and especially through the questioning and
setting in motion of the archive. In the specific case of ex-
hibitions and artworks, the more they are left incomplete,
transient, or ‘immaterial’, the more their reenactment is
effective, both because it leaves room for a freer transla-
tion/interpretation, and because, in an unfinished or un-
finishable object, there is always something unexplored to
be brought to light.16
Furthermore, when archives are interrogated in a work
of research and reconstruction, the recovery of the past
and reenactment of already existing images take place
through a montage/display of heterogeneous materials.
This process is comparable to a ‘dramaturgy of informa-
tion’, an expression John Rajchman has used for the his-
torical revaluation that occurs through a particular kind
of philosophical exhibition, his main example being Jean-
François Lyotard’s Les Immatériaux (Centre Pompidou,
Paris, 1985), where the task of expressing ideas is entrus-
ted exclusively to images;17 or better, to ‘chains of images’,
16 See John Rajchman, ‘Les Immatériaux or How to Con-
struct the History of Exhibitions’, Tate Papers, 12 (2009)
<https://www.tate.org.uk/research/publications/tate-papers/12/
les-immateriaux-or-how-to-construct-the-history-of-exhibitions>
[accessed 18 December 2018]; and Cristina Baldacci and Clio
Nicastro, ‘Il Bilderatlas Mnemosyne ri-visitato: una mostra e
un convegno a Karlsruhe’, La rivista di Engramma, 142 (2017)
<http://www.engramma.it/eOS/index.php?id_articolo=3086>
[accessed 18 December 2018].
17 Rajchman, ‘Les Immatériaux’, n. p.
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that is, dynamic and operative structures, similar to con-
stellations or clusters, which presuppose a set of interde-
pendent narrative instances (pre-production, production,
post-production).18
When artists instead deal with images that re-emerge
‘mute’ from either the archive or an indefinite time and
context, one of their first concerns is usually to under-
stand how those images can be effectively reactivated and
resignified without betraying them. In most cases, the reen-
actment of mainly archival materials is a unique oppor-
tunity to put history in motion through original counter-
narratives.19 History, then, is transformed from a succes-
sion of supposedly universally significant facts, which usu-
ally produce and reiterate a dominant cultural narrative,
into a counter-history where archival documents are re-
vived or, if necessary, recreated ex novo (through fiction) as
witnesses and personal devices of memory and resistance.
At the heart of this, there is the desire to initiate a rewrit-
ing and deinstitutionalizing or decolonizing process that
starts right from the images, and that presents, more than a
remembering technique, a ‘working through’ [Durcharbei-
tung], as Lyotard wrote quoting Freud.20
18 Philippe Parreno’s exhibitions, which cannot be examined
here, are emblematic of this attitude. Cf. Philippe Parreno:
H{n)ypn(y}osis/Hypothesis, ed. by Andrea Lissoni (Milan: Mousse
Publishing, 2017).
19 See, in particular, Sven Lütticken, History in Motion: Time in the Age
of the Moving Image (Berlin: Sternberg Press, 2013); and Cristina Bal-
dacci, ‘Re-enactment e altre storie. Dall’archivio alla contro-narrazione
per immagini nell’arte contemporanea’, La rivista di Engramma, 150
(2017), pp. 41–48 <http://www.engramma.it/eOS/index.php?id_
articolo=3215> [accessed 18 December 2018].
20 Cf. Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman: Reflections on Time, trans. by
Rachel Bowlby and Geoffrey Bennington (Cambridge: Polity, 1991),
p. 26.
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This additional narrative guides the viewer when look-
ing at images and is also a way of reflecting on two central
aspects of the archival and historical reenactment: Firstly,
who accesses the archive, and, in particular, who ‘recovers’
archival images? Secondly, how can artists make those
images accessible again, overcoming the tricky questions
of authoriality, property, and legitimacy of the (photo-
graphic) image as a document that, in theory, should
present reality instead of representing it through different
modes of interpretation?21 This is particularly evident in
the case of time-based art that ‘continuously remodels and
modulates history — for instance by actualizing the histor-
ical record in the form of images that in turn help to shape
the on-going production of new history in today’s temporal
economy’.22
Alongside the restaging of performances by artists,
actors, and dancers as homage to or dialogue with their
precursors, in recent years another form of reenactment
has been emerging as a decisive procedure of contempor-
ary art at large: the reconstruction of works and exhibitions
of the twentieth century.23 This tendency can be inter-
preted as a consequence of postconceptual art and — in
Peter Osborne’s words — its ‘process of ontological homo-
genization’, for which ‘the artistic materiality of the work
21 For Allan Sekula, ‘the archive constitutes the paradigm or iconic sys-
tem from which photographic “statements” are constructed.’ Cf. Allan
Sekula, ‘Reading an Archive: Photography Between Labour and Cap-
ital’, in The Photography Reader, ed. by Liz Wells (London: Routledge,
2003), pp. 443–52 (p. 445).
22 Lütticken, History in Motion, p. 26.
23 The endeavour undertaken by the Fondazione Prada in Venice with the
reenactment of the legendary When Attitudes Become Form (1969) in
2013 is one of the main examples — even if not the first — of this
trend and has set its standard. See When Attitudes Become Form: Bern
1969/Venice 2013, ed. by Germano Celant (Milan: Fondazione Prada,
2013).
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and its documentary function are combined’, as well as ‘a
growing indifference between the artwork and its docu-
mentation, at the level of the collection’ and therefore of
archival and curatorial practices.24 But it also reveals the
desire to restore concreteness to what is impermanent or
has survived only as a ghost-image, on one side, and to give
a place in art history to those events that have remained
outside the predominant cultural tradition, on the other.
The absence or incompleteness of the preexisting artefact
hence becomes a prophecy and a condition of its rebirth.
That’s why this meta-reflexive and historiographic ap-
proach, which stems also from the fear of elusiveness and
loss of thingliness and sometimes takes on tautological as-
pects, must not be mistaken for an academic or reactionary
exercise — an association Boris Groys has made in relation
to art documentation and specifically to installation.25 It
should rather be considered as an invitation to look further
and envisage a multifaceted art history that moves away
from the restrictively Western gaze and from conventional
categories, opening up to transculturation.
Inside the museum and other art spaces, reenacting
specific exhibitions and artworks is a way to create history
through a direct comparison of the ‘re-habilitated’ object-
image with the present to offer a possible understanding of
the past that gives preference to a visual and performative,
sometimes immersive, approach.26
24 See Peter Osborne, ‘Archive as Afterlife and Life of Art’, in WERE IT
AS IF: Beyond an Institution that Is, ed. by Bik van der Pol and Defne
Ayas (Rotterdam:Witte deWith Center for Contemporary Art, 2017),
pp. 49–53 (p. 52).
25 See Boris Groys, ‘Art in the Age of Biopolitics: From Artwork to Art
Documentation’, inArt Power (Cambridge,MA:MITPress, 2008), pp.
53–65.
26 This attitude often goes together with two different practices: first, the
search for original documentation and its gathering in archives newly
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There remains, of course, a latent risk in this prac-
tice: any repeatability can easily result in a seriality that
produces empty simulacra and multiples. Thus, far from
presenting a guarantee of continuity in time,27 reenact-
ment can degenerate into a market strategy of fetishization
that merely seeks to satisfy the collectors’ desire for posses-
sion.
constituted; second, the publication of voluminous catalogues or entire
series dedicated to the study of one single artwork or exhibition. See
for instance the book series ‘One Work’ and ‘Exhibition Histories’
published by Afterall Books.
27 Cf. Serial/Portable Classic: The Greek Canon and its Mutations, ed. by




Rehabilitation. (Noun). The action of
restoring someone to health or normal
life through training and therapy after
imprisonment, addiction, or illness.
oxforddictionaries.com
In The History of Disability, Henri-Jacques Stiker reflects
on the exclusion of people with disabilities in western
discourse and the emergence of the modern concept of re-
habilitation in the twentieth century, and writes:
The concepts of ‘re-’ […] come at logical intervals:
to reintegrate, we must redeploy; to redeploy, we
must retrain; to retrain, we must rehabilitate (the
body and its organs, intellect and movement). But
there is another way of sequencing all this: we can
replace what is missing, and this leads to retrain-
ing, and that to redeploying then to reintegrating,
and that is rehabilitation. Along this axis of spe-
cific action, rehabilitation always comes at the end,
as the most specific action or as the most generic.
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Rehabilitation is co-extensive with disabilities and
their extension in time.1
Disabilities and their extension in time structure rehabili-
tative practices that, on the most generic or specific level,
conceive of disability in a framework of loss and lack, which
needs to be compensated. Bringing back a former capacity
involves individual effort in the present, which shapes the
course of the future in a prognostic manner. In this devel-
opmentalist framework, rehabilitation operates according
to a medical view that sees impairment as a deviation from
the norm, a biological deficiency to be eliminated in order
to achieve increased independence, and an improved qual-
ity of life. Stiker’s historical analysis shows that western
cultural responses to disability regard the body as peren-
nially incomplete and disability as a temporary obstacle.
Within this matrix, ‘if you devote sufficient resources, it
is possible to reduce the distance and bring each person,
however great the burden she carries, to reoccupy a normal
place in the group of the able (normal)’.2 The distance that
needs to be reduced though rehabilitation is embedded in
a temporality in which disabilities are considered to be ab-
errant and anachronistic because they do not fit into the
‘machinery of production, [and] consumption’.3
In France and Britain, modern practices of rehabilita-
tion emerged in the aftermath of World War I, when hun-
dreds of thousands of injured soldiers returned home. Fol-
lowing the juridical discourse on work-related accidents
codified in the last decades of the nineteenth century, dur-
ing the post-war years, ‘replacement for a deficit’ became a
1 Henri-Jacques Stiker, The History of Disability (Ann Arbor: University
of Michigan Press, 1999), p. 128.
2 Ibid., p. 135.
3 Ibid., p. 128.
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generalized objective of modern notions of rehabilitation,
and extended to people with disabilities.4 Stiker reads this
paradigm of deficiency and loss in relation to a desire to ‘re-
cover and reenter the competition of the industrial world
and technological society’.5 He mentions that during this
period, in France and Britain, the word ‘handicap’ replaced
other words with negative prefixes such as ‘infirm’, ‘in-
valid’, ‘impotent’, and ‘incapable’ previously used to define
people with mental and physical disabilities. In the eight-
eenth century, handicap meant the extra weight imposed
upon a superior horse or the disadvantage imposed on a
competitor in favor of an inferior one. It thus emerged as
a negative value in a context of rivalry where some bodies
had to catch up with others. Such shifts in language imply
parallels between France and Britain in their cultural re-
sponses to disability. The modern concept of rehabilitation
emerges at the same time with this lexical change, which, in
Julie Passanante Elman’s words, is entangled with ‘healthy
bodies and healthy economies, once threatened and then
restored’.6
Stiker’s historical analysis explores rehabilitation prac-
tices as forms of governmentality that are linked to eco-
nomic profit. As a two-part process of identity and integra-
tion, emerging rehabilitation practices, primarily in France
and Western Europe, aimed to relocate bodily and mental
differences into the ‘machinery of production, consump-
tion’, and work by standardizing human beings, and assimi-
lating them into a unified social order.7 For Stiker, ‘the
4 Ibid., pp. 124–25.
5 Ibid., p. 150.
6 Julie Passanante Elman, Chronic Youth: Disability, Sexuality, and U.S.
MediaCultures of Rehabilitation (NewYork:NewYorkUniversity Press,
2014), p. 14.
7 Stiker, The History of Disability, pp. 112–28.
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demand to be like the others’, which is implemented on jur-
idical, administrative, and institutional levels, is based on
oblivion, disappearance, conformity, and normalization.8
Whereas in earlier eras disability stood for radical alter-
ity, in the twentieth century western culture it came to
mean a difference of degree on which rehabilitation came
to operate as a social act of identification that would cause
people with disabilities to disappear.9 People with bodily
differences, writes Stiker, ‘are established as a category to be
reintegrated and thus to be rehabilitated. Paradoxically, they
are designated in order to be made to disappear, they are
spoken of in order to be silenced.’10 To put it differently,
western modern conceptions of rehabilitation negate dis-
ability through their focus on adjustment and integration,
whose success depends on the physical and social obliter-
ation of disabilities.
The normative pull of rehabilitation both requires
compliance and aims to make noncompliance with, let
alone resistance to, societal norms unthinkable. As Robert
McRuer writes, rehabilitation demands obedience: ‘What
we might call the rehabilitative contract […] essentially
stipulates that, in return for integration, no complaints will
be made, no suggestions for how the world, and not the
disabled body and mind, might be molded differently’.11
For Elman, in this process of enforced assimilation to
able-bodied normalcy, rehabilitation becomes cotermin-
ous with citizenship. She uses the term ‘rehabilitative citi-
zenship’ to explain how seemingly apolitical notions of
health or growth that shape rehabilitative practices are
8 Ibid., p. 133.
9 Ibid., p. 128.
10 Ibid., p. 134 [emphasis in the original].
11 RobertMcRuer,CripTheory: Cultural Signs of Queerness and Disability
(New York: New York University Press, 2006), pp. 112–13.
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deeply attached to ‘what it means to be a good citizen’.12
As an affective tool of self-governance, hegemonic forms
of rehabilitation imply compulsory adaptation to societal
inequalities.
While rehabilitation disguises itself as an apolitical
and universal objective, crip theory and practices posit
rehabilitation as historically contingent, political, and em-
bedded in the cultural history of dominant economic
forces, which attach norms, values, and meaning to what
bodies should do or be.13 Crip theory and practices also
criticize the rigidity of ‘narratives of progress’ that shape
rehabilitative practices in western culture, which obscure
the continuities between the past and the present, and the
ways in which the past endures in the present in different
ways, as Heather Love discusses in relation to the politics
of queer history.14
Robert McRuer and Merri Lisa Johnson situates this
crip resistance to a homogenizing ideology within an epis-
temology, which they call ‘cripistemology’,15 in an effort
to rethink how we know what we know about disability
‘as though it could be a thoroughly comprehended ob-
12 Elman, Chronic Youth, p. 16.
13 The word ‘crip’ comes from ‘cripple’, which has been and is used to
describe pejoratively people with physical disabilities. It emerged in
disability activism as an oppositional political response to ableism and
to describe people with various disabilities and allies of disability cul-
ture and community. Like the term ‘queer’, which has taken on new
meanings and political agendas within (and beyond) LGBT communi-
ties, crip theory and practices also gain political and analytical power
beyond disability studies. Rather than aiming to fit into society as it is,
crip theory, like queer theory, aims to transform society and probe the
boundaries for imagining alternative futures and communities.
14 Heather Love, Feeling Backward: Loss and the Politics of Queer History
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).
15 Merri Lisa Johnson and Robert McRuer, ‘Cripistemologies: Introduc-
tion’, Journal of Literary & Cultural Disability Studies, 8.2 (2014), pp.
127–47 (p. 128).
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ject of knowledge’.16 Cripistemology questions dominant
claims of knowledge production, ‘destabilizes the category
of disability and opens its borders to include more and dif-
ferent kinds of bodily and affective experiences’.17 It puts
notions of ability and disability into a crisis, not to re-
solve them once and for all, but to attend to the question
which bodies/minds/impairments are naturalized, made
invisible, or publicly excluded. Cripistemology is about, in
Arun Saldanha’s words, ‘letting yourself be destabilized by
the radical alterity of the other, in seeing his or her differ-
ence not as a threat but as a resource to question your own
position in the world’.18 This is part of a political and rela-
tional process, which requires the ability to affect and be
affected by the shifting abilities of different bodies as part
of a critical category of cultural and historical analysis.
For me, an important part of such a politics of non-
compliance that aims to criphegemonic rehabilitative prac-
tices entails embracing vulnerability as a condition of be-
coming, and attending to ways in which certain popula-
tions or bodies are made more vulnerable to inequalities.
Subsumed under a linear and developmentalist neoliberal
temporal logic, the conventional framing of vulnerability
as an obstacle to be eliminated for maximum efficiency
and autonomy needs to be challenged. As Judith Butler
argues, we must pay attention to the ‘mass difference of
conditions that distribute vulnerability across the globe’.19
For her, the ethical task lies in accepting responsibility
16 Ibid., p. 130.
17 Ibid., p. 135.
18 Quoted in Jasbir Puar, ‘Prognosis Time: Towards a Geopolitics of
Affect, Debility and Capacity’, Women & Performance: A Journal of
Feminist Theory, 19.2 (2009), pp. 161–72 (p. 169).
19 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence
(London: Verso, 2004), p. 31.
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for its differential allocation, albeit in many affective, eco-
nomic, social, cultural, legal, and political contexts.20 It’s
the task of politics, as Butler sees it, to challenge the ways in
which vulnerability is differentially allocated across bodies
as mechanisms of control or oppression. In other words, it
is not only about identifying which populations are vulner-
able but also about focusing on situations that make certain
people vulnerable.
Drawing on how certain vulnerabilities and disabilities
are institutionally, economically, and culturally praised or
devalued is crucial to challenge paternalistic rehabilitative
norms. To put it differently, politicizing or cripping vul-
nerability and interdependence and their value in human
lives can help us resist the individualizing and assimilation-
ist ideologies that compulsory rehabilitation perpetuate
in their claim to increased independence and similarity.
The uncertainty of vulnerability that shapes our interaction
with the world encompasses a certain politics of rehabilita-
tion, not just as an individual affair, but as a social one. As
a source of hope and connection, politicizing vulnerability
involves a critique of rehabilitative practices that pin their
hopes solely on the future elimination of vulnerability, and
looks at the ways in which invulnerability as mastery is se-
lectively allocated to certain bodies in the past and present.
The negative connotations of vulnerability that link it
solely with deficit or loss of autonomy create paternalistic
rehabilitative responses or idealized care relations. Thus,
challenging univocal definitions of vulnerability is an eth-
ical task insofar as vulnerability is constitutive of life. For
me, an openness to vulnerability is embedded in a politics
of hope insofar as to hope opens one up to disappointment,
20 Judith Butler, Frames of War: When is Life Grievable? (London: Verso,
2009), p. 3.
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pain, injury, and despair. It emphasizes an openness to risk.
One may work to minimize the risks involved, yet it is im-
possible to completely eliminate them. This is not a form of
hope, therefore, that envisions a future where vulnerabil-
ities, disabilities, or impairments are eliminated for good.
It is a form of hope that challenges what counts as a normal
life or a normal body and embraces bodily differences and
human diversity as constitutive of life.
Rehabilitation II
BIRKAN TAŞ
Lorenza Böttner was a Chilean-German trans woman and
performance artist, born in 1959 in Chile. When she was
eight years old, both of her arms were amputated after a
severe accident in which she was electrocuted and fell from
an electrical tower. At the age of fourteen, two months
after the Chilean coup d’etat, she went to West Germany
for plastic surgery and moved to Lichtenau. She studied
painting at the Kassel School of Art and submitted a thesis
entitled ‘Behindert?’, which explored the category of dis-
ability and the history of mouth and foot painters.1 She
1 Paul B. Preciado, ‘Lives andWorks of Lorenza Böttner’, South as a State
of Mind, 9 [documenta 14 #4] ([2017]) <https://www.documenta14.
de/en/south/25298_lives_and_works_of_lorenza_boettner>
[accessed 10 December 2018]. Preciado served as curator of
public programming for the documenta 14. He is also the
curator of ‘Lorenza Böttner. Requiem for the Norm’, the most
comprehensive retrospective of Böttner’s work to date, co-
produced by the La Virreina Centre de la Imatge, Barcelona and
Württembergischer Kunstverein Stuttgart <http://ajuntament.
barcelona.cat/lavirreina/en/exhibitions/requiem-norm/236> and
<https://www.wkv-stuttgart.de/en/program/2019/exhibitions/
lorenza-boettner-requiem-for-the-norm/> [accessed 13 January
2019].
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presented many public performances combining dance
and painting in Munich, San Francisco, New York, and
New Mexico.2
Lorenza moved to Germany for rehabilitation, but re-
fused to use prosthetic arms and learned to paint with her
feet and mouth. If, in Julie Passanante Elman’s words, ‘re-
habilitation, at its core, is a self-making project involving
perpetual self-discipline and self-surveillance’, Lorenza’s
bodily and artistic performances crip rehabilitation by re-
fusing to return to the racetrack of ability, masculinity, and
compulsory heterosexuality that modern normalizing re-
habilitative practices reserved for her.3 As Paul Preciado
writes about her for the documenta14, which included sev-
eral of her drawings, paintings, and video work: ‘if medical
discourse and modes of representation aim to desexualize
and degender the impaired body, Lorenza’s performance
work eroticized the trans-armless body, endowing it with
sexual and political potency’.4
Modern conceptions of rehabilitation regard disabil-
ity as a temporary obstacle that needs to be readjusted in
order to approximate normalcy embedded in an economy
of autonomy and independence. In this temporal economy
of ‘rehabilitative citizenship’, bodily differences are to be
eliminated through the approximation of a supposed nor-
malcy for maximum control and efficiency.5 Lorenza’s re-
jection of prosthetic arms and conventional gender roles
2 Carl Fischer, Queering the Chilean Way: Cultures of Exceptionalism and
Sexual Dissidence, 1965–2015 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016),
pp. 205–09.
3 Julie Passanante Elman, Chronic Youth: Disability, Sexuality, and U.S.
MediaCultures of Rehabilitation (NewYork:NewYorkUniversity Press,
2014), p. 14.
4 Preciado, ‘Lives and Works of Lorenza Böttner’.
5 Elman, Chronic Youth, p. 16.
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make her body permanently anachronistic inasmuch as
reintegration to modern society requires upholding and
sustaining the able-bodied (and heteronormative) norms
embedded in a developmentalist ‘chrononormative timing
of bodies’.6 A comment under the video Lorenza (1991)
posted on Vimeo illuminates this point: The commenta-
tor says, ‘beautifully shot!’ and then asks: ‘Don’t they use
prosthetic devices these days?’7 Apart from the ambigu-
ity and objectifying tone of ‘they’, the comment reflects
a cultural grammar of rehabilitation based on compliance
and assimilation. The question operates within the tem-
poral imaginary of compulsory rehabilitation, promoting
prosthetic devices as a matter of technology and time, but
not choice. If prosthetics were available to her by then, she
must have used them. However, we learn from director Mi-
chael Stahlberg’s reply to that comment that Lorenza did
not like prosthetic devices, which he says ‘were to [sic]
cumbersome for him [sic]’.8
Having emerged in eighteenth-century English med-
ical texts, prosthetics conventionally were meant to ‘re-
place’ missing limbs. According to David Serlin, following
the Second World War, prosthetics operated within ‘the
fiercely heterosexual culture of rehabilitation medicine, es-
pecially its orthodox zeal to preserve the masculine status
of disabled veterans’.9 Thus, prosthetics emerged ‘to re-
6 Elizabeth Freeman, Time Binds: Queer Temporalities, Queer Histories
(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010), p. 44.
7 Lorenza: Portrait of an Artist, dir. by Michael Stahlberg (Hoch-
schule für Fernsehen und FilmMünchen, 1991) <https://vimeo.com/
29793957> [accessed 10 December 2018].
8 Ibid.
9 Quoted in Margrit Shildrick, ‘Border Crossings: The Technology of
Disability andDesire’, inCulture,Theory, Disability: Encounters Between
Disability Studies and Cultural Studies, ed. by Anne Waldschmidt,
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normalize the disabled [heterosexual] male body’.10 Mar-
grit Schildrick notes that the success of prosthetics ‘was
often measured in professional literature by the extent to
which they enabled the wearer to engage in normal gender
activities’.11 In other words, approximating an image of a
non-disabled body through rehabilitation and prosthetics
is historically couched in an approximation and reclaiming
of heterosexuality. By refusing to use prosthetics, Lorenza
exposes ‘the inherent plasticity of the body, and its mul-
tiple possibilities of transcorporeality’ and refuses to fol-
low a ‘normative corporeality’.12 Her unwillingness to use
prosthetics, along with her gender nonconformity, prob-
lematizes normative assumptions about what a body can
do, which bodies are regarded as whole and complete. She
does not ‘miss’ anything and hence does not need any re-
placements.
In the video, Lorenza crips paternalistic rehabilita-
tive responses to bodily injuries, responses that envision
these injuries merely in terms of a lack to overcome or
a deficiency to suppress. She rejects the demand to be
like others. Rather than making her disability disappear
by complying with modern prosthetic technologies, she
shows how disability is integral to (her) art. When she talks
about statues (e.g. Venus de Milo) that have no arms or
legs due to injury, she insists that they ‘have lost nothing of
their beauty or aesthetic appeal’. As a foundational element
of modern art, and an aesthetic value in itself, disability
is a critical resource for thinking about human variation
and difference, as disability scholar Tobin Siebers argues as
Hanjo Berressem, andMoritz Ingwersen (Bielefeld: Transcript, 2017),
pp. 137–51 (p. 139).
10 Ibid., p. 139.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid., pp. 138–40.
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well. He defines aesthetics in relation to the sensations that
some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies. That is to
say, aesthetics is first and foremost an embodied affective
encounter between bodies. What he names ‘disability aes-
thetics’ acts as a critical concept to show the presence of
disability in modern aesthetics and also an aesthetic value
in itself for future concerns. For Siebers, in most cases, it
is the presence of disability that makes an artwork more
beautiful and endure over time. He asks,
[s]ince aesthetic feelings of pleasure and disgust are
difficult to separate from political feelings of accept-
ance and rejection, what do objects representing
disability tell us about the ideals of political com-
munity underlying works of art?13
In considering this question, one of the aesthetic values I
find in Lorenza’s work is the way it broadens our under-
standing of conventional modes of beauty. In her art, dis-
ability acts as a generative force. Lorenza does not want to
be silenced. Nor does she want her disability to disappear.
In her account, disability emerges as something that can
be and is complete, whole, and desirable. Her artistic per-
formances emphasize human variation, different abilities
of bodies, and their right to non-compliance. The themes
Lorenza chose in her paintings, such as police brutality
and nudity, politicize the aesthetics of mouth and foot
painting as well. Integrating disability as a critical category
of analysis and aesthetic value, Lorenza’s public perform-
ances and paintings treat disability as a unique source of
creation in modern art. They subvert not only hegemonic
cultural discourses surrounding images of disability that
13 TobinSiebers,DisabilityAesthetics (AnnArbor:University ofMichigan
Press, 2010), p. 2.
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discuss it in terms of tragedy, loss, tears, and frustration but
also the stereotypical images of all disabled people want-
ing to be normal, cured, or rehabilitated. The dominant
emphasis on cure and rehabilitation locates disability in
bodies that need to be fixed, and hence controls and limits
human variation and difference. For that reason, reflecting
on the intricacies of disability and rehabilitation opens a
space–time where new relations between bodies, objects,
and environments as well as possible strategies for resist-
ance against bodily norms can emerge.
Renewal
CLIO NICASTRO
The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity (La rinascita del paganesi-
moantico) is the title the art historian and librarian Gertrud
Bing, together with Emma Cantimori, chose for the first
collection of Aby Warburg’s writings, released in 1966 in
Florence by the publishing house La Nuova Italia.1 The
Italian volume was published more than a decade before
the German original because Bing, who had been one of
Warburg’s closest collaborators, wanted to make up for
Ernst Gombrich’s failed attempt to sort out and select War-
burg’s texts. After the Warburgian library was relocated
from Hamburg to London in order to preserve its material
from the upcoming World War II,2 its new director Gom-
1 Aby Warburg, La rinascita del paganesimo antico. Contributi alla storia
della cultura (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1996); in English as Aby
Warburg,TheRenewal of Pagan Antiquity: Contributions to the Cultural
History of the European Renaissance (Los Angeles: Getty Center for the
History of Art and the Humanities, 1999).
2 See Dorothea McEwan, ‘A Tale of One Institute and Two Cities: The
Warburg Institute’,Yearbook of the Research Centre for German andAus-
trian Exile Studies, 1 (1999): German-Speaking Exiles in Great Britain,
ed. by Ian Wallace, pp. 25–42.
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brich — who later would write the first biography of War-
burg3 — was tasked with carrying on and concluding the
publication of the Hamburg scholar’s Nachlass. Each small
historical and biographical detail is relevant to get a sense
of the rich and assorted collection of images and words
that Warburg put together in the intense period between
the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of
the twentieth century. For those who, like Gombrich, did
not take part in the Warburg circle’s collective research,4
it was surely harder to access both Warburg’s fragment-
ary essayistic production, diaries, and notes, and the pic-
tures from the legendary, albeit unfinished project Atlas
Mnemosyne, whose tables had been collected, assembled,
and displayed in various formats for several decades.5 The
attempt to reconstruct the Atlas is, indeed, a never-ending
‘re-enactment’,6 mainly because it had been conceived as a
means to display the experimental efforts to shape a new
kind of art history, and, furthermore, had been the result
of ‘team play’.7
3 Ernst H. Gombrich, AbyWarburg: An Intellectual Biography (London:
Warburg Institute, 1970).
4 See Emily J. Levine, Hamburg, Dreamland of Humanists: Warburg,
Cassirer, Panofsky, and the Hamburg School (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2013).
5 Aby Warburg, Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Ulrich Pfisterer, Horst
Bredekamp, Michael Diers, Uwe Fleckner, Michael Thimann, and
Claudia Wedepohl (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1998– ), ii.1: Der Bilder-
atlasMNEMOSYNE, ed. byMartinWarnke andClaudia Brink (2000);
in Italian as Aby Warburg, Mnemosyne. L’Atlante delle immagini, ed. by
Maurizio Ghelardi (Turin: Nino Aragno Editore, 2002).
6 Cristina Baldacci and Clio Nicastro, ‘Il Bilderatlas Mnemosyne ri-
visitato: una mostra e un convegno a Karlsruhe’, Engramma. La
tradizione classica nella memoria occidentale, 142 (2017) <http://
www.engramma.it/eOS/index.php?id_articolo=3086> [accessed 18
December 2018].
7 Monica Centanni, ‘Editoriale: Engramma da 0 a 100’, Engramma,
100 (2012) <http://www.engramma.it/eOS/index.php?id_articolo=
1161> [accessed 18 December 2018].
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The dictionary definition of ‘renewal’ identifies it as
‘an instance of resuming something after an interruption’
or ‘the replacement or repair of something’. To renew, thus,
is to give fresh life or strength to something. As part of the
second meaning, ‘recovery’ is listed as one of the synonyms
for renewal. This link between ‘renewal’ and ‘recovery’ er-
ratically leads me to the core of Warburg’s unique method,
both by following the intertwined threads that bind the
different fields of research he explored and combined, and
by delving into a crucial event in his life. However, one
should always keep in mind Edgard Wind’s methodological
suggestion in his biting review of Gombrich’s Warburg
biography. Here, Wind, criticizing Gombrich’s statement
about the possibility of understanding Warburg’s work
only if one gets lost in his maze, warns the scholar ap-
proaching the enormous number of Warburg’s notes and
drafts that these ‘fragments’ have to be considered as no
more than preparatory scribbles.8 They constitute an es-
sential part of Warburg’s work, but they also need to be
contextualized within a broader frame.
Warburg’s fresh and crucial contribution to rethinking
the implications of Renaissance symbolic forms was the
result of his radical questioning concerning the migration
of artistic forms in space and time. With this objective,
he conferred a pivotal role to the materiality of mediatic
supports and took into account all those secondary objects
that at the beginning of the twentieth century were mostly
overlooked by art historians, as, for instance, the tools of
daily life, tapestry, or coins.
8 ‘He was like a man lost in a maze and the reader who attempts the
next chapter should perhaps be warned that he, too, will have to enter
the maze.’ Edgar Wind, ‘On a Recent Biography of Warburg’, in The
Eloquence of Symbols. Studies inHumanistic Art, ed. by Jaynie Anderson
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983), pp. 106–13.
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The art objects, which for such an expansive concep-
tion cannot, thus, be reduced to their aesthetic qualities,
are here conceived as vessels, as symptoms of the intri-
cacy of human multi-layered temporality, made of inter-
ruptions, resumptions, inversions, regressions, stops, and
accelerations. Warburg recognized in the artistic crystal-
lization of expressive gestures and forms the physical em-
bodiment of this ungraspable and discontinuous fluctu-
ation of time. The renewal of different symbolic meanings
emerges from apparently identical elements and styles, yet
unpredictably awakes something that had not previously
been there, that is, what Warburg called ‘dynamogram’, a
term borrowed from biology, more precisely from Richard
Semon’s The Mneme.9 In this book from 1904, Semon uses
the term ‘engram’ to name the traces of events on the living
organism’s nervous system and he provides an explanation
of how these energies can be reactivated when the organ-
ism encounters new experiences at a later point.
By reframing Semon’s notion within his theory of the
image, Warburg conceives of ‘dynamograms’ as crystalliza-
tions of the images of ancient psychic energies surviving in
the form of an inherited memory, which are renewed only
through the contact with a new epoch, in the overturning
or energetic inversion of the original meaning.10 Organic
and inorganic time — what Andrea Pinotti poignantly calls
memories of the neutral11 — mingle in this immobilized
time, the trace of events guarded by art objects that dis-
close the world of possibilities held in the past as a result
of the collision between Pathosformeln (forms of pathos)
9 Richard Semon,Die Mneme als erhaltendes Princip imWechsel des orga-
nischen Geschehens (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1904).
10 Ernst Gombrich, Aby Warburg, p. 248.
11 Andrea Pinotti, Memorie del neutro. Morfologia dell’immagine in Aby
Warburg (Milan: Mimesis, 2001).
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and Nachleben (survivals). Warburg’s ultimate project was
to rewrite (with words and images) the history of art as
a history of the passions, avoiding the most obvious and
partial conception of progress as a linear, teleological suc-
cession of ages.
Today, Warburg’s idea of art history has perhaps be-
gun to sound familiar, yet certainly no less timely, even
current, as it exemplifies, for instance, a particularly rad-
ical approach to interdisciplinary research and resonates
with the rise of interest in affect theory. In this respect, the
unsolvable contradictions that feature both in Warburg’s
personality (what he fondly called his ‘Janus face’) and in
his work, provide the probably most intriguing aspects to
inquire into. ‘Du lebst und thust mir nichts’,12 you live and
do me no harm, is one of the best-known Warburgian mot-
tos. He uses it to describe the safe space of experience that
only art can create, as it is the unique human dimension
where the polarity between the rational and the irrational
finds a temporary reconciliation in what he calls Denkraum
der Besonnenheit, the thinking-space of reflection (‘sophro-
syne’).
In the draft for his essay from 1920, ‘Pagan-Antique
Prophecy in Words and Images in the Age of Luther’,13
Warburg defines the Denkraum as a Zeitspanne, the time
span between stimulus and response that characterizes hu-
man perception. As a devoted reader of Nietzsche and
Burckhardt (not to mention his friend Ernst Cassirer),
12 Aby Warburg, Grundlegende Bruchstücke zu einer pragmatischen Aus-
druckskunde. Frammenti sull’espressione, ed. by Susanne Müller (Pisa:
Edizioni della Normale, 2011). The fragments have since been re-
edited in Warburg, Gesammelte Schriften, iv: Fragmente zur Ausdrucks-
kunde, ed. by Ulrich Pfisterer and Hans Christian Hönes (2015).
13 Aby Warburg, ‘Pagan-Antique Prophecy in Words and Images in the
Age of Luther’, in The Renewal of Pagan Antiquity, pp. 597–697.
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he aimed to overcome the opposition between Apollo-
nian and Dionysian principles: Warburg remained scep-
tical with respect to excess and at the same time cultivated
access to the passions through symbolic forms. The War-
burgian Denkraum, hence, is conceived not as a utopian
condition of balance and accord, but a force field of un-
polarized, that is, reversible irrational and rational energies
that can take shape only through contact with the ‘other’.
Warburg’s obsession with maintaining the right dis-
tance from reality in order to avoid the risk of incorpor-
ation, ‘to recompose the fracture between man and the
outside world’14 seems to be the leitmotif of his entire life.
In 1921, after several failed attempts in other psychiatric
institutions and right after his last violent crisis when he
threatened his relatives with a revolver, Warburg was ad-
mitted to Bellevue, whose director at the time was Ludwig
Binswanger, who subsequently became Warburg’s psychi-
atrist. His diagnosis was schizophrenia, but it was later re-
vised by Emil Kraepelin, who considered the case a ‘mixed-
state manic-depressive’. Against all expectation, during the
three-year therapy at Bellevue, Warburg was able to slowly
restore connections with family and colleagues, first of all
Fritz Saxl, who provided crucial support in the preparation
of his famous and controversial lecture The Ritual of the
Snake.15 The story of Warburg’s Kreuzlingen lecture is well-
known and has become almost legendary; his presentation
in front of the doctors and the patients of Bellevue is indeed
14 Filippo Trentin, ‘Warburg’s Ghost: On Literary Atlases and the
‘Anatopic’ Shift of a Cartographic Object’, in De/Constituting Wholes:
Towards Partiality Without Parts, ed. by Manuele Gragnolati and
Christoph F. E. Holzhey (Vienna: Turia + Kant, 2017), pp. 101–29
(p. 122).
15 Aby Warburg, ‘A Lecture on Serpent Ritual’, Journal of the Warburg
Institute, 2 (1938–39), pp. 222–92.
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often described as a turning point in Warburg’s healing
journey. Recovery, though, is rarely a peak but rather a pro-
cess, and what we actually find at stake in this lecture is
precisely the peculiar temporality of symbolic renewal. By
focussing on the material he had collected in 1896/1897,
during the period he conducted field research in the vil-
lages of the American Hopi, Warburg’s lecture sheds light
on one of his primary interests, namely the psychic paral-
lelism between the movement of an individual’s life (for
instance in mimicry) and the style of artistic movement.
The journey in Arizona and in New Mexico had provided
him with the opportunity to search in Hopi ritual practices
for the stylistic forces shaping moving life into art that he
had discerned in Renaissance symbolic forms. Behind and
beyond their aesthetic-formal value, images embody the
human biological need to shape and express the vital as
well as historical development of the passions.
Hence Warburg’s conception of an image-engram does
not arrest or in any way pacify the constitutive instability,
the pulsating movement it captures between the energetic
poles of human conflict, namely the oscillation between
primitive and chaotic energies and the rational faculty to
organize the world. His personal experience, as well as his
investigation of the Renaissance, tell us something about
the necessary ‘interruption’ implied both in ‘renewal’ and
‘recovery’. Renewal is not synonymous with ‘rebirth’, the
latter being often associated with the Renaissance in con-
trast to the Middle Ages. Rebirth requires having been
dead and being born a second time in a different body. In
the case of renewal, however, the body is the same, and it
carries the more or less conspicuous traces of the familiar
symptoms. Interruptions are not always visible, they are
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not always tragic and neat marks, they can be ‘just’ one of
the shapes of time — as well as one way to deal with time.
Repetition
DANIEL REEVE
TheSimpsons, the world’s best-known animated sitcom, has
a curious relation to time, as everyone who has seen it
knows.1 In any given episode, a remarkable sequence of
events takes place: Bart may win an elephant in a radio
phone-in competition,2 or Homer may become the owner
of the Denver Broncos as a result of the generosity of his
supervillain boss,3 or Lisa may give a principled speech
that results in the arrest of a corrupt politician).4 And yet
the consequences of these life-changing happenings do not
survive beyond the end of the episode in which they take
place: the credits roll, the reset button is pushed, and the
family returns to their sofa.5 At the beginning of each new
1 The Simpsons, created by Matt Groening (Fox Broadcasting, 1989– ).
2 ‘BartGets anElephant’, season 5, episode 17, dir. by JimReardon (aired
16 January 1994).
3 ‘You Only Move Twice’, season 8, episode 2, dir. by Mike Anderson
(aired 3 November 1996).
4 ‘Mr. Lisa Goes to Washington’, season 3, episode 2, dir. by Wes Archer
(aired 26 September 1991).
5 There is one major exception: the two-part episode ‘Who Shot Mr.
Burns?’, season6, episode 25, dir. by JeffreyLynch (aired 21May1995),
and season 7, episode 1, dir. byWes Archer (aired 17 September 1995).
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episode, we are invited to forget the years of accreted nar-
rative that precedes it, except when these accretions are
played for laughs.6 Episode breaks thus function as a way of
regenerating a state of near-endless potential for new stor-
ies, unencumbered by the need for continuity. This state of
potential is maintained equally by another strange tempor-
ality. We know that The Simpsons takes place in a universe
in which time passes. The show frequently depicts flash-
backs to the characters’ younger selves (notably, Homer’s
sung recollection of his life as a beer-seeking seventeen-
year-old in ‘Duffless’7), or flash-forwards to older versions
of its protagonists (Bart as a good-for nothing divorcee,
and Lisa as a successful businesswoman, in ‘Holidays of
Future Passed’8). However, none of the characters have
aged in the main narrative sequence since the beginning
of the show’s run in 1989. True, the present-day time in
which the show takes place has moved forward in pace
with the production date of each episode — so an episode
first aired in 2002 is understood as taking place roughly
at that time — but the overall effect of this presentness
is to sharpen further this sense of stasis. We should not
understand TheSimpsons as existing within historical time;
instead, the show’s situatedness in a roughly present time
should be taken as a guarantee that it is not historically
placed. The show exists inside historical time, but isolated
from its flow. I want to suggest that we must understand
the events of The Simpsons taking place, impossibly, within
6 For instance, the exchange between Bart and Lisa in ‘The Two Mrs.
Nahasapeemapetilons’, season 9, episode 7, dir. by Steven DeanMoore
(aired 16 November 1997): ‘— I wish I had an elephant! — You did.
His name was Stampy. You loved him. — Oh, yeah.’
7 ‘Duffless’, season 4, episode 16, dir. by Jim Reardon (aired 18 February
1993).
8 ‘Holidays of Future Passed’, season 23, episode 9, dir. by Rob Oliver
(aired 11 December 2011).
DANIEL REEVE 93
the span of a single year — one in which Bart is ten, Lisa
eight, and so on; and one which exists within a timeless,
ahistorical present approximated by the vague nowness of
the show’s setting. This is, of course, a ridiculous thing to
say about a text that does not require narrative or temporal
consistency to function effectively as a piece of entertain-
ment, but I want to insist on it for the time being.
The commercial benefits of the distinctive temporal-
ity outlined above are difficult to overstate. Long-running
serial texts that depend on visible human performers have
to contend with the fact that these performers tend to age
and change out of pace with the text. Actors may die, quit,
or otherwise change in such a way that they are no longer
able to perform the role as written, and jarring, immersion-
breaking means must be employed to explain their absence
or altered appearance.TheSimpsons, because it is animated,
can operate over a much longer arc: it has a much greater
capacity to convincingly reset itself (and, in doing so, to re-
new its potential for producing narrative) than live-action
serial television. The show’s attitude towards time solves,
perhaps more successfully than any other work of televi-
sion, the contradictory demands of serial textuality: the
demand for innovation, for new stories, alongside the need
for a stasis that guarantees recognizability and consistency.
A paradox emerges: to maximize the possibility of con-
tinued commercial success, a serially extended text must
stay the same — stay recognizably itself, true to the core
of its own original appeal — as its run continues through
time. At the same time it must change, because of the de-
mand for new stories within the established formulas, and
because of an expectation that each iteration produce a
sense of closure. Such texts must therefore change as little
as possible; they must satisfy a need for new stories while
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remaining, in quite a strong sense, themselves. The tem-
poral oddities of The Simpsons are, I suggest, explicable as
a response to these practical demands. The Simpsons is per-
haps the exemplary case of a text that has, by means of these
strategies, successfully ensured its own extended continu-
ation, even in the face of the (widely acknowledged) de-
clining quality of its writing.
Some observations follow from the above: (1) Hu-
man finitude presents a constant challenge to serial tex-
tuality, especially in a commercial situation that demands
the extended reproduction of a profitable textual product,
which must ideally remain self-similar in order to ensure
its continued success. (2) Serial texts must nevertheless
generate an impression of novelty, change or progress with
respect to their prior iterations: total stasis is not an op-
tion. (3) Certain temporal strategies, as exemplified by
The Simpsons, provide a space in which a middle ground
between finitude and stasis can emerge. (4) The concept
of seriality that emerges from this examination is one of
pure iteration; one in which no element of a series exists
in a consequential (i.e., historical) relation with another.
At this point I would like to return to the point made
above about the impossibly capacious year in which the
events of TheSimpsons appear to take place, since this show
is not the first serial cultural product to be established in a
period of time set apart from the flow of history, both infin-
itely accommodating and firmly constrained. In the middle
of the twelfth century, the Jersey poet Wace writes a history
of the British people in octosyllabic couplets, beginning
with the story of the founder of Britain, the exiled Trojan
prince Brutus. The poem narrates Brutus’s discovery of Bri-
tain, up to that point empty apart from a few giants (lines
1063–64), and recounts the deeds of successive kings of
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Britain up to the end of their domination of the British Isles
with the death of King Arthur. An important passage for
the purposes of this essay comes in the middle of Arthur’s
reign, after his consolidation of power across the British
Isles, but before his final and hubristic campaign of im-
perial conquest. Wace tells us that twelve years of peace
elapsed between these two periods of historically signifi-
cant events. He says:
For twelve years after his return, Arthur reigned in
peace. No one dared to make war on him, nor did he
go to war himself. […] In this time of great peace I
speak of — I do not know if you have heard of it
— the wondrous events appeared and the adven-
tures were sought out which, whether for love of his
generosity, or for fear of his bravery, are so often
told about Arthur that they have become the stuff
of fiction: not all lies, not all truth, neither total folly
nor total wisdom. The raconteurs have told so many
yarns, the story-tellers so many stories, to embellish
their tales that they have made it all appear fiction.9
This moment has been thought of as an origin story for
medieval romance, a fictional narrative mode that recounts
exactly the kind of fantastic adventures that Wace describes
9 Wace, Roman de Brut: A History of the British, ed. and trans. by Judith
Weiss, rev. edn, Exeter Medieval Texts and Studies (Liverpool: Liver-
pool University Press, 2002), lines 9731–34, 9785–99: ‘Duze ans puis
cel repairement /RegnaArtur paisiblement, /Nenuls guerreier ne l’osa
/ Ne il altre ne guereia. […] Que pur amur de sa largesce, / Que pur
poür de sa prüesce, / En cele grant pais ke jo di, / Ne sai si vus l’avez oï,
/ Furent les merveilles pruvees / E les aventures truvees / Ki d’Artur
sunt tant recuntees / Ke a fable sunt aturnees: / Ne tut mençunge, ne
tut veir / Ne tut folie ne tut saveir. / Tant unt li cunteür cunté / E li
fableür tant flablé / Pur lur cuntes enbeleter, / Que tut unt fait fable
sembler.’
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here.10 But, perhaps more importantly, we might note that
these fictions come into being — perhaps fiction in general
comes into being — by means of a temporal constraint. By
retreating from historical time, with its necessary depiction
of human finitude, fiction initiates the possibility of the in-
finite multiplication of incident within a single constrained
temporal frame — Wace’s twelve years of romance, or the
single year of The Simpsons.
Though medieval romances were written by many dif-
ferent authors, I want to suggest that these texts neverthe-
less deploy similar strategies of generic self-perpetuation,
markedly distinct from the standard self-referential gesture
of historiographical writing in this period, which justifies
the writing of new historical narratives by claiming that
the new text is more accurate, or more complete, than all
of its now-obsolete predecessors. Romance makes no such
claim: it does not need to because of the infinite capacity
of the twelve years in which all these texts (at least sym-
bolically) take place. What romances do instead is reset
themselves by means of a kind of return: each text ends
where it began, with an originally disrupted stasis restored,
and hence with the endless possibility of new disruptions
and challenges, whether these will be faced by the original
protagonist, his son, or another hero entirely.11 As in the
case of The Simpsons, this is seriality as pure iteration. No
one element exists in a historical or consequential relation
with any other; historical time expands sideways to accom-
modate endlessly iterable narrative.
10 See Dennis H. Green, The Beginnings of Medieval Romance: Fact and
Fiction, 1150–1220 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002),
p. 192; and Ad Putter, ‘Finding Time for Romance: Mediaeval Arthur-
ian Literary History’, Medium Aevum 63 (1994), pp. 1–16.
11 The protagonists of medieval romance are (almost without exception)
gendered male.
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I have argued that such a temporality involves definite
commercial advantages in the case of The Simpsons, and
the same is true of romance, which responds in its own
way to the same problem of innovative stasis navigated
by the form of the serial animated sitcom. Audiences de-
mand novelty even as their tastes remain conservative. The
temporal constraint of fiction represents a compromise
between stasis and innovation; one which may have been
prompted at various points in cultural history by a mater-
ial need to produce a reliably consumable serial product.
Emerging from this need, fiction instigates a mode of repe-
tition distinct from both the bare repetition of sameness
and purely formal repetition, which divides linear time
into regular units irrespective of content. This mode of re-
petition contains the potential for infinite reproduction,
endless self-similarity, but unlike the bare repetition of
sameness, remains comprehensible within human frame-
works of desire and politics by separating end from con-
clusion.12
12 On the politics of time, see Christiane Frey, ‘Restrain’; for a sequel to
this essay, see Daniel Reeve, ‘Resolution’, (both in this volume).

Repetition
Differential Monotony, Affects, Creation
ARIANNA SFORZINI
The notion of repetition has been variously analysed in
twentieth-century philosophy as a means to question the
concepts of representation and mimesis together with
the traditional ideas of the subject and object of know-
ledge. Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida —
among others — are the main philosophers who conceived
of a new relation between history, subjectivity, and real-
ity in which ‘repetition’ and its ‘difference’ are at stake.
The Foucauldian reactivation of the Deleuzean concept
of repetition as ‘difference without a concept’ is particu-
larly interesting as it allows to approach this contemporary
debate about the gesture of repeating — reaffirming a
double which is never a simple copy of an original element.
In order to describe this philosophical use of the notion
of repetition, however, it is important to recall another
central twentieth-century conceptualization of the repe-
tition mechanisms that could be usefully described as an
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‘other repetition’ in relation to which Foucault (the most
Deleuzean Foucault) elaborates his thought: the Freudian
repetition according to Freud’s fundamental 1920 Beyond
the Pleasure Principle.1
In this text, Freud questions his own theory insofar as
it took the pursuit of pleasure as the only force regulating
the behaviour of living organisms. Anyone would instinct-
ively look for pleasure and avoid pain. Yet the observation
of various patients showing strange compulsive behaviours
convinced Freud that there must be something ‘beyond’
the simple principle of pleasure. Individuals often engage
in repetitions of gestures or thoughts that are clearly pain-
ful, far from being a source of gratification. How is it even
possible to fixate on a traumatic experience? Shouldn’t the
mind stick to pleasant memories and forget hurtful ones,
as far as it can? Beyond the Pleasure Principle is largely in-
fluenced by the spread of post-traumatic disorders, which
were a painful reality in 1920 Europe, in the immediate
aftermath of the World War I. These traumatic neuroses
were believed to derive from physical injuries the soldiers
sustained during the war. But Freud proposed another the-
ory. He observed that the post-traumatic symptoms were
common even among people who hadn’t been physically
wounded, indeed even among the civilian population, des-
pite the fact that they hadn’t witnessed the war first hand.
Some patients seemed ‘traumatized’ by their own fantasies
and desires.
What strikes Freud in post-traumatic neuroses is pre-
cisely these patients’ compulsion to repeat traumatic ex-
1 Sigmund Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle [1920], in The Stand-
ard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, ed.
and trans. by James Strachey, 24 vols (London: Hogarth, 1953–74),
xviii: Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Group Psychology andOtherWorks
(1920–22) (1955), pp. 1–64.
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periences, for example, by dreaming of them. Why should
the unconscious mind re-propose images and feelings that
have been traumatic for the individual? Freud himself had
previously considered dreams as the symbolic expression
of unconscious desires — for instance in his seminal 1900
work on the interpretation of dreams.2 He thought the
unconscious mind uses dreams to fulfil its own desires
even if they go against social constraints. Nightmares, how-
ever, are difficult to explain with this analytical pattern.
After traumatic experiences, bad dreams tend to activate
the trauma itself indefinitely, despite the individual’s con-
scious efforts to drive the mind away from it.
Oddly enough, Freud finds a possible answer to this
repetition compulsion by analysing a children’s game. He
famously termed it the ‘Fort-Da’ experience: he observes
his 18-months-old grandson, Ernst, repeatedly throwing
away a toy and picking it up again, while repeating the ex-
pression ‘fort-da’ (‘gone’ and ‘there’). Freud affirms that
the child’s behaviour is not guided by the principle of pleas-
ure — by any kind of immediate self-satisfaction. The point
of the Fort-Da is the repetition itself, or more precisely, the
compulsion of repeating a particular traumatic experience:
the mother leaving the child, the child’s realization of the
necessity of being separated from the mother. The repe-
tition is a means of mastering a trauma in an active and
creative way: the child is attempting to deal with a situ-
ation it couldn’t foresee and which is definitely out of its
control. More generally, following Freud, any trauma then
presents itself as a feeling the individual couldn’t anticipate
nor expect — for example through anxiety — and that she
is obliged to master through its repetition, even if this re-
2 Sigmund Freud, The Interpretation of Dreams [1900], in The Standard
Edition, iv–v (1953).
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peating action is a source of displeasure. Repetition is the
compulsive return of a past the individual couldn’t anti-
cipate. It embodies a non-linear temporality the individual
mind has to reproduce in order to master an affective and
potentially disruptive energy. The repetition is a sort of
‘technique of the self ’ more or less effective to make oneself
survive one’s own traumatic past.
The Foucauldian notion of repetition, re-enacting
Deleuze’s philosophy, implicitly refers to the Freudian
one, but does so in order to distort and reverse it. The
repetition put into play by Foucault has three main
characteristics: (1) It is de-psychologized, acting on the
level of discourse and not in the depth of the human
mind; (2) It is affectively de-individualizing, dissolving
the individual subject into a complex and heterogeneous
web of anonymous relations; (3) It is temporally erratic,
using the power of a senseless repetition not to provide
a meaning to a traumatic past experience but to create a
new space of future possibility. The repetition is not the
reactivation of the same, from past to present, but the
interruptive monotony of the different, from present to
future.
‘Repetition’ is explicitly mentioned by Foucault in two
texts he wrote on Deleuze’s books Difference and Repeti-
tion and The Logic of Sense: ‘Ariane s’est pendue’ (1969)
and Theatrum philosophicum (1970).3 It reactivates an-
3 Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition [1968], trans. by Paul R. Pat-
ton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994); The Logic of Sense
[1969], trans. by M. Lester with C. Stivale (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 1990). Michel Foucault, ‘Ariane s’est pendue’ [1969],
in Foucault, Dits et écrits, ed. by Daniel Defert, François Ewald, and
Jacques Lagrange, 2 vols (Paris: Gallimard, 2001), i: 1954–1975, text
n° 64, pp. 795–99; ‘Theatrum philosophicum’ [1970], trans. by Donald
F. Brouchard and Sherry Simon, in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954–
1984, ed. by Paul Rabinow, 3 vols (New York: New Press, 1998–2001),
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other very important notion in Foucault’s early works on
discourse published in the 1960s: the double. The double is
a peculiar attribute of discourse and of literature in particu-
lar. Literary language in general is for Foucault at the same
time defective and excessive: defective because words are
rare compared to things and language is irreducible to
the real world; excessive because, in their autonomy from
reality, words can become an instrument of freedom, trans-
forming our attitude towards the world and inventing new
forms of being, unexpected possibilities of thought and
existence. The double is a name for this experience of free-
dom by means of literary language. Literature is a series
of doubles, of ‘doppelgängers’, of mimes of reality whose
role is not to truthfully represent reality itself but to modify
it through its multiple repetitions, its heterogeneous re-
flections in a distorting mirror. The position of a double
for Foucault is never that of a reproduction of an original
model but the dispersion of the very idea of an ‘origin’ of
sense through the indefinite re-proposition of its copies.
The double is not the same nor the other of the same, but
something new and irreducible in its own difference.
Foucault gives many examples of this literary repe-
tition: the stupidity of Flaubert’s Bouvard and Pécuchet,
Sade and his almost boring descriptions of sex and vio-
lence, the ‘mises en abyme’ of Baroque theatre, the stories
Sheherazade tells to escape death in One Thousand and
One Nights, Raymond Roussel’s jeux de mots, the surreal-
ist poems, and many others. And yet, the most famous
and probably the most intuitive examples of repetition as
the emergence of difference are pictorial ones: Magritte’s
ii: Aesthetics, Method, and Epistemology, ed. by James D. Faubion
(1998), pp. 343–68.
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works (in his renowned text ‘This Is Not a Pipe’)4 and
Andy Warhol pop series. To take the example of his ac-
count of Warhol’s Campbell’s SoupCans, produced in 1962:
the same soup can is repeated 32 times, and it is precisely
this apparently senseless repetition that allows for differ-
ence to arise as the minimal and yet fundamental fracture
in the uniform space of meanings and values:
This is the greatness of Warhol with his canned
foods, senseless accidents, and his series of advert-
ising smiles: the oral and nutritional equivalence of
those half-open lips, teeth, tomato sauce, that hy-
giene based on detergents; the equivalence of death
in the cavity of an eviscerated car, at the top of a tele-
phone pole and at the end of a wire, and between
the glistening, steel blue arms of the electric chair.
‘It’s the same either way,’ stupidity says, while sink-
ing into itself and infinitely extending its nature
with the things it says of itself; ‘Here or there, it’s al-
ways the same thing; what difference if the colours
vary, if they’re darker or lighter. It’s all so senseless
— life, women, death! How stupid this stupidity!’
But, in concentrating on this boundless monotony,
we find the sudden illumination of multiplicity it-
self — with nothing at its centre, at its highest point,
or beyond it — a flickering of light that travels even
faster than the eyes and successively lights up the
moving labels and the captive snapshots that refer
to each other to eternity, without ever saying any-
thing: suddenly, arising from the background of the
old inertia of equivalences, the zebra stripe of the
event tears through the darkness, and the eternal
phantasm informs that soup can, that singular and
depthless face.5
4 Michel Foucault, This Is Not a Pipe [1968], trans. by J. Harkness
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
5 Foucault, ‘Theatrum philosophicum’, p. 362.
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In an unpublished text on Andy Warhol’s Marilyn Diptych
(1962), Foucault affirms that the series of Marilyns are a
sort of deformed doppelgänger of the classical ‘tableau’, the
diptych of the title and its series: the series of images are
not ‘serialized’ in order to classify, master, hierarchize, and
unify them.6 Rather, the ‘series of series’ composed by the
repetition of Marilyn’s smile, is a ‘difference of differences’:
a ‘savage multiplicity’, the repetition of difference, the dif-
ference of repetition.
There is, then, a ‘repetition compulsion’ in the Fou-
cauldian philosophical practice. But it does not correspond
to the psychological need to master a traumatic past in
order to build a meaningful individual subjectivity. It is,
on the contrary, the power of breaking the uniform sets
of values that shape our present and the present forms
of discourse and individualities. It is the immense pos-
sibility of rupture that resides in any minimal difference
repeated through the minute, tiny gestures of art, language,
but also everyday lives. There is always another time within
time, another possible world to create, hidden between the
monotony of repetition and its differences.





Is there a concept of repetition? Can repetition be defined
clearly, can it be delimited without ambiguity? Can this
word, ‘repetition’, be made to correspond to a concept that
is both univocal and stable — a concept that can be iter-
ated again, at another time or place, without difference or
alteration? Is there, in other words, a concept of repetition
that is repeatable? Does such a concept not already presup-
pose an understanding of what it is yet to grasp? Does it not
anticipate the meaning of a word it is yet to define? Has the
concept of repetition — and with it every concept — not
already proposed that repetition is indeed possible? And
has it not already determined this repetition as a repetition
of a certain kind — a repetition whose content remains
stable and constant, a repetition of one and the same thing,
a repetition without alteration? Has one, then, not already
spoken of repetition before one has even begun to define
it?
These questions form the background to a remark that
is found in the writings of Johann Georg Hamann — a
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contemporary and close friend of Kant, whose critique of
pure reason was the most important target of Hamann’s
later polemical writings. In an important passage from a
letter of 1769 included in the third volume of his collected
writings, we read:
There are thoughts that one has only once in one’s
life and which one is not able to produce again
[Gedanken […] die man nur Einmal in seinem Leben
hat, und nicht Meister ist wieder hervorzubringen].1
As an astute reader of Hamann has noted, it is however
this thought — precisely this thought — that occurs again
in the fifth volume of his collected writings, in a letter
composed several years later, in 1773.2 Here we read:
It seems to me that there are certain thoughts we are
only able to have once in our life [daß wir gewißer
Gedanken nur einmal in unserem Leben fähig sind].3
Es giebt Gedanken, we read, gewiße Gedanken, certain
thoughts — but exactly which thoughts are referred to
here? Is this merely a reflection on some thoughts and
not others, on a specific class of thoughts that only occur
once? Es giebt Gedanken die man nur Einmal in seinem
Leben hat, Hamann writes. What if this remark is read as
a reflection on a much broader class of thoughts than it
seems to describe at first sight — on the thoughts of finite,
human beings as distinct from divine thought? Es giebt
1 Johann Georg Hamann, Schriften, ed. Friedrich Roth, 7 vols (Berlin:
Riemer, 1821–25), iii (1822), p. 392.
2 Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaards Skrifter elektronisk version 1.8.1,
ed. by Karsten Kynde (Copenhagen: Søren Kierkegaard Forsknings-
centeret, 2014), ‘Journaler og papirer’, DD:28 <http://www.sks.dk/
DD/txt.xml> [accessed 16 December 2018].
3 Hamann, Schriften, v (1824), p. 25.
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Gedanken die man nur Einmal in seinemLeben hat, und nicht
Meister ist wieder hervorzubringen. That certain thoughts
occur only once, thus, does not seem to be an accident: we
think these thoughts only once, writes Hamann, because
we are not able to think them again. We are not able to
think them again because we do not have absolute mastery
over our thoughts; we do not relate to them as a master
relates to a servant who can be commanded at will. There
would seem to be a force that inheres in these thoughts
that impedes our ability to master them, to produce them
again at our own will, a dynamic by virtue of which such
thoughts are unrepeatable — at least for finite beings.
How this unrepeatability is to be understood is not
specified in the remark. That is to say, it is not stated here.
The remark does not say anything about this impossibility
of repeating certain thoughts; it does, however, engage in
a repetition itself. Yet it is not immediately clear whether
this repetition illustrates the assertion, whether it demon-
strates it ‘silently’ — just as Diogenes countered the Eleatic
denial of motion by simply pacing back and forth a few
times. At first, it may seem as if Hamann’s repeated itera-
tion of this thought does precisely the opposite of what it
states — if, at least, the statement is taken to refer to the
unrepeatability of the thoughts of finite, human beings as
opposed to those of a divine being. Is the thought that is
put forward here not the same as before? Is it not one and
the same thought that is produced here once again? The
fact that the second iteration does not use the exact same
words only seems to support this. Does Hamann not say
the same thing — only in different words? The differences
between the two iterations — the substitution of man by
uns, of es giebt Gedanken by gewisse Gedanken — can easily
be understood as paraphrasing one and the same thought.
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The same can be said about the replacement of Gedanken
haben und hervorbringen in the first iteration and Gedanken
fähig sein in the second. Is this not merely a paraphrase, a
summary with the same semantic content?
Indeed, the comical effect of the two sentences de-
pends precisely on the fact that they can be read as repeated
iterations of one and the same thought — the thought that
certain thoughts cannot be repeated. If these two sentences
would not appear as iterations of the same thought, they
would not appear to contradict what they state. And yet
at the same time, the repetition complicates the possibil-
ity to understand the two remarks as repetitions of one
and the same thought. When this same thought is iterated
once again, its meaning seems to have shifted. Not that
one meaning would have been replaced by another; the
repetition of the thought that certain thoughts cannot be
repeated rather calls into question whether it means any-
thing at all. Once it is repeated, what is meant in the first
iteration no longer seems to be quite so stable: insofar as
it appears to contradict itself, it is, suddenly, permeated by
the possibility of irony.
This irony is difficult to curtail. Not only is it no longer
certain what is meant, it is also uncertain whether it is even
possible to decide with certainty whether there is an irony
here at all. The possibility of irony first opens up when one
perceives a contradiction between the semantic content of
the sentence and its repetition. But is it even certain that
there is a contradiction? Is it certain that this thought is
one of those thoughts that the remark refers to? And is it
even certain that this is a repetition of one and the same
thought? Or does Hamann, in the second letter, speak of
a thought that is quite different from the first? Is it merely
an accident that the same words — Gedanken, Einmal —
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appear here once more? Even the instability of the remark
is difficult to determine in a stable way.
The repetition of this thought, of one and the same
thought, does not leave it intact. It is not that the alteration
of meaning affects only the second iteration; it is not that
the second iteration means something different because it
has already been said while the first iteration still means
the same. The alteration does not only affect the second
iteration; it does not leave the meaning of the first iteration
intact. What is meant in the first iteration dissolves. It
becomes impossible to read this iteration if it is not already
read in relation to its double. Likewise, the second iteration
has no stable meaning on its own. It becomes possible to
read only in relation to the first. The repetition thus not
only destabilizes the meaning of the thought but also its
unity. It turns out not to be possible to speak of one and
the same thought that would be stated twice; the thought
— what is supposedly meant by what is said — is never one
but already two. It is not a repeated thought, but a thought
that is always already a repetition. Hamann’s remark thus
turns out to be far from a statement on the unicity of
thought, a simple assertion of its irreducible Einmaligkeit.
At the same time as it speaks of the unrepeatability of
thought, it conjures up a thought that is constituted only




1937 — Hitler is ensconced at the Reichstag, Stalinist ter-
ror reigns in Moscow and the Republican Army are battling
the fascists in Spain. In Berlin, a group of young com-
munists gaze at the ancient battle of deities and giants
depicted on the Pergamon Altar. This is how Peter Weiss
begins his epic three-volume novel The Aesthetics of Re-
sistance. Sinewy stone figures wrestle in a state of petri-
fied unrest, their heroic actions frozen in media res. The
scene is ‘shattered into fragments’. ‘Yawning cracks’ cut
once whole figures to pieces. Muscular stumps, bits of
jaw, leg, ankle, and ‘tremendous and dismembered hands’
protrude from the hard marble.1 Hands without fingers,
shoulders without arms, fists without swords… Mutilated
bodies strangle, clamber and clutch at one another des-
perately. Torsos convulse in pain. Ligaments tear, sweat
pours, blood congeals, arteries swell. The silence, occasion-
ally broken by the soft echoes of tourists’ footsteps, seems
1 Peter Weiss, The Aesthetics of Resistance, Volume 1: A Novel, trans. by
JoachimNeugroschel (Durham,NC:DukeUniversity Press, 2005), pp.
3–5.
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to contain an ‘inaudible roaring’ that the young observers
strain to hear:2
We heard the thuds of the clubs, the shrilling
whistles, the moans, the splashing of blood. We
looked back at a prehistoric past, and for an
instant the prospect of the future likewise filled up
with a massacre impenetrable to the thought of
liberation.3
They gaze at the beaten and the dying. They stare at the
stone and it is as though they can see their own future de-
feats unfold before their eyes, brutal defeats that the novel
goes on to trace in visceral detail. ‘The silence, the paralysis
of those fated to be trampled into the ground continued to
be palpable.’4 But they perceive other struggles contained
in the panorama of devastation. The scene is one of an-
tagonism and striving rather than of resignation; perhaps
another outcome could have been possible. The scene also
seems to function as a possible source of hope and spur to
resistance, confirming the necessity to keep on fighting.
The Aesthetics of Resistance itself stands as a scarred
monument to past struggles. Weiss is unflinching in his
portrayal of political failure and the historical wreckage
of twentieth-century Europe. Yet, as Fredric Jameson dis-
cusses, he is concerned with asking ‘how to draw energy
from such endless images of horror’.5 Forced to contem-
plate the novel’s corpse-strewn pages, Weiss places the
reader in the position of his young protagonists at the
Pergamon Altar in order to provide ‘a lesson about the
2 Ibid., pp. 3–5.
3 Ibid., p. 9.
4 Ibid.
5 Fredric Jameson, ‘Foreword: A Monument to Radical Instants’, in
Weiss, The Aesthetics of Resistance, pp. vii–xlix (p. xliii).
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productive uses of a past and a history that is not simply
represented or commemorated but also reappropriated by
some new future of our own present’.6 The novel ends by
returning to the frieze, dwelling on the empty space on
the altar where the lion’s paw of Heracles should be: ‘The
empty space in the frieze, at the spot where the lion’s paw of
Heracles would hang, designates precisely something ab-
sent, unrealized.’7 The empty space is left open for future
intervention. As Weiss himself stated, both the Pergamon
and his novel are addressed to the present: ‘that turmoil,
those figures tangled up in relentless, dreadful combat, fig-
ures strangling one another, lacerating one another with
spears. It is the very same struggle that we are engaged in
today.’8
The novel’s narrative ends in 1945 but was written dec-
ades later. Weiss died in 1982, shortly after the publication
of the novel’s third and final volume (the first having ap-
peared in 1975). The Berlin wall fell seven years after that,
bringing to an end one of the major conflicts that animates
the narrative: between the official positions (both political
and aesthetic) of the Communist Party and unorthodox
communist idealism. This conflict is also evident in Weiss’s
play Trotsky in Exile, which points to a gap between his-
torical materialist predictions and historical reality as it
unfolded. A programme note by Ernest Mandel written to
accompany a production of the play in London remarks:
6 Ibid., p. xlvii.
7 Klaus R. Scherpe and James Gussen, ‘Reading the Aesthetics of Resist-
ance: Ten Working Theses’, New German Critique, 30 (Autumn 1983),
pp. 97–105 (p. 104).
8 Burkhardt Lindner and Christian Rogowski, ‘Between Pergamon and
Plötzensee: Another Way of Depicting the Course of Events an Inter-
view with Peter Weiss’, New German Critique, 30 (Autumn 1983), pp.
107–26 (p. 120).
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The theoretical controversies, which initiate the
play — concerning the role of the peasant, the pro-
letariat, the intelligentsia and the bourgeoisie in the
coming Russian revolution, the precise, future form
of government and society, the organizations of re-
volutionaries most appropriate to a rapid success —
all find at most a contradictory, incomplete or pro-
visional validation in the actual course of history.9
Weiss stages theoretical discussions against the backdrop
of historical events that surge weirdly and wildly in direc-
tions that the protagonists cannot predict and thus con-
stantly destabilize, undermine, or complicate their pro-
nouncements; theory and praxis (or perhaps it would
make more sense to say ideas and history) crash into each
other constantly. Jameson’s description of The Aesthetics of
Resistance is also pertinent here: ‘the urgency of the dia-
logical […] is fueled by a passion for a unity that can
never come into being.’10 The passion for unity that the
text exhibits is rooted in a relation to an orthodox Marxist-
Leninist understanding of the dialectical movement of his-
tory, which sees tensions resolve in a final moment of rec-
onciliation (Absolute Knowledge/Communism). Weiss
does not operate entirely within the parameters of this
paradigm but whether consciously or unconsciously, crit-
ically or obediently, he nonetheless contends with the
dominant Party line.
Jameson’s discussion of dialogism in Weiss invokes the
Soviet literary scholar Mikhail Bakhtin, who argued that
language is always internally split. Bakhtin acknowledged
9 Ernest Mandel, ‘Trotsky in Exile’ [programme notes from the 1971
London production] <https://www.marxists.org/archive/mandel/
1971/xx/exile.htm> [accessed 20 December 2018].
10 Jameson, ‘Foreword’, p. xxvii.
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that language is ‘ideologically saturated’,11 but claimed that
the apparently rigid structures of the ‘unitary language’ al-
ways operate in the midst of heteroglossia;12 a tendency
to unite is constantly undermined by a tendency to dis-
assemble. The unitary language and heteroglossia are in
constant dialogue; the former imposing limits, tending to-
wards stasis and ossification, the latter always fighting to
resist these constraints. The unitary language is centripetal,
it keeps the language moving uniformly along a prescribed
path, whereas heteroglossia is centrifugal; it pulls things
apart. For Bakhtin, every utterance is ‘a contradiction-
ridden, tension-filled unity of two embattled tendencies
in the life of language’.13 This tension between these two
modes of language recalls the tension between a particular
meta-historical understanding of progressive time and the
messiness of history as it unfolded in practice.
In an essay reflecting on Weiss’s work, W. G. Sebald
perceives a similar tension in a self-portrait of Weiss, which
demonstrates ‘both the will to resist and a process that may
be described as the assimilation of the chill of the system
which the subject knows threatens him.’14 The work oper-
ates within a particular ideologically saturated discourse,
which the experiences being described cannot be fully con-
tained by. Heteroglossia — although it would be clearer to
11 Mikhail Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, in The Dialogic Imagination:
Four Essays, ed. by Michael Holquist, trans. by Michael Holquist and
Caryl Emerson (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1981), pp. 259–422
(p. 271).
12 The Russian term is ‘raznorechiye’, derived from ‘ravno’ (different) and
‘rechi’ (speech).
13 Bakhtin, ‘Discourse in the Novel’, p. 272.
14 W. G. Sebald, ‘The Remorse of the Heart: On Memory and Cruelty in
theWork of PeterWeiss’,On theNaturalHistory ofDestruction, trans. by
Anthea Bell (New York: Random House, 2003), pp. 169–91 (p. 175).
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say history — intrudes, cracking open the official unitary
language.
The second volume of The Aesthetics of Resistance con-
tains a long meditation on Théodore Géricault’s painting
The Raft of Medusa (1818-19). Weiss’s fascination doesn’t
only concern the painting itself, which displays the splayed
corpses of the drowned shipwreck victims (and could in
some sense be aligned with the Pergamon Altar), but also
Géricault’s personal and embodied sufferings — how the
artist’s struggle became intertwined with his subject mat-
ter in some sense. And as Weiss’s novel unfolds, it similarly
reflects this damaged subjectivity. As Sebald observes: ‘the
grotesque deformities of our inner lives have their back-
ground and origin in collective social history’.15
Is it possible for a damaged subject to damage the
damaging world? Can individuals resolve their internal
fractures through collective action? In Weiss’s work the ex-
tent to which people are capable of changing or intervening
in the course of that history remains a fraught question. In
Weiss’s 1963 play Marat/Sade (or The Persecution and As-
sassination of Jean-Paul Marat as Performed by the Inmates
of the Asylum of Charenton Under the Direction of the Mar-
quis de Sade), the tension between history and nature (or
the contingent and the immutable) is exemplified by the
figures of Marat and Sade respectively. Sade takes the pos-
ition that nature is a ‘passionless spectator’16 indifferent to
humanity, declaring that
Nature herself would watch unmoved
if we destroyed the entire human race. 17
15 Ibid., p. 184.
16 Peter Weiss, Marat/Sade, trans. by Geoffrey Skelton and Adrian
Mitchell (New York; Atheneum, 1983), p. 23.
17 Ibid., p. 24.
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Marat, on the other hand, insists on the possibility of inter-
vention:
Against Nature’s silence I use action
In the vast indifference I invent a meaning
I don’t watch unmoved I intervene
and say that this and this are wrong
and I work to alter them and improve them
The important thing
is to pull yourself up by your own hair
to turn yourself inside out
and see the whole world with fresh eyes. 18
The play stages rather than resolves this contradiction.
Structured as a play-within-a-play performed by patients
in an asylum, Marat/Sade is set in 1808; the revolution-
ary events that are directed by Sade and performed by the
inmates (which culminate in the assassination of Marat)
took place in the preceding years. In addition to the dy-
namic between Sade and Marat there is also a tension
between the patients and hospital workers. If the asylum
is understood as a microcosm of France then this dis-
tinction between the insane and the sane maps onto a
class antagonism between the proletariat and the bour-
geoisie. The patients, ordinary French people who have
not benefitted from the revolution, come into constant
conflict with the bourgeois people who run the hospital,
setting up a conflict-ridden dialogue similar to the relation
between heteroglossia and unitary language. Weiss also
aligns the Parisian audience of Sade’s play-within-a-play
with the contemporary audience he is addressing. Accord-
ing to John J. White, Weiss’s depiction of French history,
which draws a parallel between Marat and Sade should be
18 Ibid., p. 27.
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read as a comment on German history, drawing an ana-
logous connection between the Nazi past and the West
German present. For White the pronouncements of Sade
regarding the immutability of history are characteristic of
the play as a whole, which is governed by a ‘cruel note
of historical determinism’; history becomes a play lunatics
are forced to perform like puppets.19 This seems to offer a
bleaker view of the world than the opening scene in The
Aesthetics of Resistance. Would it be possible to imagine
a scenario in which the audience somehow prises open a
space for intervention, refuses the seemingly mechanically
repetitious cycles history is fatefully trapped in to refuse
the ‘chill of the system’? Could the asylum’s inmates over-
turn their situation in the manner dreamed of by the young
protagonists standing before the Pergamon Altar?
Weiss’s works pose often unresolvable questions about
the relationships between writing and action, aesthetics
and politics. They suggest that only through reckoning
with the wounds of history can wounded subjects pro-
duced by history resist the continued perpetration of fu-
ture violence.
19 John J. White, ‘History and Cruelty in Peter Weiss’s “Marat/Sade”’,
Modern Language Review, 63.2 (1968), pp. 437–48 (p. 447).
Resistance II
HANNAH PROCTOR
The air is alive with the possibilities of
assembling, gathering, congregating. At
any moment, the promise of insurrection,
the miracle of upheaval; small groups…
and strangers threaten to become an
ensemble, to incite treason en masse.
Saidiya Hartman, ‘The
Terrible Beauty of the Slum’
The summer I moved to Berlin I read The Many Headed
Hydra by Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker. The book
is a rousing work of ‘history from below’ that criss-crosses
the Atlantic, charting rebellions, rebellious movements,
and the movement of rebellious ideas that emerged with
the expansion of trade and colonization in the early seven-
teenth century. The ‘hydra’ was a pejorative term used by
the ruling classes to describe the new motley groups and
collectivities that attended capitalist expansion.1 As I read
1 Peter Linebaugh and Marcus Rediker, The Many-Headed Hydra: Sail-
ors, Slaves, Commoners, and the Hidden History of the Revolutionary
Atlantic (Boston: Beacon, 2013).
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the book I created a list of the groups, subjects, and fig-
ures that the authors mention. These are the hydra’s very
many heads detached from their contexts of struggle to cre-
ate a giant amorphous mass. In reading this list out loud I
was intrigued by what effect the sheer proliferation might
produce — if it might capture something of the possibil-
ities of ‘assembling, gathering, congregating’ that Hartman
describes or whether it rather slips into fatigue or meaning-
lessness. I’m also interested in what some of the somewhat
anachronistic professions or descriptions of groups might
mean when thought in relation to on-going struggles in the
present. Could the list be constantly expanded?
dispossessed commoners, transported felons,
indentured servants, religious radicals,




the chapmen, the tinkers, the peddlers
the discharged or wounded
The entertainers of the day — the jugglers, fencers,
minstrels, keepers of dancing bears, athletes,
and players of interludes
fortune-tellers
all those outside of organized wage labour
swarms of idle persons
peoples who lived without property, work, masters,
or kings
many different kinds of people, with many different
kinds of work experience: sailors, labourers,
craftsmen, and commoners of several sorts,
including Native Americans
a motley crew
the amorphous labouring class
hewers of wood and drawers of water
spade men, brick men, carpenters
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the dispossessed, the strangers, the women, the
children
orphans, vagrants, petty offenders, disorderly
women
The Gypsies
the radical protestant, the sturdy rogue, the redun-
dant craftsman, the Catholic recusant , the
wild Irishman, the commonist, and the cut-
purse
heretics and thieves





all those who rejected wage labour: the Abraham-
men, palliards, clapperdudgeons, whipjacks,
dummerers, files, dunakers, cursitors,
Roberds-men, swadlers, prigs, anglers,
fraters, rufflers, bawdy-baskets, autem-
morts, walking morts, doxies, and dells
assassins, Amazons, Anabaptists
religious radicals, indigenous Americans, Africans,
commoners
the vagabonds, the master-less
mechanics, watermen, apprentices
the lowly and the base
the Levellers and the Diggers
the urban rioters and the rural commoners
The Ranters
the witches
sailors, clowns, mechanics, and radical sectaries





market gardeners, and river workers such as the
watermen, ferrymen, and fishermen
market women, carters, porters, sailors, weavers,
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the sailor of the European deep-sea ship and the
boatman of the African canoe




European and African American slaves (with
and without indentures), felons, landless
paupers, beggars, pirates, and rebels of all
kinds
London Levellers, Irish soldiers, Barbadian ser-
vants, and Virginia slaves
saltwater vagabonds
coopers, gunners, sailmakers
outcasts of all nations
the convicts, prostitutes, debtors
men of unfortunate and desperate condition
peasant rebels , demobilized soldiers, dispossessed
smallholders, unemployed workers
Brethren of the Coast
banditti of all nations
a mix’t multitude
cross-dressing female warriors
the outcasts of the nations of the earth
arsonists
the dispossessed of all colours [who] feasted,
danced, sang, took oaths, and planned their
resistance
obscure people with no visible way of subsistence
a mass of desperate but necessarily creative prole-
tarians being forced to work for wages
the Papa, from the Slave Coast near Whydah; the
Igbo, from the area around the Niger River;
and the Malagasay, from Madagascar
Shamans of Gold Coast origins



















gangs of the tobacco and sugar plantations
armed agglomerations
refugees, boat people, evacuees, and prisoners
strikers
hoisters of the red flag
sons of Jamaica
runaways
a motley rabble of saucy boys
wretches, with tethered garments
traitors
the vanguard







mass cultivators of the soil
avengers
the oppressed
multiethnic gangs of labourers
housekeepers, lovers, and nurses
freedom fighters
sappers, miners, pick and shovel workers
126 RESISTANCE II
the half-clothed and the half-drunk












poor disinherited earth worms
jack tars, coal-heavers, dustmen, women of colour,
old and young
the factory worker
food rioters; army agitators; barbarians of the com-
mons
aquatic labourers, free thinkers and striking textile
workers
the forgotten, the utopian
multitudinous, numerous, and growing







Resist: from the Latin re-sistere. Literally: to stand again —
that is to say, to cease one’s movement, to remain standing,
to stand still. This literal sense of the word, resistere as a
cessation of movement, informs its ancient usage. One of
the most common uses of the Latin verb is in the imper-
ative, resiste: the demand to ‘halt’ or ‘stop’. The verb is also
used figuratively to indicate a cessation of the movement of
speech itself: resistere media in voce, to stop in the middle of
saying something.
What does it mean to think resistance in the modern,
political sense of the word in light of its etymological root?
What does it mean to think resistance not as a play of
force and counterforce, of action and reaction, but rather
in terms of movement and its arrest? What does it mean
to think of resistance, Widerstand, in terms of standstill,
Stillstand?
These questions are a persistent concern in the work of
Walter Benjamin. Benjamin uses the word Widerstand only
rarely. But when the word does surface in his writings, it
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is deployed as a technical term at the nexus of his political
thought and his reflections on history. What constitutes re-
sistance in its political dimension is perhaps best captured
by a formula that is found in a study of the early 1920s,
where Benjamin refers to ‘a resistance against the stream of
historical becoming’ (ein Widerstand gegen den [...] Strom
geschichtlichen Werdens).1 This resistance is not directed
against one process of becoming and in favour of another.
Rather it is a resistance against historical becoming as such
— history insofar as it manifests itself as a stream, a con-
tinuous flow.
Nowhere does Benjamin elaborate what is entailed in
such resistance more clearly than in his work on Karl Kraus.
His essay on the Viennese journalist, Benjamin writes in a
notebook, is to ‘designate the place, where I stand and do
not participate’ (wo ich stehe und nichtmitmache).2 This de-
scription of what is at stake in the essay resonates with the
first published portrait of Kraus, written in the mid-1920s
under the title ‘Monument for a warrior’ (Kriegerdenk-
mal). Here Benjamin conjures up an image of the writer
as an ancient warrior caught up in a battle against a force
that constantly threatens to overpower him. The adjectives
punctuating the portrait evoke a fight that must appear to
be already lost: his struggles against his contemporaries are
‘hopeless’; his attempts to change the world are ‘helpless’;
1 Walter Benjamin, ‘“El mayor monstruo, los celos” von Calderón und
“Herodes undMariamne” vonHebbel. Bemerkungen zumProblemdes
historischen Dramas’, in Gesammelte Schriften, ed. by Rolf Tiedemann
and Hermann Schweppenhäuser, 7 vols (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp,
1972–91) ii: Aufsätze, Essays, Vorträge (1977), pp. 246–76 (p. 249).
[Benjamin’sGesammelte Schriftenwill henceforth be abbreviated asGS.
All translations are mine.]
2 Walter Benjamin, ‘Schemata zu “Karl Kraus” <1>’, in GS ii: pp. 1091–
94 (p. 1093).
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his humanity is ‘powerless’. ‘The rock with which he is to
bury his enemy rolls out of his hands as it did for Sisyphus’.3
For the force against which Kraus never ceases to
struggle despite this powerlessness Benjamin reserves the
name ‘world history’ (Weltgeschichte). Kraus is the em-
blematic figure of an experience of the history of the world
that never loses sight of its catastrophic dimension. In the
writings of Kraus, perhaps most notably ‘The Last Days of
Mankind’, Benjamin recognizes the insight that the cata-
strophe is neither an exception in history nor some event
that still awaits us; the real catastrophe is that the world
— this world — continues to run its course. Or, as a care-
ful reader of Benjamin has paraphrased this thesis: ‘The
continuum — continuation as such — is the catastrophe’.4
This experience of history is marked by a curious inversion
of the concept of progress (Fortschritt) and the corres-
ponding representation of a progression (Fortschreiten) of
humankind through time. The advancement of history is
not conceived as humankind’s steady approach towards its
moral destination; rather, the very progression of history,
its Fortschreiten, is grasped as the inexorable perpetuation
of misery and suffering. ‘The concept of progress is to be
founded in the idea of catastrophe’, Benjamin writes; ‘that
things “go on like this” is the catastrophe (daß es “so weiter”
geht, ist die Katastrophe)’.5
In the figure of Kraus, this experience of world history
as catastrophe is pushed to an extreme. History congeals
3 Benjamin, ‘Einbahnstraße’, in GS iv: Kleine Prosa, Baudelaire-
Übertragungen (1972), pp. 83–148 (p. 121).
4 Rebecca Comay, ‘Benjamin’s Endgame’, in Walter Benjamin’s Philo-
sophy, ed. by Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (London: Rout-
ledge, 1993), pp. 251–91.
5 Benjamin, ‘Zentralpark’, inGS i:Abhandlungen (1974), pp. 655–90 (p.
683).
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into a concatenation of events and takes its course fate-
fully, as if it were subjected to laws of nature. ‘For him’,
Benjamin writes, ‘the horrible years of his life are not his-
tory, but nature: a river, condemned to meander through a
landscape of hell’.6 The ‘stream of historical becoming’ here
returns as a river condemned to take its catastrophic course
— an image of the history of a world that has abandoned its
hope for divine salvation or the capacity of human beings
to change it through purposeful activity. The reference to a
‘landscape of hell’ evokes the specific temporal structure
of this history: hell is here to be understood not in the
religious but in the mythical sense, as the ever-renewed,
self-same present of Sisyphus Benjamin describes in notes
of the same period. The point of ancient representations of
hell, writes Benjamin, is not ‘that “the same always happens
again” […] but that the face of the world, its enormous
head, does not change precisely in what is newest, that this
“newest” always remains the same.’7
Just as the experience of the progression of history
undergoes an inversion, so the corresponding concept of
the political is turned inside out. If there is a political di-
mension to Kraus’s writings, it can only begin from his
resistance to the advance of this catastrophic history — not
as a positive contribution to the progression of humankind
towards its moral destination. To the a priori will described
by Kant, the will for the ‘highest good’ that discloses the
task to promote its realization in a ‘moral community’, Ben-
jamin counterposes another will: ‘the will to interrupt the
course of the world’ (der tiefste Wille […] den Weltlauf zu
unterbrechen).8 If the Kantian political will is directed to-
6 Benjamin, ‘Karl Kraus’, in GS ii, pp. 335–67 (p. 341).
7 Benjamin, GS v: Das Passagen-Werk (1982), pp. 1010–11.
8 Benjamin, ‘Zentralpark’ [GS i], p. 667.
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wards an ever-receding but positive telos, this will intends
nothing but a cessation.
A model for this will — which Benjamin describes
in the same fragment as ‘the will of Joshua’ — is found
in the ‘idiosyncrasy’ (die Idiosynkrasie), Kraus’s ‘highest
critical organ’.9 Benjamin uses this term in the precise
medical sense of an excessive physical reaction to some-
thing; the sense that is preserved in the German, where
the terms can be used to describe the intolerance towards
a certain sound, taste, or other sensation — the paradig-
matic example being the intolerance for the sound of a nail
scratching the surface of a blackboard. The idiosyncrasy
thus exemplifies a will without positive end, a pure negativ-
ity: a state of extreme intolerance towards a phenomenon,
where one cannot bear that it continues and is entirely
preoccupied by the desire for it to stop. That Benjamin de-
scribes the ‘will to interrupt the course of the world’ as ‘the
will of Joshua’ — the biblical figure who prayed that God
help the Israelites in their battles at Gibeon by making the
sun stand still — suggests that this desire is to be under-
stood first and foremost in temporal terms. Towards the
end of the essay, in a crucial passage, Benjamin cites one
of Kraus’s poems:
Let time stand still! Sun, you come to completion!
/ Make the end great! Announce eternity! / […]
You golden bell, melt in your own heat, / become a
cannon against the cosmic foe!10
‘Let time stand still (Lasse stehen die Zeit)’ — the will for
history to be interrupted in its course is here described
as a demand for time itself to be brought to a stop. The
9 Benjamin, ‘Karl Kraus’ [GS ii], p. 346.
10 Ibid., p. 365.
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resistance against the course of history that manifests itself
as a ‘stream of becoming’ is rendered here as a resistance
against time — that is to say, against time that manifests
itself as a continuous flow. The impossible demand that
Kraus makes is, in other words, a demand for the cessation
of the flowing time in which the time that passes is not
differentiated from a time that is yet to come; it is a demand
that has no positive aim but arises from the Widerstand
and Widersinn, a resistance that is also a repugnance at a
flowing time in which every past and future are merely
modifications of an ever-same present.
The resistance against time that is figured here thus
has nothing to do with a desire for endurance — quite
the contrary. What is unbearable about the flow of time
is not that things do not endure, that everything perishes
in time, but rather that the world and its time remain the
same in this passing and coming into being. That Kraus,
as portrayed by Benjamin, cannot stand time means that
he cannot stand this time, the continuum — or what is
described here as the time of the sun, the ‘cosmic foe’
that comes and goes day after day, again and again. It is
this ‘golden bell’ that Kraus demands to melt in its own
heat: rather than a desire for persistence, this demand for




The classic family sitcom characteristically builds resolu-
tion into its 22-minute structure. Each episode sets up a
moralizing conclusion in which one or more characters
learn something — for example, to trust a loved one, or
to take a step towards a longer-term personal change. But
this mechanism is cynical because genuine progress is in-
imical to the genre’s episodic form.1 If a sitcom is premised
on its main characters having certain flaws (and they al-
most universally are), then any attempt to address those
flaws outside the arc of a single episode is a departure from
what made the show interesting in the first place. These
mechanisms become frequently parodied, though never
fully superseded, in later works — fromSeinfeld, with Larry
David’s much-quoted refusal to allow the show’s charac-
ters any personal development whatsoever (‘No hugging.
No learning.’), to the recent Netflix animated drama Bo-
jack Horseman.2 In this show, the eponymous main char-
acter is the former star of Horsin’ Around, a saccharine
1 See Daniel Reeve, ‘Repetition’, in this volume.
2 Seinfeld, created byLarryDavid and Jerry Seinfeld (NBC, 1989–1998);
Bojack Horseman, created by Raphael Bob-Waksberg (Netflix, 2014– ).
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90s family sitcom recognizable as a parody of the pop-
ular ABC sitcom Full House.3 We meet Bojack in 2014:
a depressed figure, who has barely worked since his sit-
com’s cancellation twenty years earlier, he compulsively
rewatches his own show, obsessed with the possibility of
satisfying closure, and imagines its credit reel rolling in
front of his eyes whenever he experiences a moment of
insight or personal growth. But Bojack Horseman itself ex-
presses a violent structural opposition to the possibility of
episodic resolution. One of the ways in which it does this
is through an intense commitment to continuity between
episodes. During an alcoholic blackout, Bojack steals the
‘D’ from the Hollywood sign (season 1, episode 6), and
in all subsequent episodes the show’s characters univer-
sally refer to the neighbourhood as ‘Hollywoo’, even as the
major narrative repercussions of Bojack’s theft fade away.
Minor details persist determinedly through entire seasons
— Bojack hits a deer with his car (season 2, episode 4),
and his broken windscreen persists stubbornly through
several episode breaks.4 Training montages decay into dis-
traction or hopelessness, refusing to make the hard work of
self-improvement easier by means of temporal manipula-
tion. The message is clear: resolution is not easily achieved;
things remain broken. Nevertheless, despite the show’s re-
markable willingness to follow this committed refusal of
resolution into disturbing plots involving abuse, irrevers-
3 Full House, created by Jeff Franklin (ABC, 1987–1995).
4 Compare this with a telling moment in The Simpsons, created by Matt
Groening (Fox Broadcasting, 1989– ), ‘Bart vs. Australia’, season 6,
episode 16, dir. by Wes Archer (aired on 19 February 1995), in which
a clump of Bart’s hair is shaved away by a boomerang, only to regrow
apparently within seconds. This moment should not be regarded as
simply an animator’s continuity error, but rather as a reminder of how
certain kinds of continuity and consequentiality are unimportant to the
cultural project of The Simpsons.
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ible cruelty, and the deaths of major characters, Bojack
Horseman cannot function without signalling — perhaps
even despite itself — at least the possibility of resolution
over a longer arc by means of the redemption of its pro-
tagonist. Though the show offers a sharp, perceptive par-
ody of the 22-minute resolution arc of the family sitcom,
demonstrating the unsustainability of such a form when
continuity of character and consequentiality of action are
prioritized, we might ask whether the parody brings us any
closer to a concept of resolution freed from all formal con-
straints. The repetitive satisfaction of the family sitcom is in
a sense a deferral of any genuinely satisfying satisfaction,
the deferral of a conclusive end. Seen in this light, Bojack
Horseman’s refusal of resolution begins to look very similar
to the family sitcom’s use of ‘fake’ closure as a structuring
principle. Moreover, perhaps Bojack Horseman’s rejection
of episodic resolution misses the point, since it is so diffi-
cult to imagine a narrative text that could ever successfully
refuse resolution in any strong sense: all narratives are fi-
nite (because they are specific), and as such have endings
— endings to which meaning inevitably accrues. Even the
most arbitrary endings imaginable — for example, those
that occur on account of authorial death or abandonment
— are easily, perhaps even inevitably, absorbed into dis-
courses of resolution. In one of the most famous examples
of inconclusive textuality, the final piece in Johann Se-
bastian Bach’s monumental work The Art of Fugue (Die
Kunst der Fuge) trails off unfinished, and in doing so leaves
incomplete the tonal, rhetorical, and structural schemes of
the piece, as well as the entire work. A note added by Bach’s
son in the autograph manuscript gravely informs the reader
that ‘over this fugue, where the name BACH is stated in
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the countersubject, the author died.’5 Loose ends are sub-
sumed unavoidably into structures of meaning, whether by
processes of commentary or extension. Today, performers
of Bach’s fugue either rely on speculative reconstructions
of the piece’s final synthesis of its themes, or solemnly en-
act its incomplete ending, but whether the piece stands as
a monument to intricate schematism or a stark reminder of
the hubristic danger of such projects, resolution — which I
am beginning to define as the retrospective determination
of the shape, and hence the meaning, of a textual iteration
— is inescapable.
Bojack Horseman expresses a tension between, on the
one hand, the recognition of the cynicism inherent in nar-
rative structures of resolution, and on the other, what I
claim is the impossibility of ever abandoning such struc-
tures. One of the great (yet largely uncelebrated) poems
of the Middle Ages, Hue of Rotelande’s Ipomedon, also
explores the contradictions and difficulties involved in tak-
ing a position against resolution. In this work, written in
England towards the end of the twelfth century, we are
told about the deeds of the eponymous Ipomedon, a great
knight, in fact the greatest in the world, who falls in love
with a beautiful woman known as La Fiere (The Proud
One). Because La Fiere is proud, she will only marry
the best knight in the world, and we know that this is
Ipomedon. However, La Fiere does not know this, because
Ipomedon pretends to be a dandy, feigning a lack of in-
terest in all courtly pursuits apart from hunting. La Fiere,
5 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, MS Mus. ms. autogr. Bach P200/1,
fascicle 3, p. 39: ‘Ueber dieser Fuge, wo der Nahme B A C H





under pressure to find a husband who meets her stringent
criteria, organizes a three-day tournament in which all of
the best knights in the world will compete for the honour
of marrying her. Ipomedon, for reasons that are never ex-
plained, decides to compete in a series of three different
disguises, while pretending that he is out hunting instead
of participating in the tournament. Ipomedon, in his vari-
ous disguises, is victorious on each of the three days, and
eventually reveals himself. La Fiere thus agrees to marry
him — but Ipomedon decides, again, for reasons that are
never explained, to continue his adventures across Europe
for another three thousand lines, before finally marrying La
Fiere at the very end of the poem.6
Ipomedon’s structural peculiarity, its extended deferral
of its own end, has a parodic force: one of the conceits
of the text is to recognize that romances are much longer
than they need to be, if romances are understood as texts
which set up the conditions under which the best knight
can marry the most beautiful woman. Ipomedon is the best
knight in the world from the beginning of the poem, and
could very quickly prove himself to be so. The text could
therefore itself end very quickly with marriage and the
promised reproduction of aristocratic virtue in the form of
children. But Ipomedon is a very long text, and so too are ro-
mances generally. So, romance, a narrative mode in which
very little happens in a certain sense of the word, must
resort to narrative strategies of self-prolongation, whether
6 For the text of the poem, see Ipomedon, poème de Hue de Rotelande, ed.
by A. J. Holden (Paris: Klincksieck, 1979). For a reading of Ipomedon
that illuminates some aspects of my argument further, see Daniel
Reeve, ‘Queer Arts of Failure in Hue of Rotelande and Alan of Lille’,
in Medieval Thought Experiments: Poetry, Hypothesis, and Experience in
the European Middle Ages, ed. by Philip Knox, Jonathan Morton, and
Daniel Reeve (Turnhout: Brepols, 2018), pp. 273–96.
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these might be the graphic and detailed description of
battles, or subplots only minimally consequential with re-
spect to the broader narrative. Ipomedon’s parodic insight is
to extend this self-prolongation in order to produce a text
that is manifestly too long, and gleefully aware of being so.
Ipomedon ends with an elaborate allegorical conclu-
sion in which an authorial voice appears to claim that
the poem’s perverse excesses are both exceptionally faith-
ful to the demands of the narrative form of romance and
to the desires of its audience. Baked into this accusation
is of course a recognition that the poem’s parody of ro-
mance operates by being, in a certain sense, a maximally
successful one — one that extends a minimum amount of
narrative material into a poem of nearly eleven thousand
lines. Ipomedon recognizes that even its own scathing par-
ody cannot avoid the resolution that it so compulsively and
mockingly defers. Instead of showing us a romance without
resolution, the parody is achieved by altering the balance of
the text, the scale at which its structural features play out,
in order to create a disproportionate monster.
The question remains: does scale make a difference?
For the musicologist Robert Fink, it does. Fink’s analysis
of twentieth-century American minimal music alongside
its historical contemporary and stylistic sibling disco
produces an insight into the relationship between
repetition and teleology (or resolution).7 Rejecting
previous analyses of minimal music as being radically
anti-teleological,8 Fink proposes instead a concept of
7 Robert Fink, Repeating Ourselves: American Minimal Music as Cultural
Practice (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).
8 The dominant account is that of Wim Mertens, American Minimal
Music, trans. by J. Hautekiet (New York: Broude, 1983); for a sum-
mary of Mertens’ claims vis-à-vis musical teleology see Fink, Repeating
Ourselves, pp. 32–34.
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‘recombinant teleologies’, in which a repetitive musical
work performs ‘goal-directedness […] whenever and
wherever it chooses; [maintaining] a distance and perhaps
even ironic stance toward “traditional” teleological
dictates even as it plays with their undeniably pleasurable
aspects.’9 By ‘detach[ing] teleology from form’,10 a new
way of understanding resolution emerges: not just an
inevitable consequence of the punctuating effects of form
(though it always remains this), but also a discursive tool
capable of being used for any number of purposes.
Seen through a certain analytical lens, this is the move
made by Bojack Horseman. Working in a form — the epi-
sodic animated television comedy — laden with strong ex-
pectations that its narrative resolutions will coincide neatly
with the end of each episode, Bojack offers instead a tele-
ology detached from its form, even if this teleology remains
only a provisional rejection or deferral of the inevitable
resolution that will accrue to its ending, even though that
final resolution is, for the time being, a mirage, and remains
available, even when enacted, for continuation, extension,
and repetition.
This, then, is the ‘katechontical’ paradox of resolu-
tion.11 All texts, always, are poised to end, and in doing so
to perform the finality that is a precise consequence of their
finitude. But, on the other hand, time refuses to do any-
thing but carry on, leaving these objects always available
for reiteration and continuation.
9 Fink, Repeating Ourselves, p. 43.
10 Ibid., p. 46.





The ‘re-’word this article examines is the verb ‘to restrain’
— and the nouns derived from it: ‘the restrainer’ and ‘the
restraint’. The word stems from the Latin restringere and
means, first and foremost, ‘to hold back’, ‘to withhold’; it
can also mean to ‘bind back’, to ‘put in chains’ or figur-
atively to ‘put in limits’ or simply ‘to limit’. Interestingly
enough, the Latin restringere can also mean to ‘reveal’ or
‘to lay bare’ — for example, a sword (ferrum) or one’s own
hand (manum).1
What is the particular function of the ‘re-’ in this word?
Since both stringere and restringere denote the action of
‘binding’, one can indeed pose the question what exactly
1 See the entries on ‘restringere’ in Gerhard Köbler, Lateini-
sches Abkunfts- und Wirkungswörterbuch, 2nd edn (2009)
<http://www.koeblergerhard.de/Latein/LateinischesWB.pdf>
[accessed 20 December 2018], p. 1103; Hermann Menge,
Langenscheidts Großwörterbuch Latein, 2 vols (Berlin: Langenscheidt,
2001), ii: Lateinisch-deutsch, unter Berücksichtigung der Etymologie,
p. 809. — I cannot withhold my gratitude for sustained critique
and comments from my co-fellows at the ICI Berlin, as well as from
Christoph Holzhey and Arnd Wedemeyer.
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the prefix ‘re-’ here contributes. For very obviously, it does
not connote a repetition or a restitution — this is not
an iterative ‘re-’. An act of restringere does not stringere
something again, nor does it take it back to its original
status. Rather, the ‘re-’ must be functioning as an inten-
sifier, adding emphasis to the meaning already expressed
in the base, stringere. Like many Latin prefixes, such as
‘ad-’, ‘ex-’, or ‘cum-’, ‘re-’ can have the function of an as-
pect marker, signifying ‘thoroughness’. ‘Resplendent’, for
example, means not to shine (splendere) again or to shine
back, but to shine brightly. Similarly, ‘to restrain’ would
thus mean to bind, but to do so thoroughly or fully: per-
haps with great intensity, force, or effect.
This way of parsing the word, however, does not yet
tell the whole story. The intensifying ‘re-’, here, does not
merely strengthen the root meaning while leaving it un-
changed; rather, it carries additional connotations, con-
notations that add to or even alter the meaning of the base.
For the intensification of the stringere in restringeremust say
something about the object of this act of binding. If what
is being bound is something that must be restrained, re-
strictum, rather than simply strictum or bound, then there
must be something about it that calls for the intensifica-
tion of the binding signified by the ‘re-’. If stringere points
to the simple act of ‘tying’ or ‘binding’, restringere would
refer, in addition, to the restraint of something that would
otherwise, were it not restrained, be in flow, in movement,
that is: ongoing. ‘To restrain’ implies that something that
would otherwise continue to perform or execute its force,
or move in whatever direction it presses toward, has been
arrested. Put differently, the ‘re-’ of restringere only makes
sense in reference to a force that is being countered, a force
that continues to exert itself even if, or even when, it is
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being prevented from achieving its aim. If there were no
force, action, or movement at the outset, there could be
no restraint. And one could go still further: the movement
or action that is being arrested must be such that it could,
potentially, succeed in overcoming the restraining force.
If the force being restrained were weak, or of inconsistent
direction, the act of restraining would be superfluous. In
every restraint, then, there are two forces at work: one that
aims, obviously, at continuing its course, or, to say the least,
aims at not being arrested; and one that arrests, one that
suspends — even if intermittently or provisionally — an
action or motion. The very ‘re-’ in ‘restrain’ implies by ne-
cessity two different dynamics, or two opposed forces.
The ‘re-’ of the re-strainer thus points to a temporal
paradox. The very expression ‘to re-strain’ necessarily im-
plies two times: one, a time that flows forward, and another
that arrests, slows or interrupts this forward-flowing time.
It thus entails a time and a countertime, a time of flow and
a time of halting. The result of the action of restringere is a
pause, a halting of motion that would otherwise have been
relentless. Evidently, the restrainer can therefore only be
understood as an anti-teleological figure. The telos that is
negatively implied in the concept of restringere — the telos
of the movement that has been arrested — is not achieved
or at least not yet achieved; it is, on the contrary, preven-
ted, for an indefinite period of time. Now, how are we to
understand the time of the restraint? Is it a meredelay in the
movement that has been arrested — and thus of essentially
the same nature as the time that would have been marked
out by the movement it prevents? Any chronological de-
scription of the process of restraint would force us to see it
this way: a (potential) movement has been restrained; just
as this movement would have covered a certain distance in
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a certain span of time, so the delay occupies a span of time,
of the very same time in which the movement’s progress
toward its telos could have been measured. In fact, however,
if the time of the restraint is of indefinite duration, and this
is the common sense of ‘restrain’, then the time of the re-
straint would seem to be of an entirely different nature than
the time of what is being restrained. A restraint is more
than a simple delay, a postponement in one and the same
time as that occupied by what it postpones. Rather, a re-
straint interrupts not just a movement but the very time of
that movement, in order to institute another kind of time:
the indefinite, non-teleological, open-ended time of the re-
straint. The restraint does not just arrest a movement, but
suspends the very time of that movement and imposes its
own, essentially different regime of time. Since its duration
is indeterminate (the act of restraining could stop after a
few seconds or go on for ages), the act of restraining, in
other words, gains a certain autarchy.
Of course, in the history of (theo-political) culture,
there is a particular concept or figure that points precisely
to this ‘double-bound’ movement: the notorious katéchon.
The main reference for the many and varied interpretations
of this concept is Paul’s (or Pseudo-Paul’s) Second Epistle
to the Thessalonians (2. 6-7). Given its importance and
impact on (past and present) theo-political concepts, I will
quote it here in its entirety:
1Concerning the coming [tēs parousias] of our Lord
Jesus Christ and our being gathered to him, we ask
you, brothers and sisters, 2not to become easily un-
settled or alarmed by the teaching allegedly from
us — whether by a prophecy or by word of mouth
or by letter — asserting that the day of the Lord
has already come. 3Don’t let anyone deceive you in
any way, for that day will not come until the rebel-
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lion [apostasia] occurs and the man of lawlessness
is revealed [kai apokaluphthēi ho anthrōpos tēs ano-
mias], the man doomed to destruction. 4He will
oppose and will exalt himself over everything that
is called God or is worshiped, so that he sets him-
self up in God’s temple, proclaiming himself to be
God. 5Don’t you remember that when I was with
you I used to tell you these things? 6And now you
know what is holding him back [to katechon], so
that he may be revealed [apokaluphthēnai] at the
proper time. 7For the secret power of lawlessness
[to mustērion tēs anomias] is already at work [en-
ergeitai]; but the one who now holds it back [ho
katechōn] will continue to do so till he is taken out
of the way. 8And then the lawless one will be re-
vealed [apokaluphthēsetai ho anomos], whom the
Lord Jesus will overthrow with the breath of his
mouth and destroy by the splendor of his coming
[tē epiphaneia tēs parousias autou].2
In this passage, the present participle of the verb katechō
is used, first in the neuter (to katechon), then in the mas-
culine (hō katechōn). In both cases, its meaning is ‘the
restrainer’: first, it is a something, some kind of power that
defers, restrains, postpones; and then it is ‘the one’, ‘he’
who restrains. Now, what exactly does this ‘restrainer’ hold
back? According to the quoted passage, it is evidently the
‘lawlessness’, ‘the evil’ — but that is not all. At the same
time that the katéchon restrains evil, it/he also keeps it from
coming to light (another meaning of the Latin restringere).3
The katéchon impedes and postpones both the unleashing
and the revelation of evil, of iniquity. For the revelation of
evil occurs only with the second coming of the messiah,
2 Quoted according to Holy Bible: New International Version (Colorado
Springs: Biblica, 1984). The Greek is transcribed according to Novum
Testamentum Graece, ed. by Eberhard Nestle, Barbara Aland, and Kurt
Aland (Stuttgart: Deutsche Bibelgesellschaft, 2012).
3 See above, fn 1.
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the so-called parousia. Only when evil is revealed or on the
condition that it fully manifests itself, is it in fact destroyed
(one of the underlying messages of this passage).4 And it
is in this sense that the katéchon must be understood as a
Janus-faced figure (just as it is both neuter and masculine
in the passage). It holds back the outburst of evil, of chaotic
lawlessness, but at the same time it also holds back the reve-
lation and hence the ultimate defeat of evil. The katéchon is
thus the biblical figure that stands for ‘order’ (nomos) while
the ‘secret power of lawlessness’ (to mustērion tēs anomias)
is at work. (It should be added, of course, that nomos is ne-
cessary only because there is anomias — and the anomias is
here not to be confused with grace or any other state that
would transcend the nomos.)5 It controls the lawlessness
and postpones its unchecked eruption — but it can’t over-
come it. The final defeat of ‘lawlessness’ is reserved for the
messianic power.
In this very ambiguity lies, I would suggest, the
main significance of the katéchon as a kind of cultural
4 In Revelations 20. 2–3, 7–10, another passage points to the same logic:
here we read that the ‘ancient serpent’, which will have been ‘bound’
for a ‘thousand years’, ultimately, at the end of times, ‘must be let out
for a little while’ (the implication being, again, that this will lead to its
ultimate destruction).
5 Which is the reading Giorgio Agamben proposes in The Time That Re-
mains: A Commentary on the Letter to the Romans, trans. by Patricia
Dailey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005). The katéchon is
a recurrent and clearly central figure in Agamben’s writings; see for
example: The Kingdom and the Glory: For a Theological Genealogy of
Economy and Government. Homo Sacer II, 4, trans. by Lorenzo Chiesa
(Stanford: StanfordUniversity Press, 2007); Stasis: CivilWar as a Polit-
ical Paradigm. Homo Sacer II, 2, trans. by Nicholas Heron (Stanford:
StanfordUniversity Press, 2015);TheMystery of Evil: Benedict XVI and
the End of Days, trans. by AdamKotsko (Stanford: Stanford University
Press, 2017); ‘Leviathan’s Riddle’, in Leviathans Rätsel, trans. by Paul
Silas Peterson (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2013); The Church and the
Kingdom, trans. by Leland de la Durantaye (Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press, 2012).
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Ur-concept of the double-movement or double-dynamic
of restringere.6 And a careful reading of the quoted passage
makes clear why, from Hippolytus and Tertullian to
Augustin and even to Luther, the katéchon at times stands
for political order as such, and at other times for the
Roman Empire (as the last Empire before the coming
of Christ),7 and at yet other times for both at once: the
political order is what controls the power of lawlessness
(while chaos and evil brew underneath). Worldly political
power thus cannot be condemned — it fulfils a necessary
function. At the same time, the political order is not to be
confused with the messianic, since the katéchon, as good
6 With this I do not mean to imply that the katéchon is the only ‘cultural
Ur-concept’ of the double-dynamic of restringere. But it seems to be a
particularly prominent and theo-politically charged concept implying
two opposing and, also in their temporality, opposed powers.
7 After the disintegration of the Roman Empire, the katéchon was iden-
tified, for example, with the Empire of Charles the Great and the Holy
Roman Empire of the German Nation. The Catholic Church, too, was
long believed to fulfil the katechontical function. See among many
other contributions to the history of the figure of the katéchon and
both its temporal and political implications: Carl Schmitt, The Nomos
of the Earth in the International Law of Jus Publicum Europaeum, trans.
by G. L. Ulmen (New York: Telos Press, 2006), pp. 58–70; Wilhelm
Stählin, ‘Die Gestalt des Antichristen und das “katechon”’, in Festgabe
Joseph Lortz, ed. by Erwin Iserloh and Peter Manns, 2 vols (Baden-
Baden: Grimm, 1958), ii: Glaube und Geschichte, pp. 1–12; G. Meyer,
C. Schetter, and J. Prinz, ‘Spatial Contestation? The Theological Foun-
dations of Carl Schmitt’s Spatial Thought’, Geoforum, 43 (2012), pp.
687–96; Sergei Prozorov, ‘The Katechon in the Age of Biopolitical
Nihilism’, Continental Philosophy Review, 45.4 (2012), pp. 483–505;
Felix Grossheutschi, Carl Schmitt und die Lehre vom Katechon (Ber-
lin: Duncker & Humblot, 1996); William Rasch, ‘Messias oder Kat-
echon? Carl Schmitts Stellung zur politischen Theologie’, in Politische
Theologie, ed. by Jürgen Brokoff and Jürgen Fohrmann (Paderborn:
Schöningh, 2003), pp. 39–54; Paul Metzger, Katechon: II Thess2, 1–
12 im Horizont apokalyptischen Denkens (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2005);
Roberto Esposito, Two: The Machine of Political Theology and the Place
of Thought, trans. by Zakiya Hanafi (New York: Fordham University
Press, 2015); Massimo Cacciari, The Withholding Power: An Essay on
Political Theology, trans. by Edi Pucci (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).
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and useful as it/he is in its/his restraining and controlling
potency, simultaneously withholds the second coming
of Christ, that is, the messianic event. By doing so and
by sustaining the state of affairs in which lawlessness
may remain concealed, the katéchon — that is, for the
sake of simplicity, the political order — does not exactly
collude with evil, but entertains an alliance with it.
It is this particular relationship with evil that renders
worldly power, as indispensable as it is, an always already
corrupted safeguard against disorder. No salvation and no
overcoming of the underlying anomic and chaotic powers
can occur within politics. At the same time, there is no
doing without politics.
With regards to a particular figure of the restrainer, the
power that withholds, the biblical katéchon, Roberto Es-
posito has noted, in his Immunitas, that there is an ‘aporetic
node of life and death, of momentum and restraint, of
opening and binding’ inherent to the katechontic.8 The
restraining katéchon is the principle that, in a way, with-
holds the coming of the end, thereby postponing death, the
ultimate limit or finis, or finitude tout court. Even if under-
stood independently of the biblical context, one could thus
understand the power that restrains at once as a negative
force — namely, as a force that withholds movement and
action (or drama in the sense of flowing and forward mov-
ing action) — and at the same time as a positive force, a
force that withholds the end, expiration, death.
My contention is that the ‘re-’ in ‘restrain’ is what
adds to the ‘strain’, the stringere, this aporetic dimension,
this double-bind of moving forward and halting, and this
double-logic of being at once something one wishes would
8 RobertoEsposito, Immunitas:TheProtection andNegation of Life, trans.
by Zakiya Hanafi (Cambridge: Polity, 2011), p. 57.
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prevail and something one wishes would loosen or release
to allow the motion to proceed. Restraint always has a
double focus — and an ambivalent one at that. It is also
my contention that the logic — the paradoxical logic —
of the restrainer is deeply ingrained in all processes of life,
of drama, of action, of being, and of politics: it is not only
the paradox that there is no action without it being at once
withheld and sustained, but also the ambivalence that it
will always remain unclear whether the end being striven
for is good or bad. The ‘re-’ of restringere thus points to
the inherent paradox of representing time as motion, to
the inherent ‘aporetic node’ of the restrainer itself. Read
before the backdrop of a long tradition of understanding
this aporetic logic of the withholding power in terms of the
katéchon, the prefix at the same time conveys to what extent
diametrically opposed concepts of the political continue
to populate the Western imagination. If the ‘secular order’
or ‘worldly government’ has the function of withholding
both the ultimate salvation and the final outbreak of chaos,
it is unclear whether one should hasten its demise or work
for its enduring power. In this line of thought, a sustained
— and still outstanding — reflection on the katéchon in
all its cultural and imaginative ramifications might help to
restrain, this time in the sense of ‘to expose’, important
but, to this day, insufficiently understood dimensions of





In the first of Rainer Maria Rilke’s Duineser Elegien, re-
citation occurs both as a poetic principle and as a per-
formed action. What Rilke covertly re-cites is Dante’s Vita
nova (1293–1295). Where can Dante be found in this
poem? Some contextual information is needed to become
aware of his undisclosed presence. From 22 October 1911
to 9 May 1912, Rilke was a guest of Princess Marie von
Thurn und Taxis in the castle of Duino. There Rilke de-
voted himself to reading the Vita nova. The Princess asked
the poet to translate Dante’s work and he pondered the
idea for a while. Eventually, he abandoned the endeavour
and, in 1912, started writing the Duino Elegies instead. In
her memories of Rilke from 1932, the Princess recalls a
peculiar episode that occurred while the poet was walking
along the cliffs near the castle: ‘in the midst of his ponder-
ing, he suddenly stopped, for it seemed to him as if a voice
had called to him in the roar of the storm.’1 The voice ap-
1 Marie vonThurn und Taxis-Hohenlohe, Erinnerungen an Rainer Maria
Rilke (Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1994), pp. 48–49. Translations are mine.
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parently uttered the following words: ‘Who, if I cried out,
would hear me among the hierarchies / of angels?’ (‘Wer,
wenn ich schriee, hörte mich denn aus der Engel / Ord-
nungen?’).2 Rilke quickly wrote down the sentence in his
notebook, and that same evening he drafted the first elegy.
The outburst of creativity continued through the following
days, when he drafted the second elegy and fragments of
later ones. The question heard in the storm came to consti-
tute the opening lines of the poem.
These dynamics of negotiation of poietic agency
closely resemble those recounted by Dante in the tenth
paragraph (XVIII–XIX) of the Vita nova.3 While walking
along a river, Dante the character is suddenly seized by a
pressing desire to speak and starts pondering the modality
and the potential audience of the speech. At that point,
[…] my tongue, as if moved of its own accord,
spoke and said: Ladies who have intelligence of love.
With great delight I decided to keep these words
in mind and to use them as the beginning of my
poem. Later, after returning to the aforementioned
city and reflecting for several days, I began writing a
canzone, using this beginning, and I constructed it
in a way that will appear below in its divisions. The
canzone begins: Ladies who have.4
2 All quotations are from Rainer Maria Rilke, Werke, ed. by Manfred
Engel, Ulrich Fülleborn, Horst Nalewski, and August Stahl, 4 vols.
(Frankfurt a.M.: Insel, 1996), ii: Gedichte 1910 bis 1926, ed. by Man-
fred Engel andUlrich Fülleborn, pp. 201–204 (p. 201).Translations are
mine.
3 I follow the text and the subdivision of the text into 31 paragraphs
provided in Dante Alighieri, Vita nova, ed. by Guglielmo Gorni
(Turin: Einaudi, 1996).Thenumbering of the corresponding section in
Michele Barbi’s edition is provided in Roman numerals in parenthesis.
4 All translations of the Vita nova are from Dante Alighieri, Dante’s
Vita Nuova. New Edition: A Translation and an Essay, ed. and trans.
by Mark Musa (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973). ‘[…]
la mia lingua parlò quasi come per sé stessa mossa e disse: “Donne
FRANCESCO GIUSTI 153
The ‘origin’ of the gesture performed in the opening lines
is concealed in Rilke’s elegy. Writing literary history, one
can retrace it only from contextual information.5 Why? I
would suggest that Rilke knows that this lyric gesture has
no proper origin. Receiving verses from external forces is
one of the motifs by which the basic gesture of negotiating
one’s own subjective voice has been traditionally carried
out. There is no attempt in the elegy to go back to the
‘first’ time that gesture was performed in order to repeat
it. Even for the presumed first occurrence in the Vita nova,
one can find a constellation of references spanning from
Greek and Latin poetry to numberless recurrences at least
up to Valéry’s vers donné.6 Rilke’s poet-speaker prefers to
trace a series of re-enacted gestures with no supersession.
Twenty lines later (26–53), the elegy addresses a ‘tra-
ditional’ condition: the poet is never ready to contain the
approaching beloved, the moment of inspiration in its full-
ness. The movements of thought and expectation seem to
divert the poet’s attention and make the fullness of experi-
ence impossible (whose vocalization is interrupted by the
sigh in Dante’s ‘Tanto gentile e tanto onesta pare’). What,
then, could poets do? They should ‘sing the lovers’ (‘singe
die Liebenden’, l. 36) in order to make their emotions im-
mortal. What kind of song should it be? It should be a song
ch’avete intellecto d’amore”. Queste parole io ripuosi nella mente con
grande letitia, pensando di prenderle per mio cominciamento. Onde
poi, ritornato alla sopradecta cittade, pensando alquanti die cominciai
una canzone con questo cominciamento, ordinata nel modo che si
vedrà di sotto nella sua divisione. La canzone cominciaDonne ch’avete’,
in Dante, Vita nova, pp. 92–93.
5 For reflections on a possible ‘lyric history’, see Susan Stewart, ‘Preface
to a Lyric History’, in The Uses of Literary History, ed. by Marshall
Brown (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996), pp. 199–218.
6 Michel Jarrety, ‘The Poetics of Practice and Theory’, in Reading Paul
Valéry:Universe inMind, ed. byPaulGifford andBrian Stimpson (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 105–20.
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of praise. This praise (Preisung) must be constantly started
anew, because it is fated never to be fully achieved. Old ex-
amples of unfulfilled love should teach ‘us’ that it is time
for ‘us’ to love without a beloved7 — one could think of
Dante’s renunciation of reciprocity in the economy of love,
but Beatrice always affects Dante even after her untimely
(or too timely) death. This is formulated as an exhorta-
tion, or an expectation, addressed to a you that might well
be the speaker or a future poet. There is no explicit you in
‘Tanto gentile e tanto onesta pare’, but I tried to show in
my first contribution (‘Recitation’) how Dante constructs
a text to be shared with potential readers: each monodic
vocalization of the poem joins a choral reiteration, some-
how de-crystallizing or, in Augustinian terms, distending
the distilled ‘now’ by vocalizing it anew in the present of
reading.8
Perhaps, this is why Rilke decided not to translate
the Vita nova, but rather to re-enact it, to take over its
way of loving, to inhabit the position of its speaker. In
other words, to listen to the ‘uninterrupted message’ (‘die
ununterbrochene Nachricht’) he mentions in line 60. ‘We’
should endure, trembling, as ‘the arrow endures the bow’
(‘wie der Pfeil die Sehne besteht’, l. 52). It is a matter of re-
citation more than mere repetition. Re-citation inscribes
the renewed gesture and the new self in a long unbroken
7 The plural first person pronoun is used in the poem itself, where the
‘I’ and the ‘you’ are included in a ‘we’ that could be defined by the
collective gesture of praise. It seems that different individuals can share
this gesture in a form of chorality. Therefore, what can be shared —
both synchronically and diachronically — is not a particular object of
love, but a certain modality of loving.
8 I am disconnecting here the notions of monodic and choral poetry
from their musical accompaniment to engage with their modalities of
enunciation. Chorality is crucial to the definition of lyric in W. R.
Johnson, The Idea of Lyric: Lyric Modes in Ancient and Modern Poetry
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982).
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series whereas repetition instantiates again the old words
by appropriating them. In its flight, the arrow is more than
itself because of the power the bowstring has given to it,
not so much for the target it is directed towards.
So, the trembling song ought to be sung for the power
that love exerts, not for an object (the beloved) to be even-
tually obtained. The relation with objects should not be
one of interpretation or attribution of meaning; as Rilke
writes at lines 12–13: ‘we are not so securely at home / in
the interpreted world’ (‘wir nicht sehr verläßlich zu Haus
sind / in der gedeuteten Welt’).9 At the same time, ‘we’ as
humans cannot withstand the angel, and even less embrace
a divine being: in fact, if an Angel ‘were to suddenly / take
me to its heart, I would vanish into its / stronger presence’
(‘und gesetzt selbst, es nähme / einer mich plötzlich ans
Herz: ich verginge von seinem / stärkeren Dasein’, ll. 2–
4). A different ontological status makes any unmediated
contact between human beings and the divine impossible.
In a Cavalcantian morbid attitude, this is the effect that the
bodily presence of Beatrice has on Dante in the first para-
graphs of the Vita nova. The vision of her annihilates the
last remainders of his vital power: ‘not only did the sight of
her not defend me: it ultimately annihilated the little life I
had left’ (‘cotal veduta non solamente non mi difendea, ma
finalmente disconfiggea la mia poca vita’ (9, XVI). How-
ever, the angel, as the young dead in the final section of the
elegy, can exert some pressure on human beings, can push
‘us’ toward it. The speaker of the elegies realizes, as much
as Dante’s speaker, that one cannot fully experience nor
9 See Raoul Walsch, ‘daß wir nicht sehr verläßlich zu Haus sind in der
gedeuteten Welt’: Untersuchung zur Thematik der gedeuteten Welt in
Rilkes ‘Die Aufzeichnungen des Malte Laurids Brigge’, ‘Duineser Elegien’
und spätester Lyrik (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2012), pp.
226–64.
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understand the divine entity; thus a different relationship,
a new way to speak about it, needs to be established.
In rhetoric, reversion — from the Latin reversio —
denotes all those figures of speech that involve a turning
back, a return, a coming aroundagain: anastrophe, chiasmus,
epiphora, anaphora. This backward movement, which es-
tablishes a present and announces a future, could be trans-
ferred from the verbal design of a single poem, through
the œuvre of an author, to the inner workings of the liter-
ary genre.10 This is another feature that Rilke could find
in the Vita nova, where Dante attempts to re-cite himself,
that is, to assemble old and scattered lyrics turning them
into a linear progression towards Christian love and a unit-
ary story of his love for Beatrice. Yet the story ends up
being less linear than expected and the linear process of
conversion to Beatrice is interrupted by reversions.11 An evi-
dence of this problematic is the fact that, as the supposedly
teleological narrative proceeds, the new poetic modality —
the stilo della loda (style of praise) — is not consistently
deployed. If the canzone in paragraph 10 (XIX), ‘Ladies
10 Riffaterre hints at a similar mechanism: ‘It is only in isolation that the
poem is difficult and, when made easy, trite. It makes sense only when
read as a metonym of the whole genre — like the antique tessera that
was just a shard by itself, but a message when fitted to its matching
piece. And its significance lies not in hidden depths, but in the fact of
its being a variation on a motif ’, Michael Riffaterre, Semiotics of Poetry
(Bloomington: IndianaUniversity Press, 1978), p. 163. I argue that the
‘variation’ does not operate primarily on motifs but rather on gestures.
Gestures give form to the speechmore than address a thematic content,
as topoi, motifs, and themes seem to do at different levels. Lyric gestures
concern the linguistic practice and show a certain degree of awareness
of its limits.
11 According to Harrison, while mourning the death of Beatrice in the
sequence of poems composed for the ‘donna pietosa’, Dante both re-
verts to previous poetics and explores a different poetic possibility, the
‘Petrarchan alternative’. See Robert Pogue Harrison, The Body of Bea-
trice (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988), pp. 93–109.
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who have intelligence of love’ (‘Donne ch’avete intellecto
d’amore’), is ascribed to the new poetics of praise, then the
reader has to wait until paragraph 12 (XXI) and then para-
graph 17 (XXVI) to have other poems composed in such
manner.12 The poems in-between dangerously revert to
previous modalities of loving and poetry writing. Even the
poetic supersession that Dante traces in a sort of progress-
ive figural fulfillment is more problematic than sometimes
admitted.13
Proper praise or celebration, in Dante’s project, had to
be directed toward a specific subject named Beatrice;14
Rilke retains the towardness of the speech but empties the
destination. In a certain sense, he prefers the Dante before
his definitive conversion (or final reversion) to Beatrice,
which is again the outcome first of Beatrice’s apparition in
12 The protagonist of the Vita nova, Barolini writes, ‘does not so much
proceed in a consistently forward direction […] as return again and
again to his previous condition, from which he must once more start
forth: textual indices of this condition are the ri prefix in “ripigliare
lo stilo de la sua loda” (XXVI, 4), and the unusual recording of two
initial quatrains […] for the sonnet of chaper XXXIV,’ Teodolinda
Barolini, ‘“Cominciandomi dal principio infino a la fine” (V.N., XXIII,
15): Forging Anti-Narrative in the “Vita Nuova”’, in La gloriosa donna
de la mente: A Commentary on the Vita Nuova, ed. by Vincent Moleta
(Florence: Olschki, 1994), pp. 119–40 (p. 124).
13 In the Vita nova, Dante traces the story of his own poetic develop-
ment while at the same time outlining a history of recent poetics: from
Guittone d’Arezzo and Bonagiunta da Lucca, through Cavalcanti and
then Guinizzelli, up to himself. See Zygmunt G. Barański, ‘Dante Ali-
ghieri: Experimentation and (Self-)Exegesis’, inTheCambridge History
of Literary Criticism, ed. by H. B. Nisbet and Claude Rawson, 9 vols
(Cambridge: CambridgeUniversity Press, 1989–), ii:TheMiddle Ages,
ed. by Alastair Minnis and Ian Johnson (2005), pp. 561–82 (p. 567).
14 Indeed, Dante sees Beatrice ‘among the hierarchies of angels’, to use
Rilke’s formulation, first in the vision (imaginazione) recounted in
‘Donna pietosa e di novella etate’ (‘A lady of tender years’, 14, XXIII)
and lastly in the ascension of his spirit to Heaven in ‘Oltre la spera
che più larga gira’ (‘Beyond the sphere’, 30, XLI). In the final lines of
the former, after the vision, he raises his eyes to Heaven and addresses
Beatrice directly (ll. 83–84).
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a vision and then of Dante’s wishful intention. Of course,
there is a historical reason for this. In Dante, divine love
is granted to the human being: God calls the individual
to respond to his love. In Rilke and in modernist negative
theology,15 the angel is utterly removed from all human
affairs. In the Duineser Elegien, therefore, Rilke problem-
atizes Dante’s idea of being called by the other as the driv-
ing force of a continuous poetic performance: the response
to the request of conversion towards the other. He seems
rather to propose the intrinsic value of the practice of a
perpetual calling upon the silent other: a return to a human
position. In the seventh elegy, it is the flow of the summon-
ing voice to keep the angel at a distance: ‘Since my call / is
always full of effusion, against such a powerful / stream you
cannot proceed’ (‘Denn mein / Anruf ist immer voll Hin-
weg; wider so starke / Strömung kannst du nicht schreiten’,
ll. 87–89).16 This way Rilke seems to revert to a poetics
of calling that values the practice of voicing itself — the
same poetics on which, according to the first elegy, secular
Petrarchism relies in its poetic practice. By mentioning the
Italian Renaissance poet Gaspara Stampa, the poem traces
its own tradition of lyric subjectivities. They seem to share
a long-lasting form of love and a modality of lyric speech
that do not expect reciprocation, but are performed by the
15 For a discussion of the role of negative theology in modern and post-
modern poetics, seeWilliamFranke,Poetry andApocalypse:Theological
Disclosures of Poetic Language (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
2009) and A Philosophy of the Unsayable (Notre Dame, IN: Univer-
sity of Notre Dame Press, 2014). See also Languages of the Unsayable:
The Play of Negativity in Literature and Literary Theory, ed. by San-
ford Budick and Wolfgang Iser (New York: Columbia University Press,
1989).
16 Rilke, Werke, ii: pp. 220–23 (p. 223).
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poetic effort to appeal to the unattainable entity.17 The di-
vine is not represented in lyric poetry, it cannot be; rather,
poetry embodies the human effort to keep calling.
The lyric poem finds its own place in different tempor-
alities that meet in every act of reading it. The historical
form of subjectivity inscribed in a poem can vary according
to cultural and historical circumstances, but the discursive
mode seems to retain certain gestures that allow for the in-
scription of subjectivity. Rilke is not saying the same words
or conveying the same meaning as Dante, he is rather mak-
ing the same gesture under different circumstances and in a
different historical context. The lyric as a discursive mode
seems to work in a non-linear and non-unidirectional tem-
porality, which is not that of nineteenth-century literary
history.
Re-citation is neither intertextuality18 nor Harold
Bloom’s agonistic supersession (the ‘anxiety of
influence’),19 but rather the effort to reinhabit the
position of previous speakers. The lyric poem as a ‘script’,
to use Jonathan Culler’s term,20 could be reconsidered,
17 Francesco Giusti, Il desiderio della lirica. Poesia, creazione, conoscenza
(Rome: Carocci Editore, 2016), pp. 107–09.
18 The phenomenon I am sketching here does not coincide with intertex-
tuality as it has been variously defined after Julia Kristeva’s use of the
term in her 1966 ‘Word, Dialogue, and Novel’, in Desire in Language:
A Semiotic Approach to Literature and Art, ed. by Leon S. Roudiez,
trans. byThomas Gora, Alice Jardine, and Leon S. Roudiez (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1980), pp. 64–91. It neither dissolves the
text into a net of other texts nor implies that it is only the reader who
gives meaning to the text. Re-citation, in the sense I give to the term,
involves the negotiation of individual presence within a transhistorical
recurrence of lyric gestures, which are not necessarily translated into a
stable phrasing to be found in a specific text and then reused.
19 Harold Bloom, The Anxiety of Influence: A Theory of Poetry (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1973).
20 Jonathan Culler,Theory of the Lyric (Cambridge,MA:Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 2015), p. 187. Tied to actual subjects, the idea can already be
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in its transhistorical dimension, as a less rigid form. It is
not a text to be simply repeated, but rather a repertoire of
gestures and rhetorical structures that, depending on the
historical context of performance, may or may not come
already arranged in verbal fragments. Different historical
subjectivities can re-enact those gestures either in writing
or in reading.21 The verbal gesture performed in the poem
is thus recognized as still viable. Indeed, lyric speech asks
to be validated by its reader. For this reason, the lyric
is not the expression of an individual’s uniqueness, but
rather the partial renunciation of enclosed particularity
found in Helen Vendler, Poems, Poets, Poetry: An Introduction and An-
thology (Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 1997): ‘[A] lyric is meant to be
spoken by its reader as if the reader were the one uttering the words. A
lyric poem is a script for performance by its reader. It is, then, the most
intimate of genres, constructing a twinship between writer and reader.
And it is the most universal of genres, because it presumes that the
reader resembles the writer enough to step into the writer’s shoes and
speak the lines the writer has written as though they were the reader’s
own’ (pp. xl–xli). More than as an identification of two entities in ac-
cordance to a precise script, here the relationship is conceived as amore
flexible performance of two processes following shared gestures that
different subjectivities can perform without fully individuating them-
selves, therefore with no requirement of a complete assimilation. See
Daniel Morris, Lyric Encounters: Essays on American Poetry from Laz-
arus and Frost to Ortiz Cofer and Alexie (London: Bloomsbury, 2013),
pp. 1–2.
21 Paul Allen Miller, Lyric Texts and Lyric Consciousness: The Birth of
a Genre from Archaic Greece to Augustan Rome (London: Routledge,
1994) locates the birth of themodern lyric subject— ‘an individual and
highly self-reflexive subjective consciousness’ (p. 1) — in the writing
culture developed in Augustan Rome and in the context of the pro-
duction of authorial books of poetry. I would distinguish, as Dante
implicitly does in the Vita nova, between the potential openness of the
single poem, which offers a shareable subjective position of enunci-
ation, and the projection of a subject or individual identity brought
forth especially by the organized macrotext, which allows ‘recursive
modes of reading’ (p. 2).The friction between the iterable single poem
and the projection of an author, made possible by retrospective and
multitemporal (self)-reading, is what Dante explores in the Vita nova.
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in favour of an open mutuality.22 In the act of re-citing
a poem, the reader realizes a similarity of particularity
(the situational experience) and generality (the shareable
conditions). Although the act of speaking individuates the
lyric subjectivity by marking its dissimilarity, it also places
it within a potential transhistorical community. Instead of
isolating a subject in an auto-referential self-sufficiency,
the subjective position of lyric speaking may open to an
acknowledgement of proximity through time.
22 See Jay M. Bernstein, ‘Confession and Forgiveness: Hegel’s Poetics of
Action’, in Beyond Representation: Philosophy and Poetic Imagination,
ed. by Richard Eldridge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1996), pp. 34–65 (p. 48).

Revolution
Making a Break in History
ARIANNA SFORZINI
‘Revolution’ is a central concept in Western contempor-
ary philosophy. Since Kant, and then Hegel and Marx, the
term revolution has taken on a double meaning: (1) the
embodiment of freedom in history, the sign of the open-
ness of historical times, the ability to change, following the
free practical human nature, and to progress towards the
better; (2) the achievement of history itself — for example,
a proletarian revolution in Marxist thought, which will ac-
complish the destruction of the old world and create the
new communist era. Revolution is a capital turning point
in the history of humanity, realizing human freedom and
pushing it to its limits. When Kant, in his essay TheConflict
of the Faculties (1798), reflects on the revolution that can
be considered the beginning of the contemporary world
— the French Revolution — he transforms it, in its pure
revolutionary form, regardless of its historical context, re-
sults, or consequences, into a decisive moral and political
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sign. Is there any concrete moment in history that could in-
dicate, reliably, that humanity as a whole advances towards
improvement? Is there any historical event that proves pro-
gress in the moral world? For Kant, the French Revolution
is this sign of progress, not as a specific political transform-
ation but as a public event, filling the hearts of spectators
with enthusiasm, sympathetic participation, and faith in
the realization of justice. Revolution is the actualization of
freedom, and the utopia of its achievement beyond all time
and history.
The present contribution aims at analysing this double
meaning of the revolution as an ‘operational value in his-
tory’1 through a particular group of articles Michel Fou-
cault wrote and which have been more vigorously criti-
cized than any other part of his œuvre: the reporting he did
for Il Corriere della Sera during his two journeys to Iran in
September and November 1978. In these articles, Foucault
describes the revolts against the Shah’s regime and suggests
to read them against a certain understanding of the notion
of revolution, through a fascinating and, at the same time,
highly ambiguous concept: that of a ‘political spirituality’.2
I shall briefly analyse this notion, exploring its link to the
Western notion of revolution. I shall then argue that, des-
pite Foucault’s rejection of this notion, revolution is still
a very important concept to reactivate in order to think
1 Michel Foucault, The Government of Self and Others. Lectures at the
Collège de France, 1982–1983, trans. by G. Burchell (London: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2010), p. 20.
2 Michel Foucault, ‘À quoi rêvent les Iraniens?’ [1978], in Dits et écrits,
ed. by Daniel Defert, François Ewald and Jacques Lagrange, 2 vols
(Paris: Gallimard, 2001), ii: 1976–1988, text no. 245, p. 694: ‘Quel
sens, pour les hommes qui habitent [la terre d’Iran], à rechercher
au prix même de leur vie cette chose dont nous avons, nous autres,
oublié la possibilité depuis la Renaissance et les grandes crises du
christianisme: une spiritualité politique.’
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about the role and the possibility of political revolts and
freedom today.
The Foucault Archive at the Bibliothèque nationale
in Paris contains the complete set of documents Foucault
gathered during and after his Iranian journeys. 3 I was most
impressed by a journal of sorts Foucault kept while in Iran,
full of historical, political, and personal notes about the
country he was discovering. It shows a true journalistic
spirit; the reader can feel Foucault’s pleasure in discovering
a country on the verge of a major political transformation
and his desire to understand this historical turning point by
analysing the economic, geopolitical, and cultural situation
in Iran. He is not a philosopher looking at history from the
superior standpoint of abstract reason, but a witness and a
reporter giving voice to the historical fractures and forces
he encounters on the ground.
Foucault is definitely fascinated by what could be
called the ‘negative character’ of the Iranian revolt against
Reza Pahlavi: it was a popular uprising, originated in a
seemingly spontaneous way; there weren’t, at the begin-
ning, any main ideological directions, political parties, or
institutions to guide it; and still, the revolt was massive, un-
divided, and capable of a major disruption of the political
order. Foucault saw the rise of an entire unarmed people,
united by the only aim of ‘saying no to the Shah’. Before the
return of Khomeini, the Shiite Islamic voices went along
with the strong Marxist movement in Iran and other op-
position forces. The religious state was a political utopia
reconnecting with an idealized past, and Foucault couldn’t
imagine in 1978 that the revolt he was witnessing could re-
sult in an oppressive clerical regime. Most importantly, in
3 Michel Foucault Archives, Bibliothèque nationale de France, boîtes
50–50bis (NAF 28730).
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his articles, he refuses to speak of an Iranian ‘Revolution’:
this concept is for him ideologically charged, meaning a
historical violent riot led and used by a political party,
group, or class. One can say that Khomeini transformed
the Iranian revolt into a revolution, but what Foucault first
saw was a ‘soulèvement’: the simple and negative opening of
the possibility of a transformation in history; a disruption
of the concrete political situation making room for some-
thing new to arise.
Revolution organizes itself according to a temporal
economy: conditions, promises, necessities; it
resides thus in history, makes its bed in it, and
ultimately lies in it. The uprising [le soulèvement],
breaking the order of time, raises men upright
against their land and their humanity.4
Did Foucault underestimate the power of the Islamic
clergy? Definitely. But was Khomeini’s regime really the
only possible outcome of the revolt against the Shah? Yet
more importantly, even after the religious and despotic
turn in Iran, Foucault claimed the relevance of a notion
he first used in his Iranian reportage: that of a ‘political
spirituality’. It is clearly an ambiguous expression, one
which resulted at the end of the 1970s in a massive critique
of the French philosopher, accusing him to have indirectly
legitimated the Khomeinist regime. Actually, Foucault
was far from imagining the theocratic outcome of the
Iranian revolt. What he did see, however, was the massive
4 ‘La révolution s’organise selon toute une économie intérieure au temps:
des conditions, des promesses, des nécessités; elle loge donc dans
l’histoire, y fait son lit et finalement s’y couche. Le soulèvement,
coupant le temps, dresse les hommes à la verticale de leur terre et de
leur humanité.’ (‘Vivre autrement le temps’ [1979], in Dits et écrits, II:
text no. 267, pp. 788–90 (p. 790) [my translation]).
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potential of a revolt rooted in a religious and existential
dimension.
The importance of Foucault’s articles lies in the in-
sights they provide into the essential role Islam and its
‘political spirituality’ — Islam as a ‘political force’5 —
was and arguably is to play in the contemporary geopolit-
ical world. Foucault sees in the Iranian revolts and in the
revolutionary energy unleashed by their mobilization of
Islamic religion a new form of opposition to state power,
that is to say: to a modern Western political order, its army,
its police, its embassies. The Iranian revolt is, in Foucault’s
eyes, a ‘counter-behaviour’ to the governmentality of the
modern state. As such, it can serve as a privileged plat-
form for political observation and experimentation. The
Western-style ‘modernization’ coveted by the Shah and by
United States policy towards Iran is actually an attempt to
reproduce Eurocentric models of state organization. And
the revolts against these attempts are for Foucault ‘perhaps
the first great insurrection against global systems, the form
of revolt that is the most modern and the most insane’.6
In Iran, religion proves to be a force that is able to oppose
the existential and political constraints of the very modern
state whose history Foucault had so tirelessly reconstruc-
ted in order to find news ways to criticize it.
Foucault is aware that Islam risks becoming ‘a gigantic
powder-keg’ on a global scale.7 His statements are clearly
relevant today, in light of what has since happened in the
5 Michel Foucault, ‘Foucault’s Response to Atoussa H.’ [1978], trans. by
Karen deBruin andKevinB.Anderson, in JanetAfary andKevinB.An-
derson, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution: Gender and the Seductions
of Islamism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), p. 210.
6 Michel Foucault, ‘The Mythical Leader of the Iranian Revolt’ [1978],
trans. by Karen de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson, in Afary and Ander-
son, Foucault and the Iranian Revolution, pp. 220–23 (p. 222).
7 Michel Foucault, ‘A Powder Keg Called Islam’ [1979], trans. by Karen
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Middle East and in Europe: the rise of religious radicalism,
the increasing numbers of migrants fleeing conflicts in Is-
lamic countries, the West’s difficulties in intervening and
imposing its control and its security strategies. Foucault
interrogates the field of ethical-political subjectivation for
a Europe (a European way of conceiving of the state) that
is in decline and a West which is globalizing the world, yet
finds itself called into question by this very process of glob-
alization. Through his reflections on the particular case of
Iran, he raises the general question: beyond the European
identity crisis, how, and by means of what poles and rela-
tions, do we create political subjectivities?
Paradoxically enough, Foucault deploys a massive set
of knowledge about Iranian history and Islamic religion in
order to develop a strictly Eurocentric reflection on revolt
and revolution. Foucault said the Iranian revolt was not,
at its beginning, a revolution, as it was not dominated by
an ideology. And yet, it was a concrete example of what
revolution has meant in Western thought since Kant and
the French Revolution: the opening of new possibilities
in time and history, demanding a form of philosophical
discourse which is no longer the ahistorical investigation
of the universal conditions of human thought but the re-
sponse to actual political needs. Foucault’s various analyses
of Kant’s 1784 essay ‘An Answer to the Question: What
is Enlightenment’ prove this point: revolution has been,
for the contemporary Western world, the actual evidence
that history is an open process, through which it has to
rethink and test its forms of discourse, thought, and exist-
ence. Could Iran and its ‘revolt/revolution’ play the same
de Bruin and Kevin B. Anderson, in Afary and Anderson, Foucault and
the Iranian Revolution, pp. 239–41 (p. 241).
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role of critique for 1970s and 1980s Europe, and maybe for
today’s world?
Foucault’s controversial concept of ‘political spiritual-
ity’ must not be thought as a sort of apologetic of a political
power built on religion. Rather, it conveys the important
idea that a true political movement cannot exist unless it is
built on an existential transformation — that is the sense
of the notion of ‘spirituality’ used by Foucault later, in the
1980s, to indicate the exercises of the self. In all likeli-
hood, Foucault stresses the fact that religion is (and has
been in Western history) a massive political force also stra-
tegically, against the French doctrine of laicism as a sort
of ‘anaesthetization’ of the political sphere. The real ques-
tion Foucault poses to the present moment would then
be: are political spirituality and revolution possible out-
side ideological dogmas? Which political energy can be
deployed today that is rooted in existential practices and
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